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Robert Kyle Driggers: Spinoza’s Metaphysics from the Human Perspective 
(Under the direction of Alan Nelson) 
In this dissertation, I argue that Spinoza intended his metaphysics to be understood 
from the “human perspective.” On my interpretation, Spinoza’s theory about the fundamental 
nature of reality—his theory of God’s attributes—is intended to render reality wholly 
intelligible to human beings. This interpretation contrasts sharply with the vast majority of 
interpretations of Spinoza’s metaphysics. According to most readers, Spinoza took God to 
have humanly uncognizable attributes, or, aspects of reality that humans cannot cognize. This 
commitment threatens the coherence of Spinoza’s philosophy. 
First, I argue that my Human Perspective Interpretation is licensed by Spinoza’s 
text—most interpreters take his text to mandate a God’s Perspective Interpretation on which 
there are humanly uncognizable aspects of reality. I argue that an exhaustive textual analysis 
reveals that there is no such mandate. Second, I argue that Spinoza’s theory of God’s 
attributes is a theory about the different ways we conceive God and not a theory about God’s 
intrinsic nature. The attributes, in other words, are only conceptually distinct from God. 
Finally, I argue that we ought to prefer the Human Perspective Interpretation because God’s 
Perspective Interpretations commit Spinoza to the view that he could not understand his own 
metaphysics. Ultimately, if Spinoza’ project of assisting humans in attaining contentment of 
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The following chapters examine the role that the human perspective plays in Baruch 
Spinoza’s philosophy. There is a common question in the background of each article: who is 
Spinoza’s philosophy for? Is it an attempt to give a systematic account of the nature of 
reality, insofar as human beings understand it? Or is it an attempt to tell us what there “really 
is” beyond that perspective, or from God’s perspective? In each article, I argue that Spinoza’s 
philosophy is for us. It is intended to guide us to clear and certain knowledge of the nature of 
reality, from our unique vantage on it. To illustrate the themes of these articles, I invite the 
reader to participate in an imaginative exercise.
 
2. Becoming Acquainted with the “Human Perspective”  
Imagine that you are Spinoza, writing down the propositions, demonstrations, scholia that 
constitute your masterwork, the Ethics. Your expressed goal in writing the Ethics, and indeed 
in pursuing philosophy in general, is to assist your readers in attaining blessedness.1 By 
                                               
1 See e.g., the appendix to Part I and the preface to Part II and Part V of the Ethics.  
At 2P49s, Spinoza writes, 
Insofar as it teaches that we act only from God's command, that we share in the divine nature, and that 
we do this the more, the more perfect our actions are, and the more and more we understand God. This 
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“blessedness,” you mean a state of being where people are as free as possible from fear, 
confusion, hatred, and come to see the value of fellow feeling and rational decision-making. 
You believe that this eminently valuable practical goal is best achieved by rendering the 
world intelligible to your readers. “If people had clear and certain knowledge of the true
 nature of things, they could learn to moderate their negative emotions and learn to love the 
world rather than fear or hate it” is your guiding thought. 
 The most foundational part of the clear and certain knowledge you wish to impart to 
your readers your knowledge of the nature of God. God, after all, is the foundation on which 
everything else rests. To attain this knowledge, you decide to abandon what your 
imagination—your sense perception, memory, language—and the imaginations of others 
have told you about God. After all, you believe that imagination cannot give you clear and 
certain knowledge of anything.2 Instead, you decide to use your intellect, the active faculty in 
your mind responsible for clarifying and ordering your thoughts, to determine what God is.  
Your intellect gives you a radically different understanding of God than is taught in 
religious circles.3 Reflection on the essence of God leads you to believe that God is not a 
                                               
doctrine, then, in addition to giving us complete peace of mind, also teaches us wherein our greatest 
happiness, or blessedness, consists: viz. in the knowledge of God alone, by which we are led to do only 
those things which love and morality advise. From this we clearly understand how far they stray from 
the true valuation of virtue, who expect to be honored by God with the greatest rewards for their virtue 
and best actions, as for the greatest bondage—as if virtue itself, and the service of God, were not 
happiness itself, and the greatest freedom (II/135/34). 
In TIE, Spinoza writes,  
Everyone will now be able to see that I wish to direct all the sciences toward one end †e and goal, viz. 
that we should achieve, as we have said, the highest human perfection. So anything in the sciences 
which does nothing to advance us toward our goal must be rejected as useless—in a word, all our 
activities and thoughts are to be directed to this end (16, II/9/13). 
2 E.g., 1App. (II/81/34-II/84) 
3 This is a recurring theme of the TTP, especially chapters 4-11. Also, 1App, passim. 
 
 14 
superhuman being. God is not an infinitely merciful, compassionate being who has 
constructed a world unfolding according to a grand, anthropocentric narrative. Your intellect 
reveals that God, far from being a compassionate governor of and tinkerer with Nature, is in 
fact identical to Nature. God, you argue across the course of Part I and Part II of the Ethics, is 
the sole substance, the sole being that is the cause of itself and that depends on nothing else 
for its existence (1P14). Everything else—your mind, your body, the minds and bodies of 
fellow people, and indeed all of creation—ultimately depends on God for its existence. In 
fact, you come to see, everything that isn’t God is just a “mode” of God or way that God is. 
 Your intellect has led you to reject the traditional theology of your contemporaries. 
Your God is not human-like in any interesting sense. But, this leads you to the question: what 
is God, essentially? What distinguishes God from everything else? Though you have realized 
that the old imaginative conceptions of God are flawed, you do not yet have a clear and 
distinct idea of what God actually is. To answer this question, you do not begin by 
investigating God’s essence directly. It’s not clear to you how to go about that. Instead, you 
start with what you are sure you know and see if you can arrive at certain knowledge of 
God’s essence by reflecting on that. 
 You are certain that you think and that you feel the effects of a body (2A2, 2A4). You 
also know that you are not a self-sufficient thing: you did not create yourself and you will 
eventually perish (2P10). You reason that if you are a material and thinking thing, then you 
must depend on other material and thinking things. It first occurs to you that your body 
depends on a number of smaller bodies at any given time, and on various bodies across time. 
The same is true of your mind and its ideas: they all seem to depend on other ideas for their 
existence. And you realize that the same is true for all other modes of God: they are either 
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thinking or extended things that depend on other thinking and extended things for their 
existence. You realize that these chains of dependence cannot go on forever: there must be 
something on which all of the thinking and extended things depend: an infinite thinking and 
extended substance.  You call this God. And you say that God therefore has the “attributes” 
of Thought and Extension.4 
 Though you prefer to talk in terms “God’s attributes,” you realize that you are no 
longer describing the essence of some divine being. You use the term “attributes” to describe 
Nature in the most general, fundamental terms. To say that God has the attributes of Thought 
and Extension entails that everything is either an extended thing or a thinking thing.       
 As far as you can tell, these are the only attributes that God has. Your proofs that God 
has these attributes began with reflection on your own experience of God. And you started 
with the certainty that you had a mind and body. However, you are also certain that you are 
aware of nothing other than thinking and extended things. There is not some third or fourth 
kind of thing that you can cognize (2A5). You would say that these are the “limits” of your 
experience, but you have no idea what could be on the other side of those “limits.”5 
 Therefore, you find yourself unable to prove that any “other attributes” belong to 
God, that is, attributes distinct from Thought and Extension. In fact, you can’t even conceive 
what another “attribute” would be. This does not stop you from having the occasional 
inchoate feeling that there must be more to God than these two attributes: sometimes, when 
you are not thinking as clearly as you normally do, it strikes you as arbitrary that God would 
                                               
4 The preceding is an interpretation of the reasoning given for 2P1 and 2P2, which establish that God has the 
attributes of Thought and Extension. 
5 This claim will be explored in Chapter 3. The idea is that we cannot understand what would be “on the other 
side” because we understand everything via Thought or Extension (1P10, 2A5, Ep 63-66).  
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have two rather than three or four attributes.6 But for the life of you, you cannot convert this 
feeling into knowledge by conceiving of what “those” attributes might be and whether or not 
they might exist. Perhaps God knows what they are and whether they exist, but you are not 
God and you can’t make clear sense of what it would be for God to know other attributes.  
At best, you can describe God as you understand God. Whether or not that’s the way 
that God “really” or “objectively” is, or the way that God is for some other different kind of 
being, is not an issue for you. (It’s not clear to you what these words in scare quotes could 
mean in the first place.) After all, you cannot escape your own perspective: you cannot 
survey the world from God’s vantage point, just like you cannot survey the world from the 
standpoint of another human being. So, you avoid including speculations and commitments 
about how God understands things in your writings.  
3. The Human Perspective, Characterized 
What you have been imagining along with Spinoza is how God is understood from what I 
call the “human perspective”: from the “inside” of the mind of a human trying to form clear 
and certain knowledge of God. If we read Spinoza from this perspective, we understand 
Spinoza’s task in constructing his theory of God and God’s attributes is to render the God 
intelligible to human beings. The resulting theory he defends is a description of God insofar 
as human beings experience and understand God. 
Insofar as Spinoza philosophizes from the human perspective, he never endorses 
positions—positive or negative—about aspects of reality (attributes) that he takes himself to 
be unable to cognize. And he never does so because he is aware that his theory about the 
                                               
6 E.g., Note d of KV/I/i  at I/17/40-I/18. 
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nature and “limits” of human thought places restrictions on his theory about the nature of 
God. In general, Spinoza never endorses commitments pertaining to the existence or nature 
of things that he cannot conceive when his ideas are at their most clear and distinct. 
3.1. The Cognizability Condition  
The chapters in this dissertation defend an interpretation of Spinoza’s theory of God’s 
attributes, on which that theory was constructed from the human perspective. It is the central 
thesis of this interpretation that Spinoza’s theory of God’s attributes does not violate what I 
will refer to as the Cognizability Condition. 
Cognizability Condition Everything is cognizable by human beings. 
 Nearly all of Spinoza’s interpreters disagree with this central thesis.7 That is, they 
assume that Spinoza believed in the existence of aspects of reality that humans cannot 
cognize. According to the majority of Spinoza’s readers, God has attributes other than 
Thought and Extension that humans cannot cognize.   
Interpretations that violate the Cognizability Condition result from approaching 
Spinoza’s metaphysics from a different perspective. These interpretations approach 
Spinoza’s metaphysics from what I will refer to as “God’s Perspective.”8 On these 
interpretations, Spinoza’s theory of the attributes attempts to describe God from a God’s own 
                                               
7 See Chapter 1 for a lengthy citation of all of those interpreters who understand Spinoza to deny the Condition.  
8 I have slightly modified Putnam’s (1990) term, “God’s-Eye View” here. Nagel (1986) refers to this perspective 
as The View from Nowhere. Moore (2000) refers to the capacity to form an “absolute representation” from no 
point of view. I do not wish to engage in psychoanalysis of rival interpreters. When I say that these 
interpretations “result” from doing philosophy from God’s Perspective, I mean to say that their interpretations 
are only coherent if we assume that they ignore the constraints on human cognition proposed by Spinoza when 
trying to understand Spinoza’s metaphysics.    
 
 18 
perspective: from the perspective of an infinite being with perfect knowledge of everything. 
Another imaginative exercise will make what I mean by “God’s Perspective” clear. 
4. Becoming Acquainted with “God’s Perspective”  
Imagine that you are Spinoza, writing down the various propositions, demonstrations, and 
scholia of the Ethics. Your primary goal in the first two parts of the Ethics is to describe God 
as God “really is,” and not just as some select group of finite creatures understand God. 
Insofar as it is possible, you want to take on God’s perspective, because only God can have 
total knowledge of God’s own essence. Your human experience and understanding of God is 
embarrassingly limited and prone to error in various ways. At best, the limitations of your 
mind can provide only a partial or corrupted understanding of everything. Only an infinite 
being could give a “wholly objective,” account of God. This account will of course include a 
story about how things appear from the myopic perspective of a human, but that will be only 
a small part of the account. The whole account could show that the human perspective has a 
partial understanding or maybe even a systematic illusion about the true nature of things.9 
 Somehow, you manage to channel God’s perspective, or you dissemble to your 
readers that you can. Your various metaphysical positions suggest that you are able to get a 
glimpse into the way that the world “really is” from the divine vantage solely by relying on a 
priori reflection that begins in your meager experience. Some future person named Immanuel 
Kant will criticize you at length for this method of proceeding.10 After all, how could 
                                               
9 An “Objective Interpretation” would hold that we have a partial understanding of God because we understand 
only two of God’s infinitely many attributes. A “Subjective Interpretation” would hold that what we call 
“attributes” are not part of God’s “real essence.” These interpretations, both of which I call “God’s Perspective 
Interpretations” will be discussed throughout this dissertation.  
10 See the First and Third Antinomies in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Also, Chapters 2 and 3 of Boehm. 
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reflection on your experience that is limited by the nature of your cognition be used to 
channel the infinite divine perspective? How were you able to transcend your own cognitive 
limitations to see the world as it “really is”? You never say. Perhaps, this is because you did 
not think carefully enough about whether your metaphysical project was ruled out as 
unthinkable by your theory of your own cognition. 
 In any case, because you are somehow able to glimpse the world from God’s 
perspective, you speculate and make commitments to the existence of things that you could 
not cognize when you adopted the human perspective.  
For example, when you remained within the human perspective, you were able to 
understand God only as an essentially thinking and extended substance.  From your higher 
vantage, however, your former belief that God has only these two attributes seems like 
epistemic chauvinism. Because God is an infinite being with infinite attributes (1D6), you 
argue, God must have more than a finite number of attributes. You can tell this much about 
them: they exist, and they are uncognizable to human beings. There are presumably other 
alien creatures that are modes of these alien attributes too, though you will never know them 
and they don’t even suspect your existence. Your communion with the divine perspective is 
still limited, the rest of the details about these alien attributes and creatures are hazy. 
Or perhaps, if another interpretation is right, you might come to say that what you 
called “attributes” do not constitute God’s essence after all! You discover that God has an 
essence that is radically different than any human being could have conceived. For humans, 
God is an essentially hidden and mysterious being. All of the best human attempts to 
represent God are pitiful failures. Humans misperceive God as a thinking and extended 
substance, but this is not how God represents itself. You see now that God has a “real 
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essence” that human beings cannot grasp. From this point of view, you see that the attributes 
are merely subjective illusions. 
 Regardless of what you see from God’s perspective, you discover that the large part 
of the truth about God’s “real nature” is otiose for your stated practical purposes.11 Because 
your main goal in the first two parts of the Ethics was to represent the world “objectively” or 
to see how it “really” is beyond the human perspective, you must ignore large parts of your 
metaphysical theory when constructing your theory of the human mind and its affects.12 And 
your bizarre visions of alien creatures or ineffable essences deserve no mention when you 
promise other humans that the path to the good life requires seeing things as they “really 
are.” In short, you make no effort to integrate central theses in your metaphysical theory into 
your overall ethical project.  
 As my description of the God’s Perspective approach suggests, I believe that this 
approach to Spinoza’s metaphysics has inescapable shortcomings. Nevertheless, some 
version of this approach is adopted almost without exception in the secondary literature on 
Spinoza’s theory of God’s attributes. If I am right, and the God’s Perspective approach 
radically misunderstands Spinoza’s most fundamental views on the nature of God, then we 
need to explicate and defend an alternative.  
                                               
11 And not for your theoretical purposes, either. I agree with Bennett, who writes, 
The situation regarding the proposition that there are more than two attributes is this: Spinoza was 
under no pressure to assert it, nothing in the Ethics unquestionably means it, none of the work’s 
structures reflects it, and if it were added to the Ethics and fully developed it would create an 
impossible problem for Spinoza’s epistemology. (78) 
12 Indeed, even if Spinoza believed in “other attributes,” he does not refer to them in Part III-V of the Ethics, 
where the psychology and explicit discussion of blessedness is contained.  
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5. The “Objective” and “Subjective” Interpretations 
It is typical for interpreters to believe that they must choose between an “Objective” or 
“Subjective” Interpretation of Spinoza’s theory of God’s attributes.  On the latter, the 
attributes are what we humans perceive of God’s essence. However, our perceptions are 
illusory: God is not essentially what we perceive God to be. On the former, the human 
intellect’s perception of God’s essence is accurate, but partial. The attributes are what God 
perceives of God’s own essence and the finite human perception of God’s essence is accurate 
in virtue of that fact. 
 The nearly unquestioned consensus in current Spinoza scholarship is that some 
version of the Objective Interpretation is correct. In addition, every Objectivist that I am 
aware of also believes that God has more attributes than the ones that human beings perceive. 
There are “other attributes” in addition to Thought and Extension—infinitely many of them. 
While not required by the mere “Objectivity” of the attributes, it is typically understood to be 
idealistic or at least unduly anthropocentric to think that God has just the two attributes 
known to humans.13 
 The Objective/Subjective dichotomy does not exhaust our interpretative options. I 
suggest that we instead think in terms of the dichotomy between God’s Perspective and 
Human Perspective Interpretations. This dichotomy reveals a crucial overlap between the 
Objective and Subjective interpretations: they both have Spinoza violating the Cognizability 
Condition. In other words, I will argue, both of these interpretations commit Spinoza to the 
view that there are aspects of reality that are uncognizable to human beings. For one class of 
                                               
13 For example, see Newlands (2012). 
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Objectivists, it is the “other attributes;” for another class it is also “attribute-neutral” or 
“trans-attribute” features; for Subjectivists it is God’s “real essence.” In contrast, the Human 
Perspective Interpretation begins with the interpretative hypothesis that Spinoza commits 
only to humanly cognizable aspects of reality because that is all he can commit to. 
6. The Human Perspective Interpretation, stated 
Let me now state the commitments of the Human Perspective Interpretation in more 
technical terms. On the Human Perspective Interpretation, the attributes are what we 
accurately perceive of God’s essence. We perceive God to be thinking and extended 
substance and nothing else. We cannot make sense of what another “attribute” would be, so a 
commitment to God’s having “that” attribute would be nonsensical. This is consistent with 
God’s having infinite attributes. When Spinoza says that God has “infinite attributes,” he 
means that God unlimited attributes. In other words, God lacks no attribute.  
Furthermore, on the Human Perspective Interpretation, God is identical to God’s 
attributes. The attributes are not aspects or properties of God, they are God. At the heart of 
Spinoza’s theory of the attributes is a theory about what Descartes called the “conceptual 
distinction” between God and its attributes. On my interpretation, Spinoza’s view is that the 
attributes (Thought and Extension) are only distinguished from each other and from God by 
the human intellect. In reality, God and God’s attributes are identical.  
Spinoza uses the names for the distinct attributes to indicate the distinct ways humans 
can conceive God. One way of conceiving God is as an infinite thinking thing; one is as an 
infinite extended thing. Both ways of conceiving God are “cognitive routes” to the same 
idea: an idea in each human mind of a single, infinite substance. These paths do not cross: we 
can conceive the attributes as “really distinct” because we cannot conceive thinking things in 
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terms of extended things and vice versa. We realize, however, that there can be no 
corresponding distinction in God. 
7. Why the Human Perspective Interpretation? 
It seems to me that the Human Perspective Interpretation makes better sense of Spinoza’s 
decision to call his masterwork the Ethics. Spinoza clearly intended his work to be beneficial 
to human beings, and so our perspective on the work ought to play a central role. It also 
seems to me that the Human Perspective Interpretation better captures the systematicity of 
the Ethics. Because the Ethics gives us a theory of human cognition, it also gives us a theory 
about what it is to understand a work of philosophy. If the Ethics presents a system of 
philosophy, the system ought not say of itself that the system cannot be understood by its 
audience. On the Human Perspective Interpretation, Spinoza’s system itself is cognizable by 
humans, according to the system’s account of human cognition.  
However, these are not the sole reasons for adopting the Human Perspective 
Interpretation. I will argue that the Human Perspective Interpretation is preferable because 
(1) it makes better sense of Spinoza’s text in the Ethics and other works than the God’s 
Perspective Interpretations and (2) because it avoids a number of philosophical problems 
endemic to the God’s Perspective Interpretations.  
8. The Chapters to Follow 
In “Spinoza’s Theory of the Attributes: A Textual Analysis,” I will argue that the Human 
Perspective Interpretation is consistent with Spinoza’s text. Most of Spinoza’s interpreters 
assume that his text requires a God’s Perspective Interpretation. I argue that Spinoza’s text 
not only fails to mandate such an interpretation but actually favors the Human Perspective 
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Interpretation. This lengthy textual analysis will focus largely on the textual questions of how 
Spinoza uses the notion of an “attribute” and related notions throughout his text and on 
whether he committed to humanly uncognizable attributes. 
In “The Identity of Substance and its Distinct Attributes in Spinoza,” I will defend the 
Human Perspective Interpretation’s account of the relationship between God and God’s 
attributes in Spinoza. The account answers this fundamental question: how can one, simple 
substance (God) be identical to two “really distinct” attributes? On the Human Perspective 
Interpretation, Spinoza believes that a substance and its attributes are only conceptually 
distinct. We can conceive God either as a thinking and extended thing, but we can understand 
that this distinction does not “divide” God in anyway.  
In “Could Spinoza Understand his own Theory of God’s Attributes?” I will argue that 
God’s Perspective Interpretations commit Spinoza to the belief that he could not understand 
his own theory of God’s attributes. It is not possible, on Spinoza’s account of the nature of 
human cognition, for humans to cognize commitments to the existence of uncognizable 




CHAPTER 1: SPINOZA’S THEORY OF THE ATTRIBUTES: A TEXTUAL 
ANALYSIS 
1. Introduction 
What is God? According to Spinoza, we must answer this question before we can answer any 
others. Spinoza’s answer is simple and heterodox: God is not a superhuman being. God is not 
essentially an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent being separate from Nature. 
Instead, God just is Nature. Because Spinoza’s God just is Nature, Spinoza’s theory of God’s 
attributes is really a theory about the fundamental nature of reality. According to Spinoza, 
God has the attributes of Thought and Extension: in other words, Nature is characterized 
fundamentally as mental and material.  
How do I know this, according to Spinoza? I know that I am a thinking thing (a mind) 
and a material thing (a body) and furthermore I know that I ultimately depend on God to 
exist. So, it must be that God too is a thinking and material thing.  
 I will refer to Spinoza’s account of what God essentially is as his theory of God’s 
attributes, or simply as the theory of the attributes, since there are no beings with attributes 
except for God. One of the most important and difficult projects in the scholarship on 
Spinoza’s metaphysics is understanding the theory of the attributes. The debates over the 
nature of God’s attributes and their relationship to God are really debates about how to 




 Spinoza’s theory of God’s attributes is Spinoza’s attempt to render God intelligible to 
human beings. The main goal of Spinoza’s metaphysics, after all, is to rid our conception of 
the world of mystery and confusion because these are two central, and ultimately avoidable, 
causes of human misery. Remarkably, almost all of Spinoza’s interpreters understand 
Spinoza’s theory of the attributes to simultaneously reveal God to be infinitely mysterious—
that is, infinitely uncognizable to human beings.  
 On the so-called Subjective Interpretation, the “attributes” are our mistaken 
perceptions of God’s “real essence.”14 On this view, Spinoza begins with the assumption that 
we cannot comprehend God and then goes on to describe what we mistakenly comprehend 
about God. Perhaps only the creator of the Subjective Interpretation, Wolfson thought it was 
the best interpretation. 
Instead, is currently mandatory in Spinoza scholarship to assume our perceptions of 
God’s essence are at least partially accurate.15 On the Objective Interpretation, we rightly 
understand God to be a thinking and extended thing. Nearly every supporter of an Objective 
                                               
14 The distinction between “Objective” and “Subjective” interpretations was introduced by Wolfson 
(1934,v.1,146). 
15 The following is a partial list of supporters of the Objective Interpretation, each of whom is cited at the end of 
this dissertation: Allison, Ariew, Bennett, Curley, Delahunty, Deleuze, Della Rocca, Donagan, Garrett, 
Gueroult, Haserot, Huebner, Joachim, Laerke, Lin, Martens, Melamed, Morrison, Nadler, Newlands, Parkinson, 
Radner. 
As Shein (511, n.12) notes, there are various ways one can be an “Objectivist”: one can think that the distinction 
among the attributes is objective and one can think that the distinction between substance and attribute is 
objective. I will use the term to refer to anyone who believes that these distinctions are drawn in God’s intellect 
and not merely in the human intellect. One is forced to be an “objectivist” if they believe that God has attributes 
other than Thought and Extension. This might lead one to ask: could one be an Objectivist and think that there 
are only two attributes? Technically, this is an available option in conceptual space, but it would be odd for 
Spinoza to hold such a position. It would be, after all, highly anthropocentric, and (in a pejorative sense) 




Interpretation also believes that Spinoza took God to have other, humanly uncognizable 
attributes. In addition to Thought and Extension, the attributes we can cognize, Spinoza’s 
God has an infinite collection of “other attributes” that we cannot cognize, on the Objective 
Interpretation.  
 I consider both the Objective and Subjective Interpretations to be what I’ll call God’s 
Perspective Interpretations. On both of these interpretations, Spinoza’s theory of the 
attributes is not a theory about God as God is understood by human beings. Instead, the 
theory explains how God understands God’s own essence. The task of Spinoza’s theory and 
indeed of his entire metaphysical system is to give an account of what God “really” or 
“objectively” is, apart from how God is understood from any finite perspective. Only from 
this transcendental perspective could Spinoza entertain the possibility that there are aspects 
of reality that humans cannot cognize.  
Even if Spinoza’s answer to the question “What is God?” is not mysterious to God, it 
ought to seem mysterious to us. However, we could forgive Spinoza of flirting with 
mysticism if his commitment to God’s being mostly incomprehensible is required by a 
correct answer to the question “What is God?” However, as many interpreters who adopt the 
God’s Perspective Interpretations readily admit, Spinoza’s commitment to God’s 
uncognizability is blatantly inconsistent with some of his other central metaphysical 
doctrines. 
 For example, the Subjective Interpretation both requires that we cannot understand 
God at all and that the “attributes” give us knowledge of God’s essence. Spinoza explicitly 
says that “The human Mind has adequate knowledge of God's eternal and infinite essence.” 
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(2P47) How can we have knowledge of God’s essence in the form of “merely subjective” 
attributes? 
 On the Objective Interpretation, Spinoza’s so-called “parallelism” of mind and body 
is incoherent. Spinoza argues at 2P7 that the modes of God’s different attributes are “one and 
the same,” albeit understood under different attributes. For example, my mind and body are 
“one and the same,” but my mind is conceived via Thought and my body is conceived via 
Extension. This suggests that each attribute will have exactly the same quantity of modes. 
However, Spinoza also argues that there is an idea of each “thing” in God’s intellect. (To put 
it less technically, God understands everything.) This suggests that there is a mode of 
Thought corresponding to each mode of every attribute. There are therefore modes of 
Thought corresponding to not only the modes of Extension, but also modes of Thought 
corresponding to modes of each of the infinitely many “other” attributes. This is plainly 
inconsistent with the claim that each attribute has the same quantity of modes as any other.16 
I have argued elsewhere that the God’s Perspective Interpretations also require 
Spinoza to believe that neither he nor his audience can understand the theory of the attributes 
in the first place.17 That is, Spinoza’s very commitment to God’s uncognizability is itself 
uncognizable to human beings because Spinoza’s theory of human cognition says that we 
                                               
16 At least one of Spinoza’s contemporaries, Tschirnhaus, was aware of this problem (Ep 70, IV/299/23-27). 
Unfortunately, Spinoza did not respond to this concern in the letters we have.  See also Curley (1969, 145-147), 
Melamed (2013, 153-162). This metaphysical problem is sometimes conflated with an epistemological problem 
discussed by Tschirnhaus in Ep 63 and 65. In those letters, Tschirnhaus asks: if there are infinitely many 
attributes, why do we know of only two of them? Bennett (78) worries that Spinoza cannot adequately answer 
this question and Melamed (ibid.) dedicates most of his interpretative work on the attributes to answering this 
question. In Chapter 3, I give an explicit reconstruction that answers this question. The answer I give can be 
borrowed by an Objectivist, as it does not presuppose my own interpretation. So, I do not think that the 
epistemological problem is the main problem for Spinoza on these readings. I take the metaphysical problem 
mentioned in the body of this chapter to be unresolvable by Objectivists.  
17 See Chapter 3. 
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cannot understand his theory of God’s attributes, at least if the God’s Perspective 
Interpretation is correct. 
 Why, then, would any charitable reader adopt a God’s Perspective Interpretation? 
Shouldn’t we, upon seeing these obvious inconsistencies, suspect that we are confused about 
Spinoza’s metaphysics? 
 I suspect that a defender of a God’s Perspective Interpretation, especially the 
Objective Interpretation, will appeal to the “overwhelming” textual case in favor of their 
interpretation.18 It is largely taken for granted that Spinoza, whether explicitly or implicitly, 
says that he believes in the problematic doctrines I’ve alluded to. “Perhaps Spinoza’s theory 
would be more plausible if he accepted that God is wholly cognizable by humans, but he says 
quite the opposite,” they might say. “Though it is important to charitably interpret Spinoza, 
we cannot ignore the fact that his text mandates a God’s Perspective Interpretation.”  
In this paper, I will argue that this supposed textual mandate is an illusion. Spinoza’s 
text is consistent with an alternative interpretation, which I call the Human Perspective 
Interpretation. On this interpretation, Spinoza took God to be wholly cognizable by human 
beings. God’s only attributes, therefore, are the ones that humans cognize: Thought and 
Extension. 
 In the following textual analysis, I have tried to identify every text that seems to 
mandate a God’s Perspective Interpretation, especially the Objective Interpretation. In each 
case, I will argue that the text (or collection of texts) fails to mandate the God’s Perspective 
Interpretation because either (1) the God’s Perspective reading of the text is implausible or 
                                               
18 See especially Melamed (forthcoming), but also Haserot. I should note that post-Haserot and Gueroult, no 
interpreters I’m aware of endorse the Subjective Interpretation. I will give the textual evidence against it here 
mainly to distinguish it from the Human Perspective Interpretation and to give an exhaustive textual analysis.  
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(2) the text is consistent with the Human Perspective Interpretation.19  My ultimate aim in this 
paper is not to show that the text mandates the Human Perspective Interpretation, only to 
show that regarding the texts, it is at least as plausible an interpretation God’s Perspective 
Interpretation. 
 I will consider a variety of sources of textual evidence. In some cases, I will point to 
direct evidence, like an instance where Spinoza seems to explicitly commit to a doctrine that 
is inconsistent with my interpretation. In others, I will construct indirect arguments based on 
texts related to but not strictly a part of the theory of the attributes. 
The following analysis is divided into three sections, each corresponding to the three 
relevant collections of textual evidence for this interpretative dispute. The first section asks 
whether the text says that theory of the attributes is a theory of how we understand God or 
how God understands God. The second asks whether Spinoza’s commitment to the “infinity” 
of God’s attributes is consistent with God’s having only two. The third asks whether 
Spinoza’s use of the phrase “other attributes” in various texts amounts to a commitment to 
“their” existence. 
 Before I jump into the textual analysis, let me clarify the core doctrines that divide the 
God’s Perspective and Human Perspective Interpretations’ accounts of Spinoza’s 
metaphysics. 
                                               
19 I mean to use the inclusive “or” here. In many cases, the God’s Perspective reading is implausible and the 
Human Perspective Reading is plausible. 
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2. God’s Perspective vs. Human Perspective Interpretations 
We can divide the interpretations at play here based on their interpretation of two definitions 
that are central to Spinoza’s theory of the attributes.  
2.1. The Definition of “Attribute” 
1D4: By attribute I understand what intellect perceives of a substance, as constituting its 
essence.20 
There are three ambiguities in 1D4 that interest us here.21 
1. Which “intellect” is being referred to here? 
2. Is the perception of God’s essence accurate or misguided? 
3. For whom is “attribute” being defined? 
2.1.1. Which Intellect? 
There are three ways we could understand “intellect” in Spinoza’s definition of “attribute.” 
First, “intellect” could be referring to God’s intellect. The attributes, then, are what God 
perceives of God’s own essence. This is the reading given by the Objective Interpretation: 
our perception of God’s attributes is accurate because is aligns with God’s own perception of 
God’s attributes. Second, “intellect” could refer to the human intellect and not God’s. In 
other words, the attributes are what we perceive of God’s essence, but God does not perceive 
                                               
20 I depart from Curley’s translation slightly here. Curley includes the English article “the” alongside “intellect,” 
which might suggest that the attributes are what a single intellect (presumably God’s, given his Objectivism) 
perceives of substance. Removing the article (which is of course not present in the Latin) leaves open the 
possibility that “intellect” is left as referring neutrally to any intellect.  
21 Haserot points out three ambiguities, the first two of which are included here. Haserot (501-502) also notes 
that one can read the Latin as “By attribute I understand that which the intellect, as constituting the essence of 
sub- stance, perceives of substance.” I do not mention this ambiguity because Haserot rightly argues that it 
would be incoherent: an intellect (a mode) cannot be the essence of substance. 
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God’s essence as constituted by those attributes. This is the reading given by the Subjective 
Interpretation.22 Finally, we could understand “intellect” as not being tacitly specified as 
belonging either just to God or just to humans. On this reading, the attributes are what any 
intellect (including both God’s and ours) perceives of God’s essence. However, the focal 
meaning of “intellect” is the human intellect, which picks up the essences of God in adequate 
ideas. The Human Perspective Interpretation adopts this reading for reasons that will become 
clearer in Section 2.1.3.   
2.1.2. Is the “perception” accurate? 
One’s interpretative choice among the “intellects” discussed in 2.1.1. will partially determine 
one’s interpretative choice about the accuracy of the intellect’s perception. The ambiguity 
over the accuracy of “intellect’s” perception of God’s essence is partially an ambiguity of the 
Latin word tanquam that Spinoza uses in 1D4. Spinoza writes, “intellectus de substantia 
percipit, tanquam ejusdem essentiam constituens.” Tanquam can be translated either as “as” 
or as “as if” in English, with the former implying accuracy and the latter implying illusion.  
According to the Subjective Interpretation, tanquam is to be translated “as if” because 
the human intellect’s perception of God’s essence does not align with God’s perception of 
God’s essence. The attributes are perceived “as if” they belong to God, but “really” they do 
                                               
22 As we see in Haserot, the choice of “intellect” is largely motivated by whether or not believes that God has 
more than two attributes. If God has more than the humanly cognizable attributes, 1D4 must be read with the 
“infinite intellect” reading. Wolfson, however, motivates the Subjective reading along both textual and 
historical grounds (v.1, 112-21, 142-57). Apart from the textual grounds discussed in this chapter, Wolfson 
argues that the “human intellect only” reading is required by the apparent inconsistency of God having more 
than two “objective” attributes and being simple (1P12, 1P13). Wolfson worries (rightly) that we cannot 
reconcile the “real distinction” between attributes with their identity with a simple substance. His solution is to 
argue that the “attributes” are just different names for God that do not adequately capture God’s essence. 
Wolfson takes this interpretative decision to be licensed by a thread he sees from medieval Jewish philosophers 
like Maimonides and Crescas to Spinoza. The latter connection is also explored in Melamed (2014). I will not 
address this apparent historical case for God’s Perspective Interpretations because it will be far less convincing 
if Spinoza’s text can be shown to be consistent with a Human Perspective Interpretation.  
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not. According to the Objective Interpretation, tanquam is to be translated as “as,” because 
God’s intellect is not subject to illusion.  
The Human Perspective Interpretation likewise adopts the “as” translation of tanquam, 
but not for the reasons that the Objectivist might give. On this interpretation, the accuracy of 
the intellect’s perception is not grounded in aligning God’s own perception. Instead, the 
claim is that the attributes are what the intellect perceives of the essence of God, when the 
intellect is perceiving things adequately. The accuracy of the intellect amounts to intrinsic 
features of its ideas: when the intellect has a clear and distinct idea of God, it perceives God’s 
essence as consisting in certain attributes. Because, on this interpretation, Spinoza believes 
that we cannot transcend our own perspective to “check” whether or not this perception 
aligns with God’s, there is no sense to be made of the further claim that God’s essence 
“really” is constituted by those attributes because these attributes are distinct only by reason 
from the substance.23   
2.1.3. For whom is “attribute” being defined? 
The former two ambiguities have been explored by previous commentators and typically 
frame the debates of Spinoza’s theory of the attributes among scholars wedded to some 
version of a God’s Perspective Interpretation. However, it seems to me that there is a more 
general ambiguity about 1D4 introduced not by Spinoza, but by his contemporary readers.  
 Who is the intended audience for this definition? That is, from whose perspective are 
we supposed to understand this elaboration of the notion of an attribute? God’s or ours? This 
                                               
23 I defend the claim that the attributes are only conceptually distinct from substance in Chapter 2. On the 
interpretation I give there, a substance is strictly speaking identical with its attributes, following Nelson’s 
(2013) “Identity Interpretation” of Descartes’ theory of the attributes. This contrasts with “Objective” 
interpretations of Descartes (from Nolan (1997)) and Spinoza (Melamed (2013) on which conceptual 




might seem to be a strange question, but it is absolutely essential to understanding Spinoza’s 
text.  
 For example, imagine that the “intellect” to refer to God’s infinite intellect. It is 
ambiguous whether Spinoza means “God’s intellect” as God understands it or as we 
understand it. From our perspective, God’s intellect must include the attributes that our 
intellect understands God to have. However, we cannot make sense of the claim (or at least I 
argue elsewhere that we cannot), that that God’s intellect contains attributes that we cannot 
understand. It would be nonsensical for us to say otherwise.  So, when Spinoza refers to 
“God’s intellect” here, he might mean “God’s intellect, insofar as we understand it.” 
 The same is true of “perception” here. If we understand that perception to be accurate, 
it must be “accurate” in terms that we can understand. Because we cannot, on the Human 
Perspective Interpretation, transcend our own perspective, we cannot judge the accuracy of 
our perceptions from God’s perspective. The “accuracy” is to be judged in terms of the 
clarity and distinctness of ideas in the human intellect. 
 Those interpreting 1D4 with a God’s Perspective Interpretation in mind must be 
imagining that 1D4 describes God’s essence from that infinite vantage.  So, terms like 
“intellect” and “perception” are to be understood as God understands them. This is behind 
the God’s Perspective Idea that our perceptions of God’s essence are only accurate insofar as 
they correspond to God’s own perceptions. It is crucial to note that this leaves open the 
possibility that there is a cleft between God’s perception and our own. In other words, 
“attribute” might refer to constituents of God’s essence that no human can perceive.  
 We can divide the God’s Perspective Interpretations along these lines.  On the 
Subjective Interpretation, this definition suggests that from God’s perspective, humans 
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misperceive God’s real essence. On the Objective Interpretation, this definition suggests that 
God understands humans to be fortunate enough to partially perceive God’s essence in terms 
of just two attributes. However, God also understands that the perception is not 
comprehensive with respect to attributes.  
2.2. The Definition of “God” 
Strictly speaking, one’s disambiguation of the definition of “attribute” does not settle an 
equally important interpretative question: how many attributes does God have? One’s answer 
to that question requires one to adopt one of two interpretations of 1D6, Spinoza’s definition 
of “God.” 
 
1D6: By God I understand a being absolutely infinite, i.e., a substance consisting of infinite 
attributes [infinitis attributis], of which each one expresses an eternal and infinite essence. 
 
There is some ambiguity in the Latin here. In Curley’s translation, “infinitis attributis” is 
translated as “an infinity of attributes,” suggesting that “infinite” tacitly describes a collection 
or quantity of attributes. However, one can also give a reading of “infinitis attributis” on 
which “infinite” is an adjective modifying “attribute,” suggesting that the attributes 
themselves are each infinite. In 4.1.1, I will defend the latter reading. 
On what I’ll refer to as the Numerosity Interpretation, “infinite” is used to describe 
the quantity of attributes and means “infinitely many” or “more than can be counted by any 
finite number.” On this interpretation, God has not only more attributes than just Thought 
and Extension, but also more attributes than can be represented by any humanly cognizable 
quantity. This of course entails that God has more than two attributes.  
 
 36 
 Opposing this interpretation is what I’ll call the Totality Interpretation. The Totality 
Interpretation adopts the adjectival reading of “infinite,” so that God is described as a being 
with attributes that are themselves infinite and express infinite essences. This reading of 1D6 
does not understand it to make any commitment whatsoever to the amount of attributes God 
has. 
Furthermore, on this interpretation, “infinite” is understood to be the negation of 
“finite.” And, on this reading, “finite” is used to express the idea that something is limited in 
some way. A “finite” length of rope is limited by its being frayed, for instance; a “finite” 
span of time has a beginning and an end. To say that something is infinite is to deny 
limitation of it. On the Totality Interpretation, then, 1D6 defines God as a being that is not 
limited with respect to the attributes. Put conditionally, if something is an attribute, then it is 
an attribute of God. Again, this does not entail anything about the number of attributes that 
God has. If “attribute” refers to Thought and Extension, then God could have “infinite” 
attributes and still have two. 
 It is clear from the definition of these two interpretations that the Human Perspective 
Interpretation must adopt the Totality Interpretation. However, the Totality Interpretation is 
consistent with the God’s Perspective Interpretations since it says nothing about whether 
God’s having two attributes would count as a “limitation.”  Those who adopt both the 
Objective and Totality Interpretations will have to provide additional textual evidence that 
Spinoza was committed to the existence of “other attributes.” This evidence will be 
considered in Section 5.  
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2.3. Deciding between these Interpretations 
To determine which interpretation best makes sense of Spinoza’s text, we need to answer the 
following questions.  
1. Does “intellect” in Spinoza’s definition of “attribute” refer only to the infinite 
intellect? 
2. Does “intellect” in that definition refer only to the finite intellect? 
3. Is the “perception” referred to in that definition inaccurate? 
4. Does Spinoza’s text require the Numerosity Interpretation? 
5. Does Spinoza’s text commit him to the existence of humanly uncognizable attributes? 
A “yes” answer to any of the following would suggest that the Human Perspective 
Interpretation is inconsistent with Spinoza’s text. It would require us to answer “God’s” to 
the ultimate question of this chapter—from whose perspective is the Ethics to be understood? 
 Obviously, “yes” answers to some of these questions will require “yes” answers to 
others, so the division among questions is somewhat artificial. However, for clarity’s sake, I 
will examine textual evidence for both the “yes” and “no” answers to each question in as 
much isolation from answers to other questions as possible.  
3. The “Intellect” in the Definition of Attribute 
3.1. Does “intellect” refer to only the infinite intellect? 
It is prima facie implausible that Spinoza meant 1D4 to refer to the infinite intellect alone. 
Spinoza does not modify intellectus with infinitus in the definition of “attribute.” In fact, he 
never defines, characterizes, or employs the notion of “attribute” with an explicit reference to 
the infinite intellect. 
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As far as I can tell, Spinoza only ever refers to the infinite intellect explicitly with the 
infinitus modifier. There does not appear to be a case in the 102 instances of “intellect” in the 
Ethics where Spinoza uses “intellectus” and can only mean “infinite intellect” in the relevant 
context. Given that “intellectus” appears over a hundred times, I cannot discuss each of these 
cases individually. However, if I’m right, then the text is compatible with reading 
“intellectus” as referring to both God’s and the human intellect unless otherwise specified.  
 There are cases where Spinoza uses “intellectus” and clearly must be referring to the 
finite intellect, suggesting that the focal reference of “intellectus” is the human intellect, the 
intellect of the reader. For example, Spinoza often distinguishes between the intellect and the 
imagination and how they regard God.24 However, it is clear that God does not have an 
imagination for Spinoza (1App), so it would be nonsensical for him to contrast the infinite 
intellect and an infinite imagination. It would be similarly nonsensical to talk about the 
intellect’s capacity to release humans from bondage via its ability to restrain the affects given 
that God has no affects for Spinoza.25  This does not entail that “intellectus” refers exclusively 
to the finite intellect, and such a claim is not necessitated by the Human Perspective 
Interpretation in any case.  
It does entail, however, that who prefer the interpretation of “intellectus” on which it 
is tacitly modified cannot assume that “intellectus” refers to the infinite intellect throughout 
                                               
24 See the 1P15s discussion of the ways we can conceive Extension; the 1App discussion of the benighted 
imaginative God and its opposition to the intellectual conception of God offered in Part I; 1P40c’s discussion of 
the perfection of the intellect;  
25 See Part V of the Ethics, which is clearly aimed at relieving human suffering. See especially 5P42d’s explicit 
mention of “human power” consisting in “the intellect.” 
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the Ethics. They will have to find a non-arbitrary way to delineate the two forms of usage and 
explain why Spinoza invites a crucial ambiguity in the fourth definition of his masterwork. 
 Melamed has argues that Spinoza’s apparent gloss on 1D4 at 2P7s requires the 
“infinite” reading (2017, 95). Spinoza writes,  
Before we proceed further, we must recall here what we showed [NS: in the First 
Part], viz. that whatever can be perceived by an infinite intellect as constituting an 
essence of substance pertains to one substance only, and consequently that the 
thinking substance and the extended substance are one and the same substance, which 
is now comprehended under this attribute, now under that.26 
Melamed argues that Spinoza “rephrases” 1D4 by saying that the “intellect” is the infinite 
intellect. 
 This objection relies on an awkward reading of the text. It is difficult to determine 
what specific demonstration Spinoza is referring to in Part I of the Ethics that “shows” that 
the attributes belong to one substance only. The most natural reading is 1P10s, where 
Spinoza argues that we cannot conclude that because the attributes are “really distinct”—they 
are conceived only through themselves—that they belong to distinct substances. However, in 
1P10, only the unmodified form of intellectus is used. In fact, there is no reference to the 
infinite intellect in the Ethics until 1P16. It would be a striking flaw in the geometrical 
presentation of the Ethics to help oneself to the existence of something that has not yet been 
proven to exist. 
 Spinoza does prove later at 1P30 that the infinite intellect must comprehend the 
attributes because any intellect, whether finite or infinite, must comprehend the attributes. 
                                               
26 All underlining in the paper is mine. 
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Here Spinoza argues that when an intellect has a true idea, the object of that idea must exist 
“in Nature.” This is another way of esteeming the intellect’s relation to truth. Then, he argues 
that “in Nature” there is only God and its modes. From this, Spinoza concludes that any 
intellect comprehends the attributes. 
 However, this text suggests that intellect’s finitude or infinitude is not what 
determines whether it has true ideas that are of things “in Nature.” It is the fact that it is an 
intellect is having those ideas that guarantees their truth. So, it is of course true of the infinite 
intellect that it comprehends God’s attributes. And we know that those attributes belong to 
only one substance from previous proofs. So, we have “shown” that what the infinite intellect 
perceives of the essence of substance, namely the attributes, belong to only one substance.  
  Given that Spinoza does not make a direct reference to any of the propositions 
mentioned here in the passage from 2P7s, we cannot be absolutely sure whether he had 1P30 
or 1P10 in mind. However, on my reading, Spinoza does not, strictly speaking, show that the 
infinite intellect comprehends the attributes until 1P30, so he cannot just be referring to 1P10. 
But if that’s the case, then Spinoza is referring to what he “showed” in two propositions in 
the previous part of the Ethics and not clarifying what he meant by 1D4. This is consistent 
with the Human Perspective Interpretation. 
Some interpreters have argued that we must choose the “infinite intellect” reading 
because the “any intellect” reading is inconsistent with the existence of the “other attributes.” 
Haserot (503) argues that we are forced to read the “intellectus” as referring to the infinite 
intellect because otherwise Spinoza’s definition would be incoherent. The finite human 
intellect conceives of only two attributes, Thought and Extension (2A5, 2P1, 2P2, 1P10). 
According to Haserot, Spinoza believes that there are infinitely many more attributes than 
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Thought and Extension (e.g., 1P9, 2P7s). Therefore, there are more than two attributes. In 
this case, the definition would mean that something only counts as an attribute if it is 
perceived by the finite intellect. This would be a blatant inconsistency on Spinoza’s part, 
since it would suggest that the “other attributes” are not attributes after all. However, this 
argument simply pushes the question back a step to the question of whether there are more 
attributes than Thought and Extension. Independent evidence will have to be given to justify 
this reading of the text. 
 In conclusion, Spinoza does not seem to define “attribute” as only what the infinite 
intellect perceives of God’s essence. In fact, it seems more reasonable to conclude that 
intellectus’ unmodified usage in the text is meant to any intellect unless specified otherwise. 
This is consistent with the Human Perspective Interpretation.  
3.2. Does “intellect” refer to only the finite intellect? 
The texts cited in 3.1 do not warrant the conclusion that the attributes are defined in terms of 
what only the finite intellect perceives of God’s essence. Indeed, Spinoza never defines or 
characterizes the attributes in a way that suggests their mere existence in the finite mind. In 
addition, at 1P30, Spinoza demonstrates that the infinite intellect also “comprehends” God’s 
attributes, suggesting that “attribute” cannot be defined to exclude God’s perception of God’s 
own essence. Any textual evidence for the Subjective reading of “intellectus” must be in the 
form of suggestions that the attributes are illusory and thus confined to the finite intellect. 
3.3. Is the “perception” referred to in that definition inaccurate?  
Spinoza never explicitly suggests that the attributes are in any sense illusory. Instead, 
Spinoza often claims that the attributes give us adequate, non-illusory ideas of God’s 
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essence. First, Spinoza is clear that it is the intellect that perceives the essence of God in 1D4, 
not the imagination. This suggests immediately that the attributes cannot be the result of 
imaginative activity. 2P44 tells us that the intellect, unlike the imagination, represents things 
truly. This is encoded in Spinoza’s division of the three kinds of knowledge. The first kind of 
knowledge, which does not give us an adequate idea of God, relies on the device of words to 
help us recollect things, much like Wolfson thinks that the attributes do on account of their 
being universals. The second and third kinds, however, do give us adequate ideas and each 
involve the activity of the intellect as opposed to the imagination. All of this suggests that the 
attributes are not best conceived of as imaginative illusions of some kind: they are objective 
rather than subjective. 
 And, to repeat the claim of 1P30, the attributes appear to be understood by the infinite 
intellect as well. How could God have a “true idea” (1P30d) of God via the attributes if the 
attributes are mere illusions?  
3.4. Summary 
The texts discussed in 3.1-3.3 are consistent with the reading of 1D4 given by the Human 
Perspective Interpretation. The attributes are what intellect, that is any intellect, accurately 
perceives of God’s essence. I do not want to make the stronger claim that they require the 
Human Perspective reading because God’s Perspective Interpreters can point to another class 
of texts to resist including the finite intellect in the definition of “attribute.” If the text 
requires Spinoza to believe that God perceives attributes distinct from Thought and 
Extension, then the reading I want to give of 1D4 would be incoherent. 
 For the remainder of this chapter, I will deal only with the illusion of a textual 
mandate for the Objective Interpretation. 
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4. The “Infinity” of God’s Attributes 
4.1. Direct Textual Evidence against the Numerosity Interpretation 
The Totality Interpretation gives a uniform reading of “infinite” throughout Spinoza’s 
corpus. On this interpretation, Spinoza intends to express the unlimitedness of God’s essence 
when he describes God and his attributes as infinite.  
 By contrast, supporters of the Numerosity Interpretation (or at least those that take 
Spinoza’s use of “infinite” to itself express a notion implying numerosity) take at least some 
of Spinoza’s uses of “infinite” to entail that God has more attributes than any finite number 
could count. As we will see, it is not obvious that the Numerosity Interpretation can give a 
uniform reading of “infinite” throughout the Ethics because this reading would make some of 
Spinoza’s claims either inconsistent or incoherent. 
 In this section, I will not attempt to discuss every usage of “infinite” in Spinoza’s 
corpus, nor will I discuss a majority of those usages.27 Instead, I will focus on core texts that 
seem to mandate the Numerosity Interpretation and argue that the Totality Interpretation 
gives a much more reasonable account of those texts. 
4.1.1. Intrinsic and Extrinsic Uses of “Infinite” 
Before I turn to particular texts, however, it will be useful to make an initial note about 
Spinoza’s use of “infinite” in the relevant contexts. One would expect that, on the 
Numerosity Interpretation, Spinoza would say explicitly and perhaps in various contexts that 
there is an infinite number/quantity/count/etc. of attributes. That is, one would expect 
Spinoza to use “infinite” as an adjective to describe something, roughly, that can be 
                                               
27 My treatment here does much supplementation of the ones given by Bennett, Kline, and Wolf. 
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quantified or counted. However, in his discussion of God’s infinity and the infinity of the 
attributes, Spinoza never uses “infinite” in this way. Instead, he modifies “God” or 
“attribute” directly. This is despite the fact Spinoza is happy to mention infinite quantities in 
other contexts, albeit derisively (1P15) and when he uses of the substantive infinita (infinite 
things) to express the thought that the class of some kind of thing is unlimited, where being 
“unlimited” indicates that “everything” falls under that class (1P16).  
 So, if the Numerosity Interpretation is correct, it must assume that Spinoza 
systematically omitted terminology that would make it clear to his reader that what is being 
described as infinite is the class, collection, or quantity of attributes and not the attributes 
themselves, considered individually. Another way of putting it is that the Numerosity 
Interpretation must assume that, at least in some cases, Spinoza is tacitly describing 
something extrinsic to the attributes, such as their count, when he predicates “infinity” of 
them, as opposed to their intrinsic features. While this interpretation might be suggested by 
the economy of using the expression “infinite attributes” as opposed to “an infinite 
collection/quantity/number of attributes,” there are no texts where Spinoza makes use of the 
less economical and clearer expression in the context of the attributes. 
 The Numerosity Interpretation cannot give a uniform reading of “infinite” as 
something extrinsic. That’s because Spinoza clearly has the intrinsic, non-counting usage in 
mind in many cases, for instance, when he describes substance, the infinite intellect, infinite 
modes, and God’s infinite idea (1P8, 1P16, 1P21, 1P22, Ep64, 2P8).  
This also seems to be the case in Spinoza’s definition of God. On the Numerosity 
Interpretation, we must read 1D6’s claim that God has infinite attributes to be a claim about 
the amount of attributes God has, as opposed to a claim about the attributes themselves. 
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However, the explication of 1D6 shows this to be a possibly incoherent reading. Spinoza 
writes, 
I say absolutely infinite, not infinite in its own kind; for if something is only infinite 
in its own kind, we can deny infinite attributes of it [NS: (i.e., we can conceive 
infinite attributes which do not pertain to its nature)]; but if something is absolutely 
infinite, whatever expresses essence and involves no negation pertains to its essence. 
This is incoherent on a uniformly extrinsic reading of “infinite.” For Spinoza would mean we 
can deny infinitely many attributes of a being that is infinite only in its own kind. This is 
impossible: we can conceive only two attributes, and in any case, our intellects are finite and 
unable to think of infinitely many things. 
 On the intrinsic reading of infinite, this explication is perfectly coherent. The claim is 
that we can deny infinite attributes, that is attributes which are themselves infinite, of 
something that is infinite only in its own kind. For example, we could deny the infinite 
attribute of Thought of a substance that has only the infinite attribute of Extension. To say 
that God has “infinite attributes” is to say that God has attributes, each of which is infinite 
and to say that God is “absolutely infinite” is to say that God has “every” attributes. This is 
why Spinoza goes on to say that “whatever expresses essence and involves no negation” 
pertains to God’s essence.   
The natural response here might be to reject the claim that the Numerosity 
Interpretation requires a uniformly extrinsic reading of “infinite.” But if that is the case, then 
the Numerosity Interpretation must find a non-ad hoc way of delimiting the cases where 
Spinoza wants to describe the uncountable quantity of the attributes and the cases where he 
describes something as intrinsically infinite. 
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 As several interpreters have suggested in their analyses of the infinite in Spinoza’s 
philosophy, it is useful to start with Spinoza’s own discussion of the proper and improper 
ways of thinking about the infinite and then to keep that discussion in mind when analyzing 
the use of the relevant terms in the Ethics. The assumption is that Spinoza’s explicit thoughts 
about the infinite ought to be borne out when he expresses theses about, for example, 
substance. 
4.1.2. The “Infinite” in the Imagination versus the Intellect 
The clearest explicit discussion of the infinite is in Letter 12 to Lodewijk Meyer (also known 
as the “Letter on the Infinite”), though his thoughts here are clearly echoed in his discussion 
of infinite and quantity at 1P15s. Spinoza begins his discussion of the infinite in the letter by 
making some crucial distinctions, since he believes that many of the puzzles and paradoxes 
generated by the notion of the infinite result from muddles about the many ideas that can 
correspond to our uses of the term “infinite” and related terms. Here are the relevant 
divisions: 
Infinite in virtue of definition or essence Infinite in virtue of cause 
Unlimited, that is, not explicable by number Infinite because its parts cannot be explicated by a number 
The infinite we apprehend only by the 
intellect 
The infinite that can also be apprehended by 
imagination 
 
Table 1: Spinoza’s Division of “Infinite” 
 
The primary division that is useful for our purposes is the division between the apprehension 
of the intellect by the intellect alone versus the apprehension of the infinite by the intellect 
with the imagination serving as an aid or by the imagination alone. It is clear throughout the 
letter that Spinoza takes the imagination’s attempts to apprehend the intellect to cause a 
variety of philosophical mishaps, including paradoxes akin to Zeno’s (IV/55/13). The 
 
 47 
essential failure of the imagination to apprehend the infinite appears to be its essential 
reliance on what Spinoza calls “beings of reason (entia rationis)” (IV/57/18). Examples of 
these “modes of imagination,” include time (that is, thinking of duration as “composed of 
[discrete] moments”), measure, and number (IV/57/8). To be fair to the imagination, as 
Spinoza makes clear elsewhere, these modes of imagination are useful insofar as they help us 
remember, classify, and explain things (CM, I/234/1-28).  However, Spinoza denies that they 
can help us get clear and distinct ideas of the infinite.  
To illustrate, we can consider how these two ways of conceiving the infinite, 
represented by the two columns in our table, give us different ways of conceiving different 
parts of Spinoza’s ontology.  
The Intellect The Imagination 
Substance, properly conceived Modes improperly conceived “in separation of” substance or as finite substances 
Eternity Duration confused with Time divided artificially into seconds, minutes, etc. 
Quantity, properly conceived, as infinite, 
indivisible, and one alone 
Quantity, abstractly conceived, as being 
composed of parts, finite, manifold 
Measure and number “inapplicable without 
manifest contradiction” 
Measure and number as “mental constructs” 
or “modes of the imagination” 
 
Table 2: How We Conceive the Infinite 
 
To illustrate, consider Spinoza’s discussion of the two ways that we might regard Duration, 
which Spinoza regards as infinite. He writes that the imagination confuses Duration with 
Time, by which Spinoza means the division of something infinite, namely Duration, into an 
arbitrary class of measurable quantities: hours, minutes, and seconds. Spinoza argues that if 
we regard Duration in this way, we quickly find ourselves in paradoxes about the passage of 
time. If, for example, time is conceived as infinitely divisible, one might worry how any time 
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could pass because passage would require a temporal traversal of an infinite number of 
moments (Ep 12, IV/55/13).  
So, what appears to be essential to the imaginative conception of the infinite is the 
imagination’s use of division and delimitation of the infinite into finite parts that are thought 
to compose that thing. The essential trouble with this method of conceiving the infinite is 
that, on Spinoza’s conception of the infinite, there’s no sense in which the finite products of 
imaginative analysis (numbers, moments, and so on) can “add up” to form a clear 
representation of the infinite. The imagination is doomed to badly represent the infinite as 
unlimited, indivisible, and unique, because the imagination must rely on devices that are 
finite.  
 This fact is borne out in Spinoza’s comments on number in the same letter. Spinoza 
argues that number results from “separat[ing] the affections of Substance from Substance 
itself, and arrang[ing] them in classes so that we can easily imagine them as far as 
possible…” (IV/57/3). That is, numbers represent the count of items that fall into a class. It is 
natural that we are doomed to fail to represent the infinite with numbers because any 
numbers “delimit” what they are representing: that is, they establish some specific, finite 
count for those items.28 
Spinoza notes elsewhere (CM I/235/10-29) that we often attempt to use number to 
represent the idea that there are more items in a class than we have ideas of, but the use of 
number in that way is essentially confused. For example, having ideas of three or four 
humans, we might form the idea of there being seven billion with the use of the numeral 
                                               
28 This also assumes that the “attributes” can fall into a class. In Chapter 3,  I argue that there cannot be a “class” 
of attributes. This is because attributes “have nothing in common” with one another and thus cannot belong to a 
class of similar entities (e.g, 1P2, 1P10s, 1A5).  
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“7,000,000,000.” However, Spinoza is clear that this method of conceiving unconceived 
items under a common class is an important source of philosophical error.29 It is reasonable to 
think that the same considerations would apply to attributes: we cannot adequately represent 
the supposed fact that there are more than two attributes by conceiving of some numeral 
higher than two and appending it to an imaginative representation of the class of attributes.   
 These comments on division of the proper and improper ways of conceiving the 
infinite suggests that there is something essentially confused (in Spinoza’s sense) about the 
Numerosity Interpretation. That’s because the notion of “infinite number,” on Spinoza’s 
view, is essentially confused and even “manifestly contradictory” (Ep 12, IV/59/14). This is 
to be expected: the imagination is an essentially finite faculty and so cannot form infinitely 
many ideas (e.g., 2P40s1, 4D6). By extension, to represent the attributes as having infinite 
numerosity is (1) to employ an imaginative aid (number) when a clear conception of the 
attributes requires the infinite to conceive them without the imagination’s help and (2) is to 
make the crucial mistake of attempting to trespass the bounds of the finite imagination. 
 Of course, the natural response on behalf of supporters of the Numerosity 
Interpretation might be that these considerations are not only compatible with their view, but 
that they appear to mandate it. In other words, the response might be that the only-two 
attribute supporter is guilty of finitizing the attributes by claiming that there are only two.30 In 
fact, there are so many attributes, the response might go, that they cannot be counted because 
any count will improperly represent them as belonging to a finite class. God’s 
“unlimitedness” entails that it has uncountably many attributes.  
                                               
29 See especially (TIE 87-90, II/32/35-I/33/33) and Spinoza’s discussion of “Transcendental” terms at 2P40s2.  
30 See e.g. Melamed’s (2018, 13) discussion of 1P9.  
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 But this response misunderstands Spinoza’s essential point. The idea is that 
applications of imaginative devices like number essentially involve dividing substance into 
parts, which is at direct odds with Spinoza’s repeated insistence that substance is undivided.31 
The Human Perspective Interpretation does not include the view that God is somehow 
divided into two distinct parts or aspects corresponding to the attributes. The view is that 
while those attributes are conceivable in isolation from one another, which makes them really 
distinct in an epistemological sense, they are not really distinct in the metaphysical sense 
(1P10s). The view is that “God has two attributes” is the view that God can be conceived to 
be thinking and extended. It is natural to speak of God’s having “two attributes”, because, as 
Spinoza notes, it can be useful for categorization and memory to represent things with the aid 
of the imagination. But strictly speaking, the intellect does not represent substance as being 
divided in any way and any perceived division (including one into a massive number of 
different attributes) is the product of confused, imaginative thinking. 
 So, if God or God’s attributes are uncountable, it must be because counting them 
would be attempting to conceive them with the use of an imaginative aid. Properly speaking, 
however, God’s infinity should not be regarded this way.32 This is why the Totality 
                                               
31 This is echoed in Spinoza’s discussion of God’s immensity in (CM II/iii, I/254/8-22) wherein he writes that 
those who assume God is “quantitative” are committing an absurdity because, prefiguring 1P15s, they derive 
this mistake from misunderstanding the properties of extension. Spinoza goes as far as to say that God’s 
immensity cannot be understood in a quantitative sense.  
32 This discussion of Letter 12 is indebted to Joachim (27-35)’s discussion of Spinoza on the infinite. For 
example, Joachim writes, 
Every measured, every time, and every number are finite—measure, time, and number are applicable only to 
what can be ‘pictured’ as well as ‘thought’: infinity belongs only to what can be thought and not pictured. The 




Interpretation reads Spinoza’s use of “infinite” in the uniform, proper sense, namely as being 
“unlimited.” 
 
4.1.3. Texts that Support the Totality Interpretation 
In addition to Letter 12, there are a variety of texts that support the Totality Interpretation. 
Many of them have been offered by Bennett (75-79) and Kline in support of the Totality 
Interpretation. I will discuss them briefly here for the sake of completeness. 
 In many texts, Spinoza suggests that “infinite” can be glossed as “every” or “all.” We 
can see this at 1P16, “From the necessity of the divine nature there must follow infinitely 
many things in infinitely many modes, (i.e., everything which can fall under an infinite 
intellect)”; at 1P17s “But I think I have shown clearly enough (see P16) that from God's 
supreme power, or infinite nature, infinitely many things in infinitely many modes, i.e., all 
things”; at 1D6e, “if something is absolutely infinite, everything [quicquid] that expresses 
essence and involves no negation pertains to its essence”;  and 2P3d, “For God (by P1) can 
think infinitely many things in infinitely many modes, or (what is the same, by IP16) can 
form the idea of his essence and of all the things which necessarily follow from it.”33 
 This gloss is present in other text. In the Part I, Chapter II of the Short Treatise, 
Spinoza gives a version of 1D6 that reads, “God is, we say, a being of which all, or infinite, 
attributes are predicated” (I/19/5-6). This is echoed later in that chapter: “From all of these it 
follows that of Nature all in all is predicated, and that thus Nature consists of infinite 
attributes, of which each is perfect in its kind” (I/22/9-11). 
                                               
33 All underlining is mine.  
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 In other texts, Spinoza suggests that “infinite” can be glossed as “unlimited” and 
“finite” as “limited.”. We can see this in the following texts: 1D2, “That thing is said to be 
finite in its own kind that can be limited by another of the same nature”; 1P8d, “But not as 
finite. For then (by D2) it would have to be limited by something else of the same nature”; 
1P8s, “Since being finite is really, in part, a negation, and being infinite is an absolute 
affirmation of the existence of some nature, it follows from P7 alone that every substance 
must be infinite”; and 1P21d, 1P28, 2D7, where Spinoza takes something’s being finite as 
entailing that it has a “determinate existence.” 
Spinoza also seems to equate something’s being finite with its being a part, 
suggesting that being infinite implies being whole. For example, see 1P13s, “That substance 
is indivisible, is understood more simply merely from this, that the nature of substance 
cannot be conceived unless as infinite, and that by a part of substance nothing can be 
understood except a finite substance, which (by P8) implies a plain contradiction” and 1P15s, 
“If corporeal substance is infinite, they say, let us conceive it to be divided in two parts. Each 
part will be either finite or infinite. If the former, then an infinite is composed of two finite 
parts, which is absurd.” This is also true in the aforementioned chapter of the Short Treatise. 
Spinoza writes, “But it is impossible that parts could be conceived in an infinite Nature, for 
all parts are, by their nature, finite” (I/25/17)  
These texts suggest that “infinite” is equivalent to “unlimited” for Spinoza.  
4.1.4. Are there Texts that Require the Numerosity Interpretation? 
In this section, I will not review every time that Spinoza uses “infinite” in my critique of the 
Numerosity Interpretation. Instead, I will focus on texts that have been explicitly mentioned 
in defenses of the Numerosity Interpretation and those that ought to be, because they appear 
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initially to be at odds with the Totality Interpretation. My goal is to show that all of the texts 
are compatible with the only-two reading and some are even much more naturally read if we 
think of “infinite” as “unlimited.” 
1.1.1.1 The Definition of “God” 
Spinoza’s definition of God at 1D6 might be cited in support of the Numerosity 
Interpretation. Spinoza describes God as absolutely infinite, meaning that God has “infinite 
attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence.” Here, it is natural to give the 
first use of infinite an extrinsic gloss, since Spinoza goes on to say that each attribute 
individually is intrinsically infinite. (A uniformly extrinsic usage would make this claim 
incoherent, see 4.1.1.) However, in the explication to this definition, Spinoza makes it clear 
that being absolutely infinite entails that one cannot “deny that [God] has infinite attributes” 
since “whatever expresses essence and does not involve negation belongs to its essence.” The 
opposition, then, between having infinite and finite attributes is the opposition between 
having everything that expresses essence and lacking some essence. In other words, between 
having unlimited attributes and lacking attributes. 1D6 therefore can be read as the claim that 
God lacks no attributes, as opposed to the claim that God has so many attributes that they 
cannot be counted.   
 Indeed, it’s far from clear that 1D6 could by itself express anything about how many 
or which attributes God has. Spinoza argues in 1P8s2 that definitions cannot,  
involve or express a fixed number of individuals, since it expresses nothing but the 
nature of the thing defined. For example, the definition of triangle expresses nothing 
other than simply the nature of the triangle, and not a fixed number of triangles. 
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The definition of God’s infinity in terms of attributes, then, cannot by itself show that God 
has some count or even uncountably many attributes, just in the same way that a definition of 
a triangle cannot by itself show a priori that there are four or five or uncountably many 
triangles. It is much more natural, then, to understand 1D6 as amounting to the claim that 
God has every attribute.  
Melamed challenges this reading of 1D6 (forthcoming, 8). He argues that the Totality 
Interpretation is incoherent because it cannot make sense of Spinoza’s claim in the 
explication that “…if something is only infinite in its own kind, then we can deny infinite 
attributes of it…” His worry is that it cannot be the case that we can deny infinite (that is, all) 
attributes of, e.g., Extension (which is infinite in its own kind) because we would wind up 
denying Extension of Extension. However, this misunderstands the Totality reading and begs 
the question against its claim that Spinoza sometimes uses “infinite” to describe something’s 
intrinsic nature and not its quantity. On this reading of 1D6Exp, the claim is that we can deny 
an infinite attribute of something that is only infinite in its own kind. So, Extension is infinite 
in its own kind because there is a sense in which we can deny Thought, an infinite attribute, 
of it.34  
Melamed’s reading also has the awkward consequence of having Spinoza believe that 
we can conceive infinitely many attributes other than Thought and Extension. After the 
clarification he quotes, Spinoza goes on to say of a thing that is infinite in its own kind that 
“we can conceive infinite attributes which do not pertain to its nature.” This is impossible 
                                               
34 This invites the question of whether there can be “finite attributes.” The answer for Spinoza is presumably not. 
However, at this point of the Ethics it is likely that Spinoza is anticipating the objections and concerns of 
Cartesian readers, who will believe that there are finite substances with what might be called “finite attributes” 
that constitute their essences. Spinoza’s demonstrations will rule out the possibility of finite substances 
eventually and so eventually the notion of a “finite attribute” will be otiose.  
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both because we cannot conceive other attributes (1P10, 2A5) and because we cannot 
conceive infinitely many things (e.g., 2P44).  
 Spinoza also seems to require a totality reading of “infinite” in 1D6 in order to 
establish monism. 1P8, which establishes the infinity of every substance (assuming nothing 
about whether there is more than one), includes the claim that a finite substance could not 
exist because it would be “limited by” another substance with the same attribute, which 1P5 
rules out.  And as Bennett notes, 1P14, the demonstration that God is the only substance, 
appears to rely on the “unlimited” and intrinsic reading of “infinite” as well (75). Spinoza 
again equates God’s absolute infinity with not lacking attributes. The demonstration is quite 
simple on the “unlimited” reading: since attributes are the means by which we distinguish 
among substances (1P5), if God has all of the attributes, then there cannot be more than one 
substance. 
1.1.1.2 1P16 
1P16 might seem to require the Numerosity Interpretation. Here, Spinoza writes that “[f]rom 
the necessity of the divine nature, there must follow infinite things (infinita) in infinite modes 
(modis).”  It might be natural for us to think that 1P16 establishes that uncountably many 
“things” follow from the divine nature, and Curley’s translation of infinitas as “infinitely 
many things” is most naturally read in English as “more things than can be counted by a 
number.” And if this were the case, then there would be serious limitation to uniform 
“unlimited” reading.  
    There are several problems with this reading. First, Spinoza’s own clarification of 
infinitas as “everything” suggests the Totality Interpretation. Second, even if one adopted the 
Numerosity Interpretation, it’s not clear that 1P16 could be used to support the Objective 
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Interpretation: Spinoza claims here that infinite things follow from the “divine nature.” 
However, the best candidates for what “divine nature” refers to are the attributes themselves 
(1P15). So, it may be that uncountably many things follow from each of the attributes, but 
that alone does not entail that there are uncountably many attributes. 
The “unlimited” reading gives a much more natural and uniform reading of 1P16. On 
this reading, Spinoza argues that every mode follows from God’s attributes. Now, Spinoza is 
clear in 1P21 that finite modes cannot follow from the attributes directly because, according 
to that proposition, everything that follows from an attribute must itself be infinite. 1P21 and 
1P22 show that strictly what follows from an attribute is an infinite mode of that attribute. 
These are the infinite modes (modis) of 1P16.35 1P16 suggests, then, that every mode either 
follows from an attribute directly or is “in” one of these directly-following infinite modes. 
The unlimited reading is uniform because while it must appeal to both an intrinsic and 
extrinsic sense of infinity, it keeps the core use of infinity as “unlimited” intact.  
4.1.5. 1P9 
At 1P9, Spinoza writes, 
 
1P9 The more reality or being each thing has, the more attributes belong to it. 
 
                                               
35 Curley worries with others here that “mode” may not be used in a technical sense here, but on the unlimited 
reading the technical sense is quite natural. In any case, neither choice presents a challenge for the view about 
the attributes under discussion.  
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Melamed has argued that 1P9 is inconsistent with God’s having only two attributes on two 
counts (2017, 98-99).36 First, Melamed claims that, if God has only two attributes, then 1P9 
entails that humans and God are equally real because humans also “have” the attributes of 
Thought and Extension. But this is impossible, given that the former are finite and the latter 
is infinite. Second, if God has only two attributes, then God would not be as real as a being 
with three or more attributes. This is inconsistent with God’s being the most real being. I will 
consider these arguments in turn. 
 The first argument assumes that human beings’ status as modes of Thought and 
Extension entails that they “have” those attributes. But the word “have” must have different 
uses in the contexts of God’s “having” an attribute and a human being’s “having” an 
attribute. If by “have” one means that an attribute constitutes the essence of something, then 
it is clear that human beings do not “have” the two attributes of which they are modes. For 
one, humans are not substances and Spinoza reserves “attribute” for essences of substance 
(1D4). And indeed, Spinoza characterizes the essence of human beings with notions such as 
contingent existence (2P10), finitude (2P13), and the conatus doctrine (3P7). That’s not to 
say that human beings are not necessarily thinking and extended things: they are certainly 
both. But as Spinoza’s discussion of the superhuman attributes of God reveals, Spinoza 
distinguishes between necessary properties (or propria) of things and essential properties of 
things (KV I, ii, I/27/19-24). It is true that humans are necessarily thinking and extended 
things and (in an awkward sense) “have” the attributes of Thought and Extension, but this is 
irrelevant to 1P9. 
                                               
36See also Curley (1969, 152-3), Melamed (forthcoming, 12-3). One might also cite Ep 9, where Spinoza tells de 
Vries “the more reality or being a being has the more attributes must be attributed to it…” (IV/45/17-25) 
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 The second argument misunderstands the comparative claim implicit in 1P9. Here, 
Spinoza claims that if and only if some substance x has more attributes than some substance 
y, then x is more real than y. But this comparative claim does not entail that God has some 
number of attributes. For example, it is compatible with the claim that a substance with 
Thought and Extension as attributes would be more real than a substance with just Thought. 
It might be true that if there were a substance with three attributes, it would be more real than 
a substance with two, but this is irrelevant if there are only two attributes for a substance to 
have. At most the comparative claim of 1P9 seems to establish that the most real being has 
all attributes, or that there is no being with more attributes than the most real being.37 1P9 
cannot give independent evidence for the Numerosity Interpretation.  
4.1.6. 1P8s2 – The Arbitrariness of “Two” Attributes 
1P8s2 suggests that whenever there is a finite number of entities, there needs to be some 
explanation as to why there are exactly that many. According to 1P8s2, 
From these premises, it follows that if a fixed number of individuals exists in Nature, 
there must necessarily be a cause why those individuals and not more or fewer exist. 
If, for example, in Nature twenty men were to exist […] in order to account for the 
existence of these twenty men, it will not be enough for us to demonstrate the cause 
why not more or fewer than twenty men exist… 
An Objectivist could argue that God’s having only two attributes is inexplicable and thus 
arbitrary. Why does God have two, rather than three, attributes? If one believes that God has 
                                               
37 Following Kline (347), Wolf (188-91), and Bennett (76-7). It should also be noted that, if we take Spinoza’s 
suspicion of number being applied to the infinite, we should suspect that 1P9 does not compare the number of 
attributes, but whether or not a substance has one of the attributes. A higher “degree” of reality means having 
more attributes; the “highest” degree means having all attributes. 
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an infinite number of attributes, then Spinoza’s’ demand for an explanation at 1P8s2 seems 
inapplicable: it is the finitude of a number of individuals that demands explanation. 
We should of course note that this text is only relevant if it is extended beyond its 
context. Here, it is clear that the “individuals” under discussion are modes since they are “in 
Nature” and have “external causes for their existence,” neither of which can be predicated of 
attributes. Nevertheless, one might take this text to be an application of a more general 
principle: whenever there is a finite number of entities, there needs to be some explanation as 
to why there is exactly that number of entities.  
 It is not obvious that Spinoza can answer the question: why does God have two 
attributes, as opposed to some other number? As 1P8s makes clear, such an explanation 
cannot come from the definition of attribute or God as infinite substance, since “[n]o 
definition involves or expresses a fixed number of individuals.” Furthermore, it’s not clear 
what kind of explanation of the commitment to these two attributes is possible, given that any 
explanation would either require us to conceive attributes through one another or through 
something else. Spinoza blocks these options at 1P10, when he argues that attributes can only 
be conceived through themselves. 
 This argument misunderstands the Human Perspective Interpretation’s claim that 
“Thought and Extension are the only attributes.” Remember that on this interpretation, the 
attributes are defined as what we conceive of God’s essence. And, according to 2P1, 2P2, and 
2A5, we conceive of God’s essence as being constituted by Thought and Extension and no 
other attribute. Since the “attributes” just are what we conceive of God’s essence, it’s not 
clear in what sense that it could be arbitrary that there are only two. There is no wider class 
of “attributes” to compare “our” attributes to. Because we cannot conceive of other attributes, 
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we cannot entertain the possibility that there could be other attributes in addition to the ones 
we perceive. In fact, the notion of “attributes other than the ones we perceive” is 
contradictory in the first place, since “attribute” is defined in terms of what we do perceive 
on the Human Perspective Interpretation.38  This suggests that there is no need to explain the 
finitude of the class of attributes, because there is no genuine contrast between God’s having 
two versus God’s having three. There does not need to be a sufficient reason that a 
contradictory state of affairs does not obtain.  
 If one starts with an interpretation of 1D4 on which the attributes are what God 
conceives of God’s own essence, then it does appear arbitrary for an infinite being to 
conceive of its own essence as constituted by finitely many attributes. But this just begs the 
question against the Human Point of View Interpretation.39 
4.1.7. Conclusion 
I’ve argued that Spinoza’s text does not mandate the Numerosity Interpretation. However, 
this does not suffice to show that there is no textual mandate for the Objective Interpretation, 
because God’s having all the attributes is consistent with God’s having more than two.  One 
might defend the Objective Interpretation by pointing to texts where Spinoza appears to 
                                               
38 I defend this claim at length in Chapter 3. 
39 Along similar lines, one might claim that the existence of only two attributes is inconsistent with Spinoza’s 
adoption of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. For example, one might deny that there could be a sufficient 
reason as to why there are two and not three or twenty-eight attributes. There are two issues with this usage of 
the PSR. First, it begs the question by assuming that there are other attributes to have or lack. In other words, it 
is not arbitrary for God to have two attributes because those are all the attributes anything can have. Second, as 
Della Rocca notes, the PSR only suffices to show that God has at least two attributes (2011, 35-36). Even if one 
believed that the PSR entails a Principle of Plentitude, as Lovejoy (52, 151-57) does, or takes it to at least 
motivate such a Principle (as Lin (2017, 149-52) does), a Principle of Plentitude entails that God has as many 
attributes as can be had. This suggests that the PSR is consistent with God’s having “only” two attributes.  
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make explicit reference to “other attributes”. I will argue that each of these texts is consistent 
with Human Perspective Interpretation. 
4.2. “Other Attributes” 
4.2.1. 2P7s 
By far, the most commonly cited text in support of the Objective Interpretation is 2P7s, the 
scholium to the proposition asserting Spinoza’s so-called “parallelism.” This text is often 
cited because Spinoza mentions that parallelism, while clearly obtaining between modes of 
Thought and Extension, also holds for “other attributes.” Here is the relevant text from 
Curley’s translation, which, as we will see, is friendly to the Objective Interpretation: 
(1) Therefore, whether we conceive nature under the attribute of Extension, or under 
the attribute of Thought, or under any other attribute, we shall find one and the 
same order, or one and the same connection of causes… (emphasis added)  
And later in the scholium, Spinoza tells us that 
 (2) I understand the same concerning the other attributes. (emphasis added)  
We should first notice the way in which this translation prejudices the reader against the 
only-two attribute reading. In both emphasized sections, Spinoza appears (in English) to 
make direct reference to the other attributes using a definite article. However, as there are no 
articles (e.g., “the”) in the original Latin, this is as much an interpretative choice as it is a 
choice of translation. The original Latin reads: 
(1) …ideò sive naturam sub attributo Extensionis, sive sub attributo Cogitationis, sive 
sub alio quocunque concipiamus... (emphasis added) 
(2) …idem de aliis attributis intelligo. (emphasis added) 
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In neither case, is the addition of an article like “the” mandated by the Latin, though it might 
be inserted for ease of readability, if one adopts the Objective Interpretation. However, we 
can reasonably translate the two texts this way: 
 (1) Therefore, whether we conceive of nature under the attribute of Extension, or 
under the attribute of Thought, or under another attribute… 
 (2)  I understand the same concerning other attributes. 
These translations, which conform to the Latin more directly, are without the suggestive 
direct reference to “the other attributes.” So, in other words, one cannot conclude from 
Spinoza’s own words that he wanted to refer to other attributes, thus suggesting that he is 
committed to their existence.40 
 Still, one might reasonably ask why, on the Human Perspective Interpretation, 
Spinoza bothered to prove that parallelism holds even in case there are other attributes. It 
might be argued that these clarifications about the generality of the demonstration are strictly 
speaking unnecessary, if Extension and Thought are the only two attributes.  
 But here, we should reiterate what the claim that there are “only two” attributes 
amounts to. Spinoza never demonstrates a proposition ruling out that there are other 
attributes; he has only demonstrated that Thought and Extension are attributes. Indeed, it’s 
not clear that he could provide such a negative demonstration on the Human Perspective 
Interpretation. Such a demonstration would either have to be constructed from the range of 
ideas that Spinoza has access to, namely ideas of Thought and Extension and “nature” 
conceived through both independently. 1P10s suggests that Spinoza could not form the 
                                               




relevant idea under the description “an attribute distinct from Thought and Extension” 
necessary to deny the existence of such a thing. Furthermore, the mere lack of a 
demonstration of other attributes is not suggestive of the absence of other attributes. To 
suggest that we could conclude that there are no other attributes because we aren’t presented 
with modes of them is to badly misunderstand the scope of conclusions that we can draw 
using a priori reasoning from the axioms of Part II. On this interpretation, we are permitted 
to neither affirm nor deny a commitment to “other attributes,” whatever inconceivable 
collection of things that description might attempt to latch onto. 
 Nevertheless, it is useful for, and characteristic of, Spinoza’s employment of 
geometrical reasoning to provide maximally general demonstrations when he can. For 
example, he tells us in 1P21d that it does not matter which attribute we choose when we 
prove the general thesis that “anything following directly from an attribute must be infinite.” 
This is because, he says, “the demonstration is universal.”41 That is, when used in the service 
of a universal demonstration, the choice of attribute is arbitrary because the thesis will hold 
for any attribute. The choice of attribute in the demonstration of parallelism is equally 
arbitrary, since the general thesis seems to follow from Spinoza’s conception of an idea as an 
entity that takes an object and not anything about the objects of ideas themselves.42 That is, it 
holds generally because of the nature of ideas, not because there are two or more attributes. 
Since parallelism, like the thesis in 1P21d, is a core thesis in his metaphysics, and one in 
                                               
41 At 2P43s, he also notes that the demonstration of 1P20 is universal. The scholium to 2P46 claims that 2P45 is 
universal. Also see 4P4, 4P16 for further examples.  
42 As the demonstration makes clear, the essential connection between knowledge of causes and effect 
establishes relations among ideas (namely of causes and effects) and the idea-object relation establishes the two 
parallel orders because every idea has an object (2A3) and since ideas of extended things cannot be conceived 
under the same attribute as their objects.  
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which the nature of the attributes plays a central role, it would be natural for Spinoza, 
following the geometrical method, to demonstrate that some core theses would hold for other 
attributes. 43 But again, a demonstration of this kind of geometrically general claim neither 
suffice to prove that there are other attributes nor to give us an idea of what “another 
attribute” could be.  It is therefore reasonable to conclude that 2p7s can be given a 
reasonable, systematic reading that is friendly to the only-two attribute view. 
 Spinoza might have included this phrase for purely rhetorical reasons. Some of 
Spinoza’s readers might have had the view that God has attributes other than Thought and 
Extension. However, Spinoza has no use for “other attributes” in his system. So, Spinoza 
gains no advantage from trying to engage with those that believe in other attributes: an 
extended discussion of this issue would be an abstruse distraction. 
4.2.2. 2P13d, Letters 64 and 66 
1.1.1.3 Denying knowledge of “other attributes” 
Melamed argues that 2P13d implies that Spinoza worried about the implications of other 
attributes on his account of the nature of the mind (2017, 5). Spinoza writes 
Next, if the object of the Mind were something else also, in addition to the Body, then 
since (by IP36) nothing exists from which there does not follow some effect, there 
would necessarily (by P12) be an idea in our Mind of some effect of it. But (by A5) 
there is no idea of it. Therefore, the object of our Mind is the existing Body and 
nothing else, q.e.d. 
                                               
43 This should allay Melamed’s (forthcoming, 5) worry that Spinoza does not mention doubting the existence of 
other attributes after asserting 2P7. On the Human Perspective Interpretation, the “doubt” itself would be 
impossible and, in any case, rhetorically unwise.  
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Note that Spinoza does not say that the “something else” is a mode of another attribute, 
though his appeal to 2A5 suggests that he might be worrying about modes of attributes other 
than Thought and Extension. After all, 2A5 states that we are aware only of modes of 
Thought and Extension. The demonstration, then, appears to be ruling out the possibility that 
our minds could include ideas of modes of “other attributes.” 
 Melamed believes that this text subtly implies that Spinoza takes there to be “other 
attributes” to be concerned about. While that reading is compatible with the text, it is not 
necessitated by it. Here, Spinoza seems to be offering a corrective to those who believe that 
we do have ideas of modes of other attributes. His proof is supposed to establish that we do 
not. However, this does not entail that (1) there are modes of “other attributes” and (2) that 
we do not have ideas of “them.” Spinoza could be understood as arguing for the conditional 
claim that “if there are other attributes, we would not be aware of their modes.” This 
conditional claim can be true even if there are no other attributes or if the notion of “other 
attributes” is irredeemably confused.  
 These same considerations bear on Melamed’s appeal to Letters 64 and 66, where 
Melamed tells us that “Spinoza unmistakably asserts the existence of infinitely many 
attributes unknown to the human mind.” However, the main goal of these letters is to 
establish that we cannot know any other attributes than Thought and Extension. On 
Melamed’s reading, Spinoza’s mere discussion of his ignorance of “other attributes” 
somehow commits him to “their existence.” This reading is a stretch to say the least: one can 
coherently deny knowledge of something without asserting its existence, otherwise one could 
never be agnostic about the existence of anything! 
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1.1.1.4 “Other Minds” in Letter 66 
To be fair, the apparent commitment to “other attributes” in Letter 66 does not come in just 
the form of Spinoza’s denial of knowledge. In response to Tschirnhaus’ persistent and 
confused line of questioning about “other attributes,” Spinoza writes the following. 
[…]To reply to your Objection, I say that although each thing is expressed in infinite 
modes in in the infinite intellect of God, nevertheless those infinite ideas by which it 
is expressed cannot constitute one and the same Mind of a singular thing, but infinite 
minds, since each of the infinite ideas has no connection with any other, as I’ve 
explained in the Scholium to E II P7, and as is evident from I P10. 
In isolation from its context, Spinoza’s suggestion that there are infinitely many minds 
corresponding to ideas of modes of infinitely many attributes in the infinite intellect, seems 
to commit him to there being attributes other than Thought and Extension. However, in 
context, this passage does not appear to be so damning to the Human Perspective 
Interpretation. 
 First, let’s retrace what led Spinoza to this statement about infinitely many minds. 
The quoted passage above is a response to the following question from Tschirnhaus in Letter 
55: “[why] does the Mind perceive only the Modification expressed through Extension, i.e., 
the human Body, and no other expression through other attributes?” As Spinoza’s citation of 
1P10 and 2P7s in his response suggests, Spinoza denies that the human mind can have ideas 
of “other attributes” because it cannot conceive attributes other than what the human mind 
involves: namely, Thought, the attribute of the mind itself, and Extension, the attribute of the 
body. Spinoza’s response is essentially the same—though significantly terser—as his 
response in Letter 64 to nearly the same question from Tschirnhaus in Letter 63. There, 
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Tschirnhaus asks why we cannot know more attributes than Thought and Extension and 
Spinoza responds in Letter 64 with a lengthy demonstration. 
 What is relevant about this exchange with Tschirnhaus is (1) Tschirnhaus’ repeated 
claim that Spinoza is committed to there being more than two attributes on account of God’s 
have infinite attributes and (2) Spinoza’s lack of an admission that this is the correct 
understanding of the infinity of God’s attributes. In fact, in Letter 64, Spinoza seems to 
correct Tschirnhaus’ misunderstanding by writing the following: 
We form the axiom of 1P10s from the idea we have of an absolutely infinite Being 
(as I indicated at the end of that Scholium) and not from the fact that there are, or 
could be, beings which have three, four, etc., attributes. 
The “axiom” Spinoza refers to seems to be 1P9, which states that “The more reality or being 
each thing has, the more attributes belong to it.” Spinoza claims that this follows from the 
1D6 definition of an absolutely infinite being, which as we’ve seen, is a being that lacks no 
attributes. However, Spinoza does not claim in the exchange with Tschirnhaus that “there are 
other attributes” that he cannot think.  
 Spinoza seems to correct Tschirnhaus’ misunderstanding of 1P9 on which 
Tschirnhaus assumes a numerical interpretation of “infinite” and then concludes that there 
are more than two attributes. Nevertheless, as the subsequent letters show, Tschirnhaus never 
receives this correction. His remaining questions seem premised on the idea that there are 
more than two attributes. 
 Given that Tschirnhaus seems to repeatedly misunderstand Spinoza’s position on the 
infinity of the attributes, as well as his position on our inability to conceive them through 
each other, it is no surprise that his responses to Tschirnhaus become terser, and given the 
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otherwise polite tenor of the exchange, perhaps more irritated. Spinoza finishes Letter 66 by 
saying “If you attend just a bit to these things, you’ll see that there is no remaining difficulty, 
etc.” And it appears that Spinoza ceases to want to correct Tschirnhaus on the point about the 
infinity of God’s attributes. 
 So, it appears that Spinoza’s brief response just ignores Tschirnhaus’ 
misunderstanding and gives Tschirnhaus an explanation that assumes that there are more than 
two attributes. On this speculative assumption, Spinoza explains, there are infinitely many 
minds corresponding to infinitely many attributes. Of course, Spinoza would argue, we 
cannot know if there are these other minds, but it would appear to be the case that there 
would be infinitely many of them since there “could be” other attributes (Ep 64, IV/278/20). 
Remember: Spinoza cannot say intelligibly say that “there are not” or “could not be” other 
attributes because he cannot think them. So, it appears that Spinoza’s speculations in Letter 
66 do not provide definitive evidence in favor of the Objective Interpretation.   
4.2.3. Letter 56 to Hugo Boxel 
Another popular bit of text to cite in favor of the Objective Interpretation is in Letter 56.44 
Here, Spinoza responds to Boxel’s worry that Spinoza claims to have complete knowledge of 
God in virtue of knowing all of God’s attributes. In response, Spinoza says: 
To your question as to whether I have as clear an idea of God as of a triangle, I reply 
in the affirmative. But if you ask me whether I have as clear a mental image of God 
as of a triangle, I reply in the negative. We cannot imagine God, but we can 
apprehend him by the intellect. Here it should also be observed that I do not claim to 
have complete knowledge of God, but I do understand some of his attributes 
                                               
44 See Curley (2016, 423 n.109), Melamed (forthcoming, 5-6), and Melamed (2017, 99) 
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(attributa)—not indeed all of them (omnia), or the greater part (maximam partem)—
and it is certain that my ignorance of very many attributes does not prevent me from 
having knowledge of some of them. (emphasis added) 
Spinoza clearly denies that he knows all, or even most of what the Latin refers to as God’s 
“attributa.” At first glance, the qualification that he fails to know the greater part (maximam 
partem) is highly suggestive of the Objective reading because it suggests (1) that Spinoza 
believes that there are many more attributes and (2) he fails to know the majority of them. 
Without the qualifications, in other words, the text would be consistent with the Human 
Perspective Interpretation because it would amount to a mere denial of knowledge of other 
attributes.45  
 We should note something important about the Latin here. Spinoza wrote the original 
Letter 56 in Dutch, which was subsequently lost. What we have is in its place in the Opera 
Posthuma is a Latin version of unknown origin.  If it is a translation, it is entirely possible 
that the translator chose the Latin attributa to translate the relevant Dutch, without regard for 
its technical usage. We are unware whether the letter, for example used eigenschappen, 
which, in the Short Treatise, corresponds to the more technical notion of attribute of the 
Ethics, or a word like eigenen, which Spinoza uses to refer to non-attribute propria of God 
like immutability and omniscience.46 Given the close usage of these terms in Dutch (and the 
fact to be discussed below that Boxel insists on a non-Spinozistic usage of “attribute”) a 
mistake would have been natural. If that is the case, and attributa is an unfortunate 
                                               
45 Pace those who cite Letter 64 and the Short Treatise’s denials of knowledge as suggestive of a commitment to 
other attributes.  
46 Cf. (KV, I, ii., 29) and (KV, I, vii, 6)  
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translation of a more neutral term like eigenen, then this text would not present as strong of a 
case for the Objective Interpretation.  
Second, it should be noted that Spinoza freely uses eigenschappen throughout the 
Short Treatise to describe features of God that are not “proper attributes” (eigene 
eigenschappen) (KV, I, ii, 28 I/27/15), like being a cause of all things (KV III), having 
providence (V), predestining all things (VI), and so on. The loose usage of the Dutch 
suggests that we cannot always count on Spinoza to have the official definition of “attribute” 
in mind when using eigenschappen, and so even the natural translation of that term to 
attributa in the Latin could be misleading.47 
 On a more neutral translation, Spinoza is merely claiming that he fails to know most 
of God’s properties, or most of the things that are true of God. This thesis is uncontroversial 
as far as the dispute over attributes is concerned: it is impossible for any finite being to know 
everything that there is to know about God, or Nature, if “everything” includes all of God’s 
modes in addition to its attributes. One can know all of God’s attributes, or God’s essence, 
without knowing all of the true things that one could predicate of God, in other words. 
This is suggested in Letter 54, when Spinoza denies that God has certain human 
“attributes”. He writes, “I too, not to confuse the divine nature with the human, ascribe to 
God no human attributes, such as will, intellect, attention, hearing, etc.” (IV/252/1-3). These 
could not be “attributes” in the 1D4 sense because humans are not substances and are not 
essentially willing, hearing, and so on things. Boxel clearly adopts this unofficial usage in 
Letter 55.  
                                               
47 Curley wisely reveals this fact in his translation by putting “attribute” in quotes to suggest a non-official usage.  
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 Furthermore, what Spinoza says about triangles to clarify his position right after the 
selected text suggests that word translated as attributa, was actually intended to indicate a 
lack of knowledge about a great deal of the propria that apply to God. Spinoza writes that, 
When I was studying Euclid’s Elements, I understood early on that the three angles of 
a triangle are equal to two right angles, and I clearly perceived this property 
(proprietatem) of a triangle, although I was ignorant of many others.   
Here, the translator chooses to use proprietas in the context of talking about the triangle 
instead of attributa, which is telling. If Spinoza means to clarify that he’s talking about 
God’s essence when he denies the completeness of his knowledge, the use of this theorem 
would be highly misleading. After all, the theorem that the interior angles of a triangle sum to 
180 degrees is hardly a candidate for characterizing the essence of a triangle.  In the relevant 
part of the Elements, which Spinoza refers to in the example, this theorem is a proposition 
(1P17) about a property of a triangle, as opposed to a definition, and it follows from several 
other facts about sides and angles. The triangle, however, is defined in terms of the number 
of sides (1D19, 1D20).48  
 Spinoza also uses this very example in the Short Treatise’s Second Dialogue (I/32/10-
26). Here, Spinoza compares his idea of a triangle with the idea of “the extension of one of 
its angles.” He then mentions that these two ideas can be used to prove that the sum of the 
degrees of the interior angles is 180 degrees. However, this demonstration does not change 
the essence of the idea of the triangle. He writes, 
                                               
48 Here I am modeling my citation of Euclid on Spinoza, substituting “parts” in Spinoza for “books” in Euclid. 
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You see now that although this new idea [the theorem] is united to the preceding one 
[the triangle], no change takes place on that account in the essence of the preceding 
one. On the contrary, it remains without the least change. 
So, in a similar context (a discussion about God’s attributes) in a different work, Spinoza 
clearly distinguishes the essence of a triangle from what the theorem states. Given that 
Spinoza uses an example to clarify the incompleteness of his knowledge of God in which an 
essence is clearly not under discussion, it would be strange for him to be illustrating his 
ignorance of a great deal of God’s proper attributes.  
It would also be natural for Spinoza to have what he considers propria of God in 
mind when discussing this matter with Boxel, since Boxel’s discussion focuses on God’s 
purported “superhuman attributes”: Boxel (Ep 55) argues that if we do not think of the divine 
attributes as infinite versions of human attributes, like willing, thinking, sensing, etc., then he 
fails to understand what Spinoza means by “God.” As was mentioned before, Spinoza 
believes that these propria or “extrinsic denominations” can be reduced to Thought and 
Extension or eliminated entirely. It is natural, however, to see why Spinoza would deny full 
knowledge of all of God’s propria, because to have such knowledge would to be to have 
knowledge of every property that necessarily, thought non-essentially, characterizes God. 
And, like in the case of the triangle, it is not clear how this could be possible.49  
                                               
49 In fact, in some cases, it’s not clear that we can get a full grasp on some of the propria themselves. See the 
discussion of the inexplicability God’s omnipresence in CM (I/254/28-35).  
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4.2.4. From the Short Treatise 
1.1.1.5 Note 3 
A brief selection from a note in the Short Treatise appears to provide the most compelling 
evidence for the Objective Interpretation (I, i, n.3).50 Spinoza writes, 
After the preceding reflections on Nature, we have not yet been able to find in it more 
than two attributes that belong to this all-perfect being. And these give us nothing by 
which we can satisfy ourselves that these would be the only ones of which this perfect 
being would consist. On the contrary, we find in ourselves something which openly 
indicates to us not only that there are more, but also that there are infinite perfect 
attributes which must pertain to this perfect being before it can be called perfect. 
And where does this Idea of perfection come from? It cannot come from these 
two, for two gives only two, not infinitely many. From where, then? Certainly not 
from me, for then I would have had to be able to give what I did not have. From 
where else, then, than from the infinite attributes themselves, which tell us that they 
are, though they so far do not tell us what they are. For only of two do we know what 
they are. 
What appears to be especially troubling for the Human Perspective Interpretation about this 
passage is that Spinoza explicitly endorses the general thought “that there are other 
attributes,” even if he does not assert existence of a particular “other attribute.” 
 Additionally, the Short Treatise contains several instances wherein Spinoza is clear 
that “infinite” means “unlimited” or “all” when he talks about the infinity of God’s attributes. 
                                               
50 Joachim (39, n.5) claims that the following passages from KV establish that there are other attributes “beyond 
any reasonable doubt.” 
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Often, “infinite” and “all” are simply juxtaposed, with the latter clarifying the former. And 
Spinoza refers to God, the infinite being, as All in several places.51 So, Spinoza does not take 
the mistaken step of concluding from God’s infinity alone that it must have more than two 
attributes. There must be some other grounds for which Spinoza makes this conclusion.  
 Most of the passage other than this last thought is not problematic for my 
interpretation. On that view, we cannot know what the other attributes are and we lack any 
definite demonstration that there are no more than the two of which we are aware. However, 
in this note in one of Spinoza’s earliest works (and it should be emphasized that this is the 
only place where Spinoza makes this kind of substantive claim), he goes on to say that 
“something” compels us to assent to the idea that there are more. This something is in some 
sense “external to us” because it is impossible for us to generate or, better, achieve ideas of 
other attributes from the ideas of the two we can conceive. Spinoza’s best explanation is that 
this “something” is God insofar as God has other attributes. 
 Supporting one’s interpretation by pointing to Spinoza’s marginalia should seem 
problematic enough in its own right, but we shouldn’t exclude it from consideration.52 The 
issue with this text is not that it appears in the notes to an early treatise, it’s that this text itself 
and others in the Treatise itself suggest that Spinoza’s views on the attributes actually 
changed, and to my mind, clarified in the period between the composition of it and the 
Ethics. There are several important differences between Spinoza’s thought in the two works 
                                               
51 See Section 4.1.3 
52 And this is to (I think generously) ignore the problems inherent in interpreting the Treatise. As Curley notes in 
his introduction, the Treatise is likely a copy of a copy of another manuscript, contains errors in copying, and 
has features suggesting that it still required serious revisions. It is also unclear for various reasons whether we 
can take the marginal notes as definitive of Spinoza’s final thoughts on the matters on which he was writing.  
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(and in this selection in particular) that should be highlighted to help us make sense of this 
passage. The question we should ask is whether it is more likely that there is an interpretation 
that can reconcile these differences in the two works, or whether we should agree that 
Spinoza’s thought is slightly, if importantly, different, at least when it comes to the issue of 
the other attributes. 
 The most important difference is Spinoza’s views on the distinction between the 
attributes in the Short Treatise versus the Ethics. In the Ethics, it is of course a hallmark 
thesis that Thought and Extension can in no way be conceived through one another (1P10s). 
However, as some have noticed in the secondary literature, the same does not seem to be true 
in the Short Treatise.53 Several texts suggest that modes of the two known attributes have 
causal influence on one another. Here are some examples: 
(1) Spinoza writes that the attributes “act on one another” and the soul can cause 
changes “in the animal spirts.” (KV, II, xix,10-11, I/91/32-92/26; II, xx, 2, 
I/95/27-I/96/5)  
(2) In fact, the soul and body “exercise influences on one another” because they are 
“united” (II, xix, 9, I/91/30) 
(3) The soul “arises from the existence” of the body. (App. II, 12, I/120/1) 
(4) There is no proposition demonstrating a causal barrier in the First Appendix’s 
propositions, even though attributes are asserted to be really distinct and thus to 
have no overlapping modes. These axioms (3 and 4) are not strong enough to rule 
out cross-attribute causation.54 
                                               
53 Della Rocca (1996, 12), Melamed (2013, 167, n.32-5), Donagan (1980, 101), Garber (2014) 
54 pace Della Rocca (ibid, 175, n. 36). 
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It should be noted, however, that Spinoza does seem to be suspicious about some body-soul 
interactions (for example, he denies that motion can be caused by the mind (II, xix, 8)), but 
the relevant passages still suggest that the link between modes of different attributes is much 
tighter than the parallel causal chains of 2P7. 
 What this suggests about our main quote, then, is that in the Short Treatise, Spinoza 
may have the philosophical tools necessary for explaining this “something” that gives him 
the idea that other attributes exist. His language in the quote suggests causality: the idea 
“comes from” the other attributes in some way. (After all, even though Spinoza takes the 
causal exclusion to be weakened here, he still thinks that there is enough of exclusion prevent 
knowledge of these attributes.) Perhaps, if Spinoza allows cross-attribute causal influences in 
the Short Treatise, then he could have allowed other attributes to implant this idea in him.  
 The details of this implantation, of course, are obscure. And the general move of 
pointing out the permeability of the causal barrier in the Short Treatise, taken even by 
supporters of the Objective Interpretation, is arguably a bit too generous to Spinoza, because 
it assumes that Spinoza’s note espouses a thesis that can be made consistent with the rest of 
his commitments in the Treatise. It does however, provide an interpretative route that is 
friendly to the Human Perspective Interpretation because Spinoza’s tentative, marginal, 
admission of other attributes into his ontology here is based on a core philosophical doctrine 
that greatly changed by the time he composed the Ethics. In Spinoza’s most systematic and 
clearest presentation of his philosophy, he repudiated the thesis that is necessary for 
defending the Objective Interpretation.  
 There is another interpretative route we could take here. We can assume that 
Spinoza’s note here is an expression of what he would later consider (in the Ethics) as a 
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confused way of conceiving the attributes. Note that in the passage, Spinoza appears to be 
thinking of the attributes as falling into a countable class under the abstract concept of an 
“attribute”: he argues that the two attributes could not have produce this “something” “for 
two can only yield two.” That is, numerically speaking, one cannot arrive at the idea of 
infinitely many things of a class by finite reflection on some finite number of things in that 
class. The latter point is consistent with Spinoza’s thoughts about the infinite. 
 But what seems problematic about the passage is that it conceives of infinite things as 
numbered, and as Letter 12 and 1P15s reveal, thinking of the infinite in terms of number is 
bound to lead to confusion because it involves using an imaginative aid to conceive the 
infinite. In this case, (and arguably in the case of interpretations that understand Spinoza’s 
view to be that there are uncountably many attributes), the confusion is inevitable: 
representing the attributes as two, namely as numbered, is bound to give the appearance that 
there is a limitation on how many attributes there are. This is why God’s having two 
attributes seems to be in conflict with its perfection, as Spinoza says in the note. Since there 
are numbers conceived as greater than two, it is natural, if we use the imaginative device of 
number to represent the attributes, to think that there are more attributes than two, and indeed 
more attributes than any finite number. But, again, by the standard of the Ethics, these 
thoughts are hopelessly confused. 
 So, if we cannot give an interpretation of the note that is consistent with the rest of the 
Short Treatise, we can at least see (1) that it expresses a highly natural, albeit confused 
thought that (2) can be diagnosed, as it were, using the resources of Spinoza’s more polished 
work. No matter which route we take, it appears as though the ideas expressed in this 
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marginal note are inconsistent with Spinoza’s thought in the Ethics and thus do no mandate 
the Objective Interpretation. 
1.1.1.6 Second Appendix 
The considerations raised in 4.3.4.1 bear on a second appearance of the “other attributes” in 
the Second Appendix of the Short Treatise. Spinoza writes, 
Therefore, the essence of the soul consists only in the being of an Idea, or objective 
essence, in the thinking attribute, arising from the essence of an object which in fact 
exists in Nature. I say of an object that really exists, etc., without further particulars, 
in order to include here not only the modes of extension, but also the modes of all the 
infinite attributes, which have a soul just as much as those of extension do (I/119/6). 
Here, we see a more explicit mention of modes of the other attributes. Melamed quotes this 
text and writes that it is an “elaborate discussion” of those modes (forthcoming, 6-7). 
However, he neglects to include the context of this statement in the Appendix. Later, Spinoza 
goes on to say, 
This is why we have used these words in the definition, that the soul is an Idea arising 
from an object which exists in Nature. And with this we consider that we have 
sufficiently explained what kind of thing the soul is in general, understanding by this 
expression not only the Ideas that arise from corporeal modes, but also those that 
arise from the existence of each mode of the remaining attributes  
But since we do not have, of the remaining attributes, such a knowledge as we 
have of extension, let us see whether, having regard to the modes of extension, we 
can discover a more particular definition, which is more suited to express the essence 
of our soul. For this is our real intention (I/119/33). 
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As we see in 2P7, Spinoza aims to give a general definition of “soul” or “mind” on which 
something’s “soul” is just an idea that takes that thing as its object. My soul is the idea of my 
body, as Spinoza will assert at 2P13. However, Spinoza immediately denies that we have 
knowledge of the “remaining” attributes and then moves on to his “real intention” which is to 
discuss the ideas of extended things.  
 This is consonant with Spinoza’s vague “feeling” that there are “other attributes” 
mentioned in 4.3.4.1. As I argued there, Spinoza does not seem to have settled his views on 
the distinction between and causal isolation of the modes of different attributes. If he takes 
himself to have a notion that there are other attributes, it makes sense that he might produce 
this general definition and then ignore some of its consequences. However, as we see in texts 
like 1P10 and its scholium in the Ethics, Spinoza is very clear that we cannot conceive “other 
attributes” through Thought and Extension. So, any “feeling” that there are other attributes 
must be confused.  
5. Conclusion 
In 2.3, I argued that a God’s Perspective Interpretation would be mandated by Spinoza’s text 
if we had to answer “yes” to one of the following questions. 
1. Does “intellect” in Spinoza’s definition of “attribute” refer only to the infinite 
intellect? 
2. Does “intellect” in that definition refer only to the finite intellect? 
3. Is the “perception” referred to in that definition inaccurate? 
4. Does Spinoza’s text require the Numerosity Interpretation? 
5. Does Spinoza’s text commit him to the existence of humanly uncognizable attributes? 
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Over the last three sections, I have argued that Spinoza’s text does not mandate a yes to any 
of these questions. If I am right, then the Human Perspective Interpretation provides a 
plausible interpretation of Spinoza’s text. We are not required to ascribe to Spinoza a 
commitment to attributes other than Thought and Extension or to a “real essence” which we 
subjectively perceive as Thought and Extension.  Because Spinoza’s text does not require a 
God’s Perspective Interpretation, we are free to decide on which interpretation is correct on 
philosophical grounds: which interpretation provides the simplest, most coherent 
reconstruction of Spinoza’s theory of the attributes? Because even supporters of God’s 
Perspective Interpretations acknowledge deep inconsistencies in Spinoza on their readings, 
we have reason to consider alternative interpretations. I suggest we start anew with a human 
perspective on Spinoza’s metaphysics.
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CHAPTER 2: THE CONCEPTUAL DISTINCTION AMONG SUBSTANCE AND ITS 
ATTRIBUTES IN SPINOZA 
1. Introduction 
According to Spinoza, there is only one substance: God (1P14). In other words, God is the 
only being that does not depend on something else for its existence (1D3). Every other being 
(e.g., human minds and bodies) is just a way that God is, or a “mode” of God (1D5).  
 Spinoza defines “God” as a “substance consisting of infinite attributes” (1D6) and 
tells us that attributes are “what intellect perceives of substance as constituting its essence” 
(1D4). The human intellect perceives God’s essence as constituted by two attributes: Thought 
and Extension. In other words, we conceive God as essentially a thinking and extended 
thing.55  
Because God is a substance, we do not conceive God through anything else (1D3). 
Our idea of God, in other words, does not involve an idea of some other being on which God 
depends. Similarly, Spinoza argues that God’s attributes must be conceived through 
themselves (1P10). One cannot conceive these “attributes” through one another: one cannot 
understand extended things as depending on or causing thinking things and vice versa.
                                               
55 According to those with an “Objective Interpretation” of the attributes, God has more attributes than the two 
we perceive. I cast doubt on the textual warrant and coherency of this interpretation in Chapters 1 and 3.  For 
the purposes of this chapter, all that matters is that God has more than one attribute, which no one will contest.  
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 Spinoza claims that God’s attributes, in other words, can be conceived to be “really 
distinct” (1P10). As such, Spinoza argues, the attributes of Thought and Extension and their 
respective modes, have “nothing in common” and “cannot be understood through one 
another” (1A5).  
Nevertheless, Spinoza claims that the “really distinct” attributes are each expressions 
of “one and the same” substance, and that the modes of these attributes are “one and the 
same,” yet comprehended under distinct attributes (2P7). In other words, the attributes of 
Thought and Extension are distinct “expressions” of, or ways of conceiving “one and the 
same” God and extended and thinking things are “one and the same,” conceived in two 
different ways. 
 It is clear that these doctrines form the foundation of Spinoza’s metaphysics of 
substance and attribute. However difficult these doctrines might be to understand in isolation, 
they appear to be outright inconsistent when considered in conjunction, at least if the popular 
Objective Interpretation is correct. 
On the Objective Interpretation, the attributes what God conceives of God’s own 
essence. Because God has perfect knowledge, according to Spinoza, it must be that God’s 
essence “really” is divided into multiple attributes. As such, the distinction among attributes 
must correspond to “objective” distinctions in God of some kind. These “objective 
distinctions” introduce what I’ll call the Identity and Simplicity Puzzles.  
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Spinoza seems to believe that all that exists is God and God’s modes (1A1). Because 
attributes are clearly not modes, Spinoza seems to believe that a substance is identical to its 
attributes.56 How can one God be identical to two “really distinct” attributes? 
 Finally, Spinoza argues that God is simple, or “undivided” (1P12-3). For Spinoza, 
God cannot be conceived as having “parts” (1P15, Ep 12). How can a simple substance be 
conceived to be “divided” into two “really distinct” attributes? 
 The key to solving these puzzles lies in Spinoza’s claim that one God is conceived 
under multiple attributes. Spinoza claims that “…the thinking substance and the extended 
substance are one and the same substance, which is now comprehended under this attribute, 
now under that” (2P7). In other words, the multiplicity of God’s attributes seems to be 
explained by a multiplicity of ways that God is “comprehended” or ways that God 
“expresses” God’s essence. How should we make sense of this claim? 
I will argue in this chapter that Spinoza’s elegant, simple solution to these puzzles 
involves the idea that a substance and its attributes are merely “conceptually distinct.” 
Though we can conceive God as having “really distinct” attributes, this does not entail that 
the attributes are “really distinct” from one another or from God. In other words, the 
attributes are different ways of conceiving the same thing. Of course, there are multiple ways 
of understanding this last claim. 
On what I’ll call the Aspect Interpretation, the multiple “ways” of understanding God 
correspond to multiple objective “aspects” of God. While God has distinct aspects—
                                               
56 Of course, this textual argument for the identity of substance and attribute is too quick. See 2.1 for a more 
rigorous textual case. 
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objective, intrinsic differences in God that we call “attributes”—these are aspects of one 
God.  
 The Aspect Interpretation of Spinoza can be understood as an extension of one 
interpretation of Descartes’ account of a “conceptual distinction.” On this interpretation of 
Descartes, God’s attributes are each aspects of a complex idea of God. When we understand 
God as omniscient, for example, we “selectively attend” to that attribute and “ignore,” for 
example, God’s omniscience. On this Interpretation, God is not strictly speaking identical 
with God’s attributes. I will argue that, whatever the merits of the Aspect Interpretation are 
for understanding Descartes, the Aspect Interpretation does not adequately explain Spinoza’s 
text.  
 Instead, I will adopt a highly plausible interpretation of Descartes’ notion which I will 
call the Cognitive Route Interpretation.  On this interpretation, the attributes are strictly 
identical to God, but we use distinct names of the attributes to indicate the “cognitive routes” 
we follow to the idea of God. The distinction in the attributes is a distinction in our “ways” of 
conceiving God and not distinctions in God.  
I will then extend the Cognitive Route Interpretation to Spinoza and defend it both as 
textually warranted and as providing an elegant solution to our three interpretative puzzles 
about Spinoza’s theory of God’s attributes. On this view, the “distinction” between the 
attributes Thought and Extension amounts to a distinction in the starting points on our routes 
to the idea of God. On the one hand, I can come to the idea of God by understanding God as 
the cause of extended things by making the idea of my body clear and distinct. On the other, I 
can come the idea of God by understanding God as the cause of thinking things by making 
the idea of my mind clear and distinct.  But no matter which of these two “routes” I take, I 
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come to form the same idea of the same being, God. God is, in other words, “one and the 
same substance” conceived in two different ways. 
2. Two Puzzles 
The two puzzles for Spinoza’s theory of substance and attribute are introduced by what is 
referred to as the Objective Interpretation of Spinoza’s account of God’s attributes. Spinoza 
defines “attribute” as “what intellect perceives of substance, as constituting its essence” 
(1D4). On the Objective Interpretation, the “intellect” in this definition refers to God’s 
intellect: the attributes are what God conceives of God’s own essence. Our perceptions of 
God’s essence are adequate or “objective” because God perceives God’s essence in the same 
way.  
According to Spinoza, God’s perception of God’s essence is of course true (2P32). 
Furthermore, God must conceive the attributes to be really distinct (1P33s2, 1P10).57 If God is 
not mistaken, there must be some ground of God’s divided conception of God’s own essence.  
This need to ground God’s divided conception leads immediately to the Puzzles, at 
least if we interpret Spinoza’s claims that substance and its attributes are identical and that 
substance is “simple” using unqualified notions of “identity” and “simplicity.” In Section 3, I 
will consider the Aspect Interpretation’s attempt to qualify these notions.  
                                               
57 At 1P10, Spinoza writes that we can conceive the attributes as really distinct, but since there is no potential 
intellect in God (1P33s2), God must understand them to be really distinct.  
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2.1.  The Identity Puzzle 
There is ample textual evidence that Spinoza took the attributes to be identical to substance. 
Despite their different definitions, the idea that “attribute” is interchangeable with the notion 
of “substance,” occurs repeatedly throughout Spinoza’s work. This interchange appears in 
the text in two forms. The first is when Spinoza describes the attributes as self-conceived, 
which is how he defines substance. The second is when Spinoza appears to interchange 
“substance” and “attribute” in proofs, definitions, and clarifications.  
In 1P10, Spinoza demonstrates that attributes must be conceived through themselves. 
Here the proof relies solely on the definitions of “substance” and “attribute.” Spinoza argues 
that since the attributes are perceived to be the essence of substance—that which explains 
what substances are in a way that distinguishes them from all other beings—and substances 
are conceived through themselves, then attributes must be conceived through themselves. We 
can use this result in conjunction with other claims in the Ethics to conclude that substances 
are identical to attributes. At 1A2, Spinoza claims that everything is either conceived through 
itself or through something else. At 1P6c, Spinoza claims that only substances and their 
modes exist. Together with the definitions of substance and mode, these entail that 
substances are the only self-conceived things and that modes are conceived through those 
substances. 1P10 makes it clear that attributes are not modes, since they are conceived 
through themselves. Thus, substances are identical to their attributes.  
 This conclusion is stated more succinctly in a different context at 1P28d, wherein 
Spinoza writes that “For there is nothing except substance and its modes (by A1, D3, and D5) 
and modes (by P25C) are nothing but affections of God's attributes.” This claim is only 
coherent if substances are identical with their attributes.   
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 At 1P29, Spinoza defines Naturata naturans as “what is in itself and is conceived 
through itself, or [sive] such attributes of substance as express an eternal and infinite essence, 
i.e. […] God…” Here, Spinoza uses the Latin sive which he typically uses to indicate that he 
is clarifying what has just been said. This suggests that the attributes, “i.e. God,” are in 
themselves and conceived through themselves. 
 There are a number of texts where Spinoza uses the notions of “substance” and 
“attribute” interchangeably. In the Short Treatise, Spinoza says explicitly that he uses the 
term “attribute” to describe what “others call […] substances”, namely “a being existing 
through itself” (I, viii, 10). He also uses “substance” to clarify the term “attribute,” writing 
that “P3: Every attribute, or substance is by its nature infinite…” (IApp.) 
 The Ethics is replete with similar examples. At 1P4, Spinoza again clarifies that 
attributes and their substances are identical. He writes, “Therefore, there is nothing outside 
the intellect through which a number of things can be distinguished from one another except 
substances, or what is the same (by D4), their attributes, and their affections,   q.e.d.”.58 1P19 
and 1P20 suggest that the same proofs can be used to show that “God, or all of God’s 
attributes” are eternal and immutable. In each case, eternity and immutability are predicated 
of the attributes in virtue of the attributes constituting the essence of an eternal and 
immutable substance. And in 1P20, Spinoza argues that God’s existence is identical with his 
essence. Since God’s essence is perceived as God’s attributes (1D4), God must be perceived 
as identical with God’s attributes.   
 In the proof of 1P30, Spinoza subtly and without argument switches from a proof 
about substance to a proof about the attributes. He sets out to prove that the infinite intellect 
                                               
58 All cases of underlining are my emphasis. 
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comprehends only God’s attributes and the modes of those attributes. His proof relies on the 
premise that nothing exists outside of substance (God) and its affections. However, he does 
not conclude that because the infinite intellect comprehends everything it must comprehend 
substance and its modes. Instead, he concludes that it must comprehend God’s attributes and 
their modes. This would be a leap in logic if substances were somehow distinct from 
attributes. 
 All of this textual evidence suggests that Spinoza understood the attributes to be 
identical to substance. This might suggest the following unsound syllogism: 
1) Thought = Attribute 
2) Extension = Attribute 
3) God = Attributes 
4) God = Thought 
5) God = Extension 
\ Thought = Extension 
The conclusion of this syllogism seems to be false for Spinoza. Spinoza seems to suggest that 
the attributes are not conceived to be identical to one another. At 1P10s, Spinoza claims that 
we can conceive the attributes as “really distinct” and “in isolation” of one another.  At 1P2, 
he claims that substance with different attributes have “nothing in common with one 
another.” These would be strange claims if the attributes were identical. So, how is it that 
distinct attributes can be identical with one and the same substance? 




Before we proceed further, we must recall here what we showed viz. that whatever can 
be perceived by an infinite intellect as constituting an essence of substance pertains to 
one substance only, and consequently that the thinking substance and the extended 
substance are one and the same substance, which is now comprehended under this 
attribute, now under that. 
So, a solution to the Identity Puzzle will lie in understanding Spinoza’s claim that one and 
the same substance is “comprehended” or conceived under two distinct attributes. 
2.2. The Simplicity Puzzle 
Immediately after demonstrating that God exists (1P11), Spinoza demonstrates that attributes 
cannot “divide” substance (1P12) and that, in general, nothing can “divide” substance 
(1P13). 1P13 is clearly directed at the claim that a substance can be divided into “parts,” i.e., 
modes, so it does not concern us here.  
 Though Spinoza warns us against concluding that distinct attributes divide substance 
into distinct substances at 1P10, 1P12 gives us an explicit demonstration justifying that 
warning. The demonstration starts with the assumption to be shown to be false: assume that a 
substance is divided by its distinct attributes. Spinoza notes that the products of that division 
will be either substances or non-substances (1A1).  We have to remember that by this point 
of the Ethics, Spinoza has demonstrated that (1) substances are infinite, (2) substances are 
self-caused and cannot cause one another and that (3) substances can only be distinguished 
by their attributes (after all, the “attributes” are what the intellect conceives as the essence of 
substance). So, if we assume that the products of our division are substances, we must 
conclude that a single substance can be divided into, for example, two infinite, self-caused 
substances, each with its own attribute. And, because these substances are the result of 
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“dividing” a more complex substance, it must be that either (1) the more complex substance 
is the cause of the simpler substances or (2) vice versa. However, at 1P6, Spinoza 
demonstrates that distinct substances cannot be the cause of one another because they have 
nothing in common with one another. That is, if the simpler substances have different 
attributes, then they have nothing in common with one another and thus cannot enter into 
causal relationships with one another (1P3). This shows that our assumption, that a substance 
with many attributes can be “divided” is false.  
If the products of our division are not substances—if the substance is ultimately 
composed of non-substances—then the substance would be produced by something else. 
However, Spinoza demonstrates at 1P7 that substances are the sole causes of themselves. It 
cannot be that a substance’s attributes divide it. 
These demonstrations are ways of expressing Spinoza’s views on the indivisibility of 
substance into complex, argumentative form. Spinoza’s ideas on the indivisibility of 
substance are more clearly expressed in Letter 12. In Letter 12—and in a less clear way 
1P15—Spinoza argues that the “infinite,” namely infinite substances, are properly understand 
as being free of limitation and division.  Any perceived division in substance will be the 
result of confused imaginative thinking. So, thinking of substances as intrinsically “divided” 
into parts or more fundamental substances is necessarily confused. I will not rehearse the 
arguments for this conclusion here. 
Nevertheless, as was mentioned in 2.1, we can conceive substance as constituted by 
“really distinct” attributes. Now, even if one disagrees that substance and attribute are 
identical simipliciter, as supporters of the Objective Interpretation (Section 2.3) must, it 
appears that real divisions among attributes appear to complexify substance in some way or 
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another. For example, a real distinction among attributes suggests that God’s essence is 
complex, even if God is not. In any case, it is not immediately clear how an “undivided” 
substance can have a division between its attributes. 
2.3. Motivating the Aspect Interpretation 
It seems that the only path forward for the Objective Interpretation is to qualify the sense in 
which attributes and substance are identical, the sense in which it is the same substance under 
each attribute, and the sense in which substance is simple. In Section 3, I will examine how 
the Aspect Interpretation relaxes the notions of identity and simplicity. On the Aspect 
Interpretation, attributes are merely aspects of God.  The notion of an “aspect” is notion 
custom-engineered to allow for the tightest ontological relationship between God and the 
attributes that is not just identity. On this view, this relationship is so close that it justifies 
Spinoza’s sliding back and forth between the notions of God and God’s attributes. It is “one 
and the same” God under the distinct attributes because those attributes are all aspects of the 
same thing. And because “aspects” are not parts of God, they do not “complexify” God 
except in a totally unqualified sense. I will argue that there is not sufficient textual evidence 
in support of the Aspect Interpretation and, in any case, these loose notions of identity and 
simplicity are too mysterious to ascribe to Spinoza. 
The alternative interpretation I offer in Section 4 is not an Objective Interpretation. It is 
what I refer to elsewhere as the Human Perspective Interpretation. On this interpretation, the 
primary meaning of “attribute” is what humans perceive of God’s essence.59 Humans can 
                                               
59 On the Human Perspective Interpretation, the definition of attribute (1D4) should be read “An attribute is what 
intellect perceives of substance as constituting [that substance’s] essence.” This interpretation does not assume 
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conceive God as divided into attributes, but they can also understand an ability to draw this 
division in the intellect is product of their own initially confused thought about God and not 
the product of a division internal to God.60 God is simple and identical to God’s attributes tout 
court. 
3. Spinoza on “real distinctions” 
How can Spinoza solve the Identity and Simplicity Puzzles? His solution lies in the claim 
that the attributes “can be conceived to be really distinct” (1P10s). In this section, I will trace 
Spinoza’s concept of “real distinction” to its origin in Descartes’ theory of distinctions, 
especially as that theory is expressed in his Principles of Philosophy. I will argue that 
Spinoza and Descartes differ in what they take to be the metaphysical consequences of a 
conceived “real distinction” between two things. Descartes holds that clearly and distinctly 
conceived real distinctions “divide” substances, where Spinoza claims that clearly and 
distinctly conceived real distinctions do not “divide” substance. In other words, Spinoza 
takes the “real distinction” between attributes have the (lack of) metaphysical consequences 
of Descartes calls a “conceptual distinction.”   
On the Aspect Interpretation, conceptual distinctions correspond to distinctions in 
different “aspects” of a substance. To clarify the Aspect Interpretation, I will briefly describe 
how Nolan uses it to make sense of Descartes notion of a conceptual distinction. After 
discussing Descartes, I will give an example of how one of Spinoza’s interpreters seems to 
                                               
that “intellect" is tacitly modified in some way. The attributes are in the finite human intellect and the infinite 
intellect, at least insofar as the former conceives the latter. 
60 That is not to say that the “attributes” are therefore illusory, as the now defunct Subjective Interpretation 
would require. Cf. Wolfson (v.1, 112-21, 142-57) 
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extend the Aspect Interpretation to Spinoza’s theory of the attributes. I will then argue that 
the Aspect Interpretation is untenable in Spinoza.  
3.1. Descartes on substance and attribute 
3.1.1. Real, Conceptual, and Modal Distinctions in Descartes  
In the Principles of Philosophy, the conception of a “conceptual distinction” is one part of 
Descartes’ tripartite theory of distinctions. Each distinction is characterized by (1) how it is 
conceived and (2) what ontological distinction Descartes takes it to correspond to. I will 
characterize each distinction in terms of two things, A and B, that bear the relevant 
distinction to one another.  
 Descartes writes that A and B are really distinct just in case A and B “can be clearly 
and distinctly conceived apart from one another” (I, 60). According to Descartes, only 
substances are properly called “really distinct” because only substances can be conceived 
apart from one another. The famous example of a real distinction is the real distinction 
between mind and body. According to Descartes, a mind can be conceived as existing apart 
from its body and vice versa. Minds and bodies are therefore understood to be distinct 
substances. 
A and B are modally distinct (I, 61) just in case either A is a mode of B or vice versa 
or A and B are modes of the same substance. Take the first case: A is a mode of substance B. 
We can recognize that A and B are modally distinct because we can clearly and distinctly 
perceive B apart from A but we cannot clearly and distinctly perceive A apart from B. 
Furthermore, if A and B are both modes of the same substance, then we can perceive them 
apart from each other but not apart from the substance that they modify. Descartes gives the 
example of the shape of an extended substance to illustrate a modal distinction: one can 
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conceive the extended substance without its particular shape, yet one cannot conceive of a 
particular shape except as a modification of an extended substance.   
Finally, A and B are conceptually distinct (I, 62) just in case we cannot clearly and 
distinctly perceive A apart from B and vice versa.61 For Descartes, there is only a conceptual 
distinction between a substance and its attributes and between the attributes themselves. For 
example, Descartes claims that a substance and its duration (one of its attributes) are only 
conceptually distinct: if one conceives of a (finite) substance without duration, then one has 
to concede that that substance doesn’t exist, so one cannot clearly and distinctly perceive a 
substance without duration. And, one cannot clearly and distinctly perceive duration except 
as it belongs to an enduring substance.  
The interpretations of Descartes discussed here disagree about the ontological 
consequences of conceptual distinctions. Do conceptual distinctions correspond to distinct 
“aspects” of a substance, or do they not make any ontological distinction at all? 
3.1.2. These Distinctions in Spinoza 
Spinoza clearly had these distinctions in mind when constructing his philosophy.  
 The notion of a conceptual distinction appears in various places in Spinoza’s work. In 
the Cogitata Metaphysica, Spinoza claims that “[A substance] must, therefore, be explained 
by some attribute, from which, nevertheless, it is distinguished only by a distinction of reason 
                                               
61 As Nolan (135) notes, Descartes says only that  
[a conceptual] distinction is recognized by our inability to form a clear and distinct idea of the 
substance if we exclude from it the attribute in question, or, alternatively, by our inability to perceive 
clearly the idea of one of the two attributes if we separate it from the other (PP 62).  
He does not explicitly say the converse. Nolan argues that PP 55 implies the converse.  
It should be noted that “conceptual distinction” is often translated as “rational distinction.” 
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[ratione distinguitur].” (CM 1, III) In that work, he also warns the reader against confusing 
conceptual and modal distinctions as (he claims) Descartes does (CM I, VI). Furthermore, he 
claims that the attributes are distinct only by reason and that this follows from the fact that 
God is a simple being (CM I, V)) In the Short Treatise, Spinoza tells us that truth and falsity 
are “distinct only by reason and not really” and goes on to say that a distinction of reason 
does not match a distinction in the thing conceived (II, XV). In the Ethics at 4P8, Spinoza 
argues that the idea of an affect is only “conceptually [conceptu] distinct” as opposed to 
really distinct from its object. Importantly, 4P8’s demonstration cites 2P21 which in turn 
cites 2P7, Spinoza’s argument for the identity of substance conceived under the distinct 
attributes. This suggests that substance and attribute are conceptually distinct in Spinoza, as 
they are in Descartes.  
 The notion of a modal distinction is implicit in Spinoza’s definition of mode at 1D5, 
where he claims that modes are “conceived through” their substances. At 1P15s[V], Spinoza 
argues that “parts” of extended substance are distinguished only modally as opposed to 
really. That is, the parts of extended substance are not themselves substances, but are merely 
“affections” of extended substance. In Cogitata Metaphysica, Spinoza explicitly cites and 
appears to endorse Descartes’ definition of a mode in the Principles (CM 1, I).62 
3.1.3. Spinoza’s Departure from Descartes  
Though Spinoza clearly borrows Descartes theory of distinctions, he appears to depart from 
Descartes on a few key points. 
                                               
62 He writes, “it is easy to see that being should be divided into being which exists necessarily by its own nature, 
or whose essence involves existence, and being whose essence involves only possible existence. This last is 
divided into Substance and Mode, whose definitions are given in the Principles of Philosophy I, 51, 52, and 56. 
So it is not necessary to repeat them here.” Insofar as the CM represents Spinoza’s own views, this appeal to 
Descartes’ definition reads like an adoption or endorsement of the Cartesian definition of “mode.”  
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 First, Spinoza believes that attributes can be clearly and distinctly conceived to be 
really distinct from one another, even if he denies that they are really distinct (1P10s) and 
denies that substances can (1P14). Descartes holds that distinct substances are clearly and 
distinctly conceived to be really distinct and that attributes of distinct substances are clearly 
and distinctly conceived to be really distinct.63 
 Second, Spinoza denies that clearly and distinctly conceiving two things as really 
distinct entails that they are really distinct substances, as he warns us in 1P10s. 
 Finally, as we will see in Section 3.2 and 4.2, Descartes does not think that really 
distinct things can be conceived “in isolation” of one another. To form clear and distinct idea 
of A, one must exclude it from a clear and distinct idea of B. Spinoza does not claim that 
conceiving A requires one to exclude B. He says that the attributes can be conceived “in 
isolation” of one another (1P10s).   
 The following table compares Spinoza and Descartes on the nature of the distinctions. 
  
                                               
63 The fact that attributes of distinct substances are conceived to be really distinct is implied by Descartes’ claim 




Descartes How Conceived What Conceived Ontological 
Implications  
Real Distinction A conceived while 
excluding B and vice 
versa 
A and B are 
substances or 
attributes of distinct 
substances 








A not conceivable 
apart from B and vice 
versa 
A is an attribute of 
substance B or vice 
versa or A and B are 
both attributes of the 
same substance 
? 
Spinoza How Conceived What Conceived Ontological 
Implications 
Real Distinction A conceivable in 
isolation of B and vice 
versa 
A and B are both 





A not conceivable 
apart from B and vice 
versa 
A is an attribute of 




Table 3: Distinctions in Descartes and Spinoza 
 
The key interpretative questions, then, are: what are the ontological implications for 
conceiving (1) conceptual distinctions in Descartes and (2) conceiving real and conceptual 
distinctions in Spinoza?  We will now consider the answer given to these questions by the 
Aspect Interpretation. 
3.2.  The Aspect Interpretation in Descartes 
 The Aspect Interpretation is developed by Nolan in his “Reductionism and 
Nominalism in Descartes’s Theory of Attributes.” Nolan’s integrates Descartes’ theory of 
distinctions with Descartes’ theory of the mental operations that correspond to those 
distinctions.  Nolan argues that we can characterize Descartes’ distinctions in terms two 
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kinds of “mental operations”: “abstraction” and “exclusion” (133-5). For ease of exposition, 
assume that these operations are performed clearly and distinctly.  
Imagine conceiving of some complex idea, say of a complex substance. When 
forming an idea from some richer idea via abstraction, I selectively attend to some “aspect” 
of a complex idea, while “turning [my] thought away” from other aspects of that idea. Nolan 
cites the example of abstracting the shape of an extended substance from the substance itself. 
The abstraction here consists in mentally “focusing” on the shape and ignoring the 
substantiality or extendedness of that substance. That is not to say that we imagine some 
other representation of the shape, say in lines of chalk written on a blackboard. Instead, we 
attend to the shape as it is present in its substance while ignoring other features of that 
substance. 
In contrast to abstraction, exclusion doesn’t involve mere selective attention. When I 
exclude one idea from another, I attend to one while “denying” the other. The most notable 
kind of exclusion, for Descartes, is my ability to exclude my idea of my mind (a thinking 
substance) from my idea of my body (an extended substance): I can conceive of my mind 
while denying the existence of my body and vice versa. Nolan notes whenever I can exclude, 
I can also abstract, but not vice versa since exclusion is a more “extreme” mental operation. 
Descartes claims that we cannot conceive of the attributes in isolation of one another 
because, in order to conceive one, we must “deny” the other.    
  According to Nolan, Descartes took these different mental operations to have 
different ontological implications. For Descartes, abstraction carries no ontological weight: 
the fact that I can selectively attend to A while ignoring B does not entail that there is a 
robust metaphysical distinction between A and B outside of my intellect. However, my 
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ability to exclude A from B suggests that there is an ontological separation between A and B 
themselves. 
The reason that exclusion reveals metaphysical distinctions and abstraction fails to do 
so has to do with the connection Descartes draws between our clear and distinct perceptions 
and metaphysical reality. Descartes adopts what is commonly known as the Truth Rule: if I 
clearly and distinctly perceive something, then it must be true. Descartes arrives at the Truth 
Rule by reflecting on God’s goodness: he argues in the Fourth Meditation, for example, that 
my clear and distinct perceptions cannot be in error because otherwise God would be a 
deceiver. That is, God would have introduced a gap between my conception of the reality 
when I’m at my epistemic best and reality in itself. Because God is not a deceiver, it must be 
that things really are the way I conceive them to be, at least insofar as I am clear and distinct. 
For this reason, if I clearly and distinctly exclude A from B, then there must be some kind of 
distinction between A and B that warrants this exclusion. The same is not true of abstraction: 
even when I am clear and distinct, I cannot fully separate A and B when I abstract A from B 
or vice versa. “Focusing on” A in B is not the same as actively denying B.  
According to Nolan, modal, conceptual, and real distinctions can be characterized in 
terms of the presence and mutuality of exclusion. If A and B are mutually excludable, then A 
and B are really distinct substances. In other words, if I can conceive of A while excluding B 
and vice versa, then A and B are really distinct. If A and B are non-mutually excludable, then 
A and B are modally distinct. In other words, if A is excludable from B but not B from A or 
vice versa, then A and B are only modally distinct. If A and B are not excludable at all, that 
is, are mutually inclusive, then A and B are only conceptually distinct. In other words, we 
cannot clearly and distinctly perceive A if we exclude B and vice versa.  
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For example, because I can exclude the idea of my mind from my body and vice 
versa, then my mind and body must be distinct substances. Because I can form an idea of my 
body while excluding its particular shape, but I cannot form an idea of my body’s particular 
shape while excluding the idea of my body, my body’s shape is a mode of my body. And 
because I can neither conceive of a substance while excluding its duration, nor conceive of a 
substance’s duration while excluding the substance itself, a substance and its duration are 
only conceptually distinct. At best, I can abstract a substance’s duration from my idea of that 
substance.  
According to Nolan, abstraction consists in selectively attending to simple(r) aspects 
of a complex idea (136). We can illustrate the model with the example of a clear and distinct 
idea of a particular triangle. The triangle has a number of distinct, highly general, intrinsic 
features, which Nolan refers to as “aspects”: a triangle has shape, duration, etc. According to 
Nolan, my idea of a triangle itself has various aspects corresponding to the various aspects of 
the triangle. When I abstract something from my idea of the triangle, I focus my attention on 
one of the various aspects of my idea: for example, I could form a (simpler) idea of the shape 
of the triangle while giving less attention its duration; I could focus on the size of the triangle 
while ignoring the particular triangle itself. That is not to say that I deny that the triangle has 
duration when I think of its shape or that I exclude its shape from its other attributes. I merely 
exert a kind of mental focus on each aspect.  
Nolan’s model can be extended to my idea of God, since God is a substance. For 
Nolan, my idea of God is multifaceted: I conceive God, for example, as omnipresent, 
omniscient, immutable, and existing (PP I, 22). I form an idea of one of these attributes by 
selectively attending to one aspect of my multifaceted idea of God. For example, I form an 
 
 101 
idea of God’s immutability by selectively attending to that aspect of God and ignoring other 
aspects such as his existence, omnipotence, and so on. Because I am merely abstracting these 
attributes from God, I am not recognizing a real distinction between God and its attributes. 
The same is true of the attributes themselves: on Nolan’s reading, Descartes also believes 
that because we cannot exclude God’s attributes from one another in thought, then those 
attributes must not be robustly distinct from one another outside of our thought. 
Nolan is not clear whether Descartes took the distinctions among aspects to be 
“objective” in the sense of corresponding to distinctions in God. There is considerable 
pressure for Nolan’s Descartes to take even conceptual distinctions to have some kind of 
ontological import, given that they can be clearly and distinctly perceived and thus must be 
“true” in some sense. If Nolan is forced to “ontologize” his aspects of God, his interpretation 
is not an example of what Nelson calls an Identity Interpretation (198). That is, if the idea of 
God has distinguishable aspects and that idea is “true,” it would seem to be the case that 
Nolan is committed to the distinguishable aspects of the idea of God to correspond to distinct 
aspects of God. If this is the case, then Nolan cannot hold that God’s attributes are strictly 
speaking identical to God. Furthermore, he cannot say that God is strictly speaking simple 
either because God has multiple intrinsic aspects. If his interpretation is coherent, he must 
qualify the notions of identity and simplicity.64  
It is clear, however, that an Aspect Interpretation of Spinoza’s theory of the attributes 
would require the distinctions between “aspects” to have ontological import, at least if the 
Objective Interpretation is correct. On the Objective Interpretation, God’s “aspects” cannot 
                                               
64 It should be noted again that Nolan does not make these claims. He seems to believe that the idea of God can 




reside wholly in the human intellect. As we will see, this “objective” Aspect Interpretation 
appears to reintroduce our puzzles for Spinoza. 
3.3. The Aspect Interpretation in Spinoza 
In Spinoza’s Metaphysics: Substance and Thought, Yitzhak Melamed offers an interpretation 
of Spinoza’s theory of the attributes that has strong affinities with Nolan’s Aspect 
Interpretation of Descartes. I should note at the start that Melamed himself does not explicitly 
endorse or reject Nolan’s characterization of Descartes, nor does he characterize Spinoza’s 
views in terms of mental operations. (He cannot because Melamed takes the distinctions to 
be drawn in God’s intellect.) Nevertheless, Melamed’s appeal to “aspects” has similar 
motivations and similar consequences and, as we will see, the differences between the two 
views are irrelevant. 
On Melamed’s view, God’s attributes are just the infinitely many “aspects” under 
which God conceives itself. This aspectual reading is extended to modes: Melamed draws a 
distinction between “modes of God” and “modes of attributes.” Like God, the modes of God 
have infinitely many aspects, each corresponding to a particular attribute. A mode of an 
attribute—for example a mode of Extension—is an aspect of a corresponding mode of God, 
conceived under a particular attribute, for example, Extension. Each idea in the infinite 
intellect—itself a mode of Thought—has infinitely many aspects corresponding to the 
infinitely many aspects of God its modes. The idea of God, then, has a rich internal, 
aspectual structure mirroring God’s own rich, internal, aspectual structure.  
Melamed’s notion of an “aspect” shares the following features with Nolan’s. First, it 
is not reducible to the notion of a “part,” nor is it identical to the notion of a “mode” (84). 
Second, a substance’s having distinct aspects does not suffice to divide that substance into 
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distinct substances. Melamed argues that Spinoza’s claim that thinking and extended 
substance are identical just amounts to the claim that “thinking” and “being extended” are 
two aspects of the same substance.  
Melamed does not appeal to selective attention or other “mental operations” in his 
discussion of God’s conception of the attributes because Spinoza’s God does not engage in 
such operations. On Melamed’s interpretation, the “conceptual distinctions” in God’s 
intellect among the different attributes amount to distinctions among aspects of ideas which 
in turn correspond to distinctions among aspects of God.  
Unless Melamed’s interpretation succumbs immediately to the Identity and 
Simplicity Puzzles, he must adopt qualified notions of identity and simplicity. After all, the 
distinct aspects of God are ontologically distinct even if they are not distinct substances. So, 
Melamed cannot say that God’s attributes are identical. On this interpretation, to say that 
substance is “identical to its attributes” is to say that ontologically distinct “aspects” of that 
substance belong to the same substance.65 Melamed cannot say that substance is identical to 
any particular attribute. 
                                               
65 Melamed is unclear on this point, especially given his repeated claim that God “has” the attributes, suggesting 
that the attributes are somehow distinct from God, at least collectively. Melamed hints that God is identical to 
the collection of attributes (83) in his discussion of “modes of God,” where he tells us that God is the substance 
under all attributes, but it seems to me that his interpretation requires it. Otherwise, Melamed will have to 
commit himself to an independent notion of “substance” such that the collection of attributes is distinct from 
substance. His criticisms of Bennett (82-3) suggest that this latter option is not his view. In (2017, 101-3), 
Melamed claims that substance and attribute are only “rationally distinct” (or what I call “conceptually” 
distinct). However, (unlike me) Melamed takes “rational distinctions” to correspond to distinctions outside of 
the intellect.  
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Furthermore, Melamed can say only that God is simple in the sense of not having 
“parts” or not being composed of other substances. But, because the aspects of God are 
distinct in an unqualified sense, he cannot say that God is simple simpliciter. 66 
3.4. Objections to the Aspect Interpretation in Spinoza  
Whether or not the Aspect Interpretation is the best interpretation of Descartes, it does not 
make the best sense of Spinoza’s text.  First, it’s far from obvious that Melamed’s notion of 
an “aspect” is present in Spinoza’s text. Second, it’s not obvious that the notion of an aspect 
is compatible with Spinoza’s apparently strict notions of identity and simplicity.   
The main worry for Melamed’s interpretation is that the notion of an “aspect” is ad 
hoc interpretative invention rather than a notion adopted by Spinoza himself. According to 
Melamed, the notion of an “aspect” is at play through Spinoza’s metaphysics and provides 
him solutions to the various philosophical puzzles that have been ascribed to his theory of the 
attributes. However, Spinoza himself never characterizes his views in terms of “aspects” or 
“facets.” Given that the notion of an “aspect” is not reducible to other notions like “mode” or 
“part”, one would have expected Spinoza to have defined it in Part I of the Ethics.  
The closest notion to that of an “aspect” is Spinoza’s notion of a “species,” in the 
phrase sub specie aeternitatis. (The only other usage is the one opposed to genus, which is 
clearly not at play here). Throughout the Ethics, Spinoza discusses the intellect’s ability to 
consider things “under the aspect [specie] of eternity,” that is, to consider them without 
consideration of their status as durational, or temporal, things (e.g., 5P22, Part V, passim.). It 
                                               
66 See Melamed’s discussion (2017, 101-3) of objective grounding of rational distinctions. 
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reasonable to give a Nolan-style gloss on this notion: when reason considers the body, for 
example, it ignores or abstracts away from those aspects of the body that are durational.67  
 However, Spinoza does not suggest anywhere in these texts that “eternity” is 
“objective” in the sense it is intrinsic to God: Spinoza always couples this notion of “species” 
with the conception of the human mind.68 In this sense, considering things under an aspect is 
essentially a “subjective” matter. Second, Spinoza is clear in the Short Treatise that eternity 
is not properly understood as an attribute of God, but is rather an “extrinsic denomination,” 
along with a variety of other putative “attributes” of God like immutability assigned by 
Spinoza’s contemporaries and predecessors (1, I , 29). As Nolan argues, the phrase “extrinsic 
denomination” appears to be borrowed from Suarez, who argues that distinctions of reason 
“consist[] solely in a certain [extrinsic] denomination [denominatione] issuing from concepts 
of the mind” and not in distinctions in the objects that those concepts apply to. This suggests 
that Spinoza actually thinks of conceptual distinctions in a similar way to Suarez, at least on 
Nolan’s reading of Suarez (Nolan 137).  For that reason, it appears that Spinoza cannot have 
thought that attributes were merely aspects under which we consider a substance or its 
modes, much less “objective” aspects. 
Of course, Melamed would readily admit that there is not much in the way of direct 
textual evidence here. The notion of an “aspect” is intended to be a useful interpretative posit 
which plays a central, albeit tacit role in Spinoza’s explication of his various complicated 
                                               
67 This is consonant with what Spinoza says about conceiving things sub specie aeternitatis in the TIE (108, 
II/39/16-20) 
68 One might argue that 1D6 is an exception since it claims that God’s essence is eternal. However, this is 
consistent with the identity of God’s essence with the attributes. Since the attributes are, on this interpretation, 
dependent on the human subject’s perception of God, their being conceived as eternal is also dependent on that 
perception. At best, 1D6 is equivocal between an intrinsic and extrinsic reading.  
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doctrines and one that helps Spinoza avoid numerous objections. The problem is that these 
objections are the result of Melamed’s Objective Interpretation of the attributes.  
Melamed takes it as a starting point of interpretation that Spinoza committed to the 
existence of more than two attributes.  As Melamed makes clear in Chapters 5 and 6 of 
Spinoza’s Metaphysics, the primary defense he offers of his Aspect Interpretation is that 
helps obviate the classic objection that Spinoza’s parallelism is inconsistent with his 
commitment to the existence of modes other than Thought and Extension. The remainder of 
his defense consists in showing how central texts can be given an aspectual reading. As far as 
I can tell, Melamed never argues that Spinoza’s text mandates the aspectual reading on its 
own terms. At best, Melamed can be construed as arguing that the Aspect Interpretation is 
the best Objective Interpretation and not the best Interpretation tout court. I have argued 
elsewhere that we have good reason to believe that Spinoza was not committed to these 
“other attributes,” so we have reason to suspect that the Objective Interpretation is required 
by Spinoza’s text in the first place.  
The Aspect Interpretation’s reliance on “loose” notions of identity and simplicity also 
seem to be in conflict with Spinoza’s text. As was noted in Section 2, Spinoza appears to use 
the notions of “substance” and “attribute” interchangeably in definitions, propositions, and 
demonstrations.  This interchangeability is hard to square with a “loose” conception of 
identity: if there is any kind of conceptual difference between an “attribute” and a 
“substance,” then Spinoza’s free exchange of these terms would appear to be unwarranted 
and, in some cases, problematic.  
Furthermore, Spinoza’s commitment to the indivisibility of substance in, e.g., Letter 
12, is an unnatural fit for the “loose” conception of simplicity that the Aspect Interpretation 
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must employ. In Letter 12 and 1P15, for example, Spinoza illustrates the indivisibility of 
substance in the context of its being extended and lacking parts. However, his arguments 
against using the imaginative constructs of Number and Quantity apply more generally to 
any attempt to divide substance into classes of things. “Aspects,” as far as I can tell (given 
the opacity of the notion) divide substance in this way: “aspect” seems to refer to a class of 
discrete things that constitute substance.  
These objections cast enough doubt on the viability of the Aspect Interpretation that I 
am willing to set it aside and consider an alternative. On the Cognitive Route Interpretation, I 
will now explicate, both Descartes and Spinoza hold that if A and B are conceptually distinct, 
then A = B without qualification. Unlike the Aspect Interpretation, the Cognitive Route 
Interpretation is an Identity Interpretation. On this view, conceptual distinctions are not 
mirrored in or among substances in any sense.  
4. A New Approach: Cognitive Routing 
4.1. Cognitive Routing in Descartes 
Nelson defends the Cognitive Route Interpretation of Descartes’s theory of distinctions in his 
“Conceptual Distinctions and the Concept of Substance in Descartes.” The key insight of this 
interpretation is the rejection of the idea that attributes are or correspond to intrinsic features 
of substance and our idea of it. Instead, Nelson takes the distinction between “substance” and 
each of the attributes to indicate something extrinsic to God and to be merely nominal. That 
is, “substance” or “God” and, for example, “omniscience” can be used to refer to a single, 
intrinsically simple idea of an intrinsically simple substance. The differences in the names of 
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the idea are used to indicate the different ways that the idea of God can be generated in the 
finite intellect. 
At the center of Nelson’s interpretation is the notion of a cognitive route. Consider 
one of the attributes that Descartes takes to belong to God: omniscience. Descartes takes 
himself to establish that there must be a being with each of these attributes by reflection on 
his own limitations. For example, imagine that a Cartesian meditator starts on a “route” to the 
idea of an omniscient being by first reflecting on a confused idea of her own knowledge. The 
meditator can come to realize that her knowledge is limited in various ways: she is subject to 
illusion and ignorance, for example. The meditator might come to realize that her knowledge 
can increase and furthermore that it an indefinitely increase because there is a potential 
infinity of things to know about the world around her. As the meditator clarifies and makes 
the idea of knowledge more distinct, she realizes this process of increasing knowledge is 
interminable and doomed to confusion. However, as she makes her idea of her knowledge 
more clear and distinct, she will come to realize that her limited knowledge is actually a 
limitation of a more perfect form of knowledge, a knowledge not of the infinitely complex 
world of finite minds and bodies, but of eternal truths that apply to that complex world. As 
she makes this further idea clear and distinct, the meditator can come to realize that there 
could be an infinite form of knowledge, that is, one not limited in any way. Of course, the 
meditator realizes that the infinite form of knowledge is only potential in her and will never 
be actual. Further, she may realize that perfect knowledge cannot be merely potential on pain 
of being imperfect. This leads the meditator to form the idea of actual, infinite knowledge. 
Since this knowledge is actual, it must belong to an actual perfect being, namely God. 
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Finally, the meditator has reached the idea of God. This “route” to the idea of God began 
with a confused idea of knowledge and ended with the idea of God.  
Of course, the meditator was able to reach the idea of God via the process of 
clarification and distinction because, according to Descartes on this interpretation, the idea of 
God is attainable by the clarification and distinction of any given idea because the idea of 
God is present in any given idea as its ultimate cause.  
On the Cognitive Route Interpretation, the terminal idea—the idea of God—of this 
route does not retain the intrinsic character of each step along the route. The terminus of this 
route is not God-qua-omniscient or Omniscience, in other words. It is the idea of God, an 
infinite substance. Furthermore, the idea of God, on this interpretation, is a simple idea. One 
cannot make the idea of God more clear and distinct by understanding God as dependent on 
some other being: God is, after all, a self-caused, necessarily existing substance.  
Because this idea can be reached by making any given idea clear and distinct, there 
are many routes to the idea of God. However, if we were to follow a route starting with a 
different confused idea—of our own power, for example—and then end with the idea of God, 
we would have arrived at intrinsically the same idea. Of course, the ideas of God at the 
termini of these routes are modally distinct because we follow them at different times. 
However, these terminal ideas of God have no intrinsic differences with one another.  
On this view, the distinct “content” of the ideas of omniscience, omnipresence, and so 
on is reduced to extrinsic facts about the distinct origins of the same idea of God. That is, the 
fact that the idea at the terminus of a cognitive route is an idea of “omnipresence” and not 
“omniscience” is explained in terms of its causal history in the subject: the distinct 
occurrences of the idea at the end of these termini are identical, even though they are reached 
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by distinct psychological processes. And, the distinction among these processes is accounted 
for in terms of the ideas that one starts with when they embark on the process of forming the 
idea of God as well as the ideas along the way. 
Nelson argues that we use different terms for different attributes to refer to the idea of 
God because it is useful to mark a distinction in language between the various cognitive 
routes, especially if one’s goal is to guide others to clear and distinct perceptions. For this 
reason, Nelson argues that while we can choose to use the distinct words, for example, 
“omniscience,” “omnipresence,” or just “God” to refer to the idea of God, the differences 
here do not mark distinctions in God or in the idea of God. To be clear, the names for 
different attributes—at least if they are used well—are not properly used to refer to the 
cognitive routes themselves, since those involve confusion. They are reserved solely for the 
clear and distinct perception at the end of each route. 
 Because the terminal ideas of these routes are all occurrences of an identical idea in 
the strict sense of “identical,” there’s no search for corresponding features of God match the 
intrinsic difference in the ideas themselves. That is, there is no need to posit two “aspects” of 
God that ground the difference between the omniscience perception and the omnipotence 
perception. On this reading, to say that A and B are conceptually distinct is to say that the 
cognitive route to A starts from a different idea than the cognitive route B, but A and B are 
distinct occurrences of the same idea. 
On this interpretation, “substance” and its “attributes” are said to be identical because 
the “substance”/”attribute” distinction is merely nominal. Each word for substance and each 
attribute refers to the same idea, at least for those who have reached a clear and distinct 
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perception of God at the end of each route. This “identity” is not qualified in any sense: there 
is nothing in God or the idea of God corresponding to a distinction among attributes. 
Furthermore, on this interpretation, we can say that God is simple in an unqualified 
sense  because any of the cognitive routes we follow to God end with God. After all, for 
Descartes, God is not conceived through anything else and the idea of God is a simple idea.  
We cannot therefore analyze God into more basic “parts” or as constituted by other 
substances.  
We can get a better understanding of “real distinction” on this account as well. A and 
B are really distinct just in case their ideas are distinct termini of distinct cognitive routes. 
For example, I might reach an idea of my mind (a substance for Descartes) by reflecting on 
the origin of my thoughts or reach an idea of my body (also a substance) by reflecting on the 
origin of the parts of my body. In these cases, the termini of these routes are different: my 
idea of my body is distinct from my idea of my mind because those ideas are intrinsically 
modally distinct in addition to being extrinsically modally distinct because I arrive at them at 
distinct times. 
Though I cannot defend this claim in detail here, the Cognitive Route Interpretation 
seems to me to be the most plausible explanation of Descartes’ notion of a conceptual 
distinction. More importantly, however, it seems to be the best interpretation of Spinoza.  
4.2. Cognitive Routing in Spinoza 
On the Cognitive Route Interpretation in Spinoza, a substance is identical to its distinct 
attributes. The names “Thought” and “Extension” indicate that the idea of God can be arrived 
at by making the ideas of our thoughts and body clear and distinct, respectively. For example, 
if I begin with confused knowledge of my own body and then arrive at the idea of God from 
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that starting point, I might say that “God is a thinking thing” or that “Thought is an attribute 
of God.” Of course, we can arrive at the same idea of God whether we start with an idea of a 
thinking or extended thing. So, if I reflect on the causes of my body and eventually arrive at 
the idea of God, I will say that God “has the attribute of Extension.” In either case, however, 
the distinction between God and God’s attributes is merely nominal, at least for those who 
have formed a clear and distinct idea of God from the two starting points available to us. 
Of course, Spinoza differs from Descartes in that Spinoza thinks that all cognitive 
routes that lead to a maximally clear and distinct idea lead to the idea of God. This is how the 
Cognitive Route Interpretation suggests we understand Spinoza’s claim that the attributes do 
not “divide substance” into distinct substances. Descartes, by contrast, would hold that the 
Thought- and Extension-routes lead to intrinsically distinct ideas of distinct substances like 
my mind or body. 
1P10s might seem to present a challenge to the Cognitive Route Interpretation. At 
1P10s, Spinoza claims that attributes “can be conceived to be really distinct.” On the 
interpretation of “real distinction” I’ve been defending, doesn’t this suggest that the idea of 
Thought is intrinsically different than the idea of Extension? Otherwise, in what sense could 
the attributes be conceived to be really distinct? 
This challenge can be met if we look closely at Spinoza’s gloss of what it means to 
conceive the attributes as “really distinct.” He writes, 
From these propositions it is evident that although two attributes may be conceived to 
be really distinct (i.e., one may be conceived without the aid of the other), we still 
cannot infer from that that they constitute two beings… 
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This clarification indicates another contrast between Descartes and Spinoza. Recall that, 
according to Descartes, conceiving A and B to be really distinct means “excluding” A from B 
and vice versa. This suggests that to fully understand, for example, Thought, one would have 
to exclude it from Extension. On the Cognitive Route Interpretation, this means that one 
would have to contrast one’s ideas of the termini of routes to clearly and distinctly perceive 
them as distinct. 
At 1P10s, Spinoza takes his claim that the attributes can be conceived to be “really 
distinct” to mean they can be conceived “in isolation” of one another. This is strictly a 
weaker claim because it does not require one to contrast the terminal ideas of distinct 
cognitive routes. It is inevitable that Spinoza makes this weaker claim because he cannot 
believe that the terminus of any given cognitive route will be distinct: all routes end with God 
if they end with a clear and distinct perception at all.  
Spinoza’s claim that the attributes can be conceived in isolation of one another seems 
to be required by his claim that Thought and Extension (and their modes) have “nothing in 
common” with one another and thus cannot be conceived through one another. In other 
words, Spinoza does not believe that cognitive routes with distinct starting points (that is, one 
starting with an idea of my body and the other with an idea of my mind) “cross” at any point. 
After all, minds and bodies cannot be conceived through one another because they have 
nothing in common. So, it makes sense to say that the “attributes” can be conceived in 
isolation of one another because they never overlap. This does not require, however, that they 
have distinct terminal ideas.   
It’s natural for Spinoza to draw this contrast with Descartes. After all, for Spinoza, all 
routes lead to the same idea, so there’s no reason to believe that either the routes must be kept 
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in total isolation to avoid confusing intrinsically distinct terminal ideas. In other words, there 
is no reason to exclude Thought from Extension because they are the same substance. The 
fact that they can be conceived in isolation of one another indicates an ability of and not a 
requirement on our cognition. Descartes, of course, takes the termini of different routes to be 
ideas of distinct substances, and so requires us to exclude distinct ideas from one another. 
Otherwise, we will land in confusion. 
4.2.1. Textual Evidence for the Cognitive Route Interpretation 
We have seen textual evidence that Spinoza takes the attributes to be merely conceptually 
distinct from God and from one another. On the Cognitive Route Interpretation of conceptual 
distinction, the term for a particular attribute (e.g. Thought or Extension) indicates that one 
has come to the idea of God from a particular confused starting point, either from an idea of 
the effects of one’s body or of one’s thinking. Additional textual evidence for this 
interpretation, then, will take two forms: evidence that there is one idea of God at the end of 
each route and evidence that there are routes starting in confusion and ending in an adequate 
idea of God. 
4.2.1.1. One Idea of God 
Spinoza uses the Latin “idea Dei” throughout the Ethics to refer to the idea of God. Spinoza 
never uses the plural ideae to indicate that there are multiple ideas of God corresponding to 
God as conceived under distinct attributes. This alone suggests that the distinction among 
attributes is extrinsic to God. Otherwise, we would expect multiple ideae corresponding to 
God as conceived under distinct attributes. At 2P4, Spinoza tells us explicitly that the idea of 
God is “unique.”  
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The idea of God plays a central role in Spinoza’s account of knowledge and of 
attaining blessedness. Spinoza claims that it is the “greatest virtue” of the mind to “proceed[] 
from an adequate idea of certain attributes of God to an adequate knowledge of the essence 
of things” (5P25d). An essential part of coming to master our affects is relating those affects 
to the idea of God (5P14). 
 In Spinoza’s Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect, the “method” Spinoza 
proposes for achieving knowledge consists in “show[ing] how the mind is to be directed 
according the standard of a given true idea” (TIE 38).  The ultimate “given true idea” sought 
in the TIE is the idea of the “most perfect being,” or, God (ibid.). Spinoza claims that this 
idea is “in us” and is an “inborn tool” for seeking knowledge (39). This idea aids our minds 
in “reproduc[ing] completely the likeness of Nature” by “bringing all of its ideas forth from 
that idea which represents the source and origin of the whole of Nature” (42). 
 Spinoza’s a posteriori proof of God’s existence in the Short Treatise (I. i. I/16/1) 
relies on the assumption that man has “an Idea of God.” Spinoza tells us that it is “clear” that 
man has such an idea because “he understands [God’s] attributes, which he could not 
produce because [man] is imperfect” (I/18/6-7).69 
As Curley (1985, 429 n.54) notes, there is ambiguity about the ownership of this idea 
owing to the ambiguity of the genitive in the Latin. Does idea Dei refer to the idea of God or 
the idea belonging to God of God? Curley wonders whether the term idea Dei refers to the 
idea of God in God’s intellect or in the human intellect.70 
                                               
69 What seems to be Spinoza’s note to this quoted passage (I/18/29) indicates that “attributes” is being used in an 
unofficial sense. Spinoza’s examples following the quote make it clear that he means God’s propria.  
70 In Curley’s translation, the distinction is marked by the English “God’s idea” to indicate the idea in the infinite 
intellect and “the idea of God.”  
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Though I do not have the space to give a full defense of my reading of idea Dei here, 
there seems to be at least some evidence that the answer to Curley’s question is: “both.” That 
is, the single idea Dei is in both God and the human intellect, at least when the latter is 
thinking adequately. Spinoza tells us that “…our Mind, insofar as it perceives things truly, is 
part of the infinite intellect of God (by P11C); hence, it is as necessary that the mind's clear 
and distinct ideas are true as that God's ideas are.” 
Curley cites the following texts as suggestive that there is an infinite idea Dei in God 
that is not in humans: 2P3, 2P4, 2P7, 2P21. 2P3 claims that there is an idea of God that is 
“only in God,” which Curley reads as entailing “and not in humans.” However, 2P3 cites 
1P15 as establishing that this idea is “only in God” and 1P15 is the general claim that 
“whatever is, is in God.” And it appears that the idea under discussion is not just the idea of 
God, but also the idea of God and of everything (“whatever is”) that follows from God. This 
idea of course can “only be” in God because only God has an infinite intellect. My claim is 
not that idea Dei at the termini of our two cognitive routes is an idea of the infinitely many 
things that follow from God’s essence, but merely an idea of God. 
At 2P4, Spinoza tells us that “infinite things follow in infinite modes” from the 
unique idea Dei. However, this is compatible with the claim that the human intellect is part 
of the infinite intellect insofar as it has an adequate idea of God. We can understand that 
everything follows from God’s idea because, Spinoza claims, we know that everything 
follows from God on account of God’s being the only substance (1P16). This does not entail 
our discernment of the idea of God enables us to survey each and every thing that follows 
from God. Presumably, only God’s infinite intellect (2P3) can do that.  This also makes sense 
of a similar claim in 2P7c: the knowledge that there is an idea of everything in God and that 
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those ideas follow from the idea of God does not entail that our having the idea of God 
requires us to have the idea of everything. 
At 2P21, Spinoza does argue that the idea of God is infinite on account of its having 
an infinite thing as its object. However, this does not entail that a finite intellect cannot have 
this idea. After all, at 2P30, Spinoza writes that “[a]n actual intellect, whether finite or 
infinite, must comprehend God's attributes and God's affections, and nothing else.” Spinoza 
defends this claim by making reference to a “true idea’s” agreement with its object. As we 
have seen in the TIE, this “true idea” is the idea of God. 
 These sources of textual evidence suggest that there is a single idea of God that can 
be obtained by making one’s ideas more more clear and distinct. 
4.2.1.2. Many Routes 
The routes in the Cognitive Route Interpretation are analytic: they involve a process of 
making a confused idea (e.g., the idea of one’s own knowledge) more clear and distinct until 
one reaches a simple idea, the idea of God.  Another way of expressing this is that they 
proceed from limitation and finitude to perfection and infinitude: for Descartes and Spinoza, 
the infinite is essentially simple and undivided and thus when we have clear and distinct 
ideas of it, those ideas must themselves be simple. In the Ethics, Spinoza eschews the 
analytical method of the Meditations and appears to present his metaphysics synthetically, 
starting from the simple idea of God and then proceeding to complex idea of the human mind 
and body, etc. Therefore, we don’t see many instances of explicit expression of the analytic 
reasoning expected by the Cognitive Route Interpretation in the Ethics itself. 
However, we do see a brief expression of analytical reasoning in the beginning of 
Part II of the Ethics, especially where Spinoza demonstrates that Thought and Extension are 
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attributes of God. Spinoza obscures this reasoning somewhat in his geometrical presentation, 
it is clear that this analysis is present. While 2P1d employs a synthetic demonstration that 
God has Thought as an attribute, Spinoza argues that 2P1 can be given a different, analytic 
demonstration.  He writes: 
 
This Proposition is also evident from the fact that we can conceive an infinite 
thinking being. For the more things a thinking being can think, the more 
reality, or perfection, we conceive it to contain. Therefore, a being that can think 
infinitely many things in infinitely many ways is necessarily infinite in its power of 
thinking. So, since we can conceive an infinite Being by attending to thought alone, 
Thought (by ID4 and D6) is necessarily one of God's infinite attributes, as we 
maintained. 
The reasoning here is nearly identical to the reasoning in the Third Meditation. Recall that 
Part II of the Ethics includes three axioms about our knowledge: Man thinks (2A2), We feel 
that a body is affected in many ways (2A4), and We do not perceive anything but extended 
and thinking modes (2A5). As stated, these axioms suggest a state of confusion—2A5 
suggest that we perceive nothing but modes, but Spinoza will go on to argue that we can also 
have adequate ideas of the attributes of those modes. Perhaps the idea, then, is that in our 
confused state, we begin with confused knowledge of modes and then ascend to knowledge 
of the attributes. 
 2P1s goes on to take us from this confused state to God’s attributes by insisting that 
we can conceive an infinite thinking thing. The first implicit step is that we recognize that we 
are limited, imperfect thinking things. The second step, now explicit, is that we can conceive 
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of a more perfect thinking thing. The third step establishes the link between perfection and 
reality, such that this conceived infinite thing doesn’t exist merely potentially. And then, 
finally, Spinoza concludes that we can conceive an infinite Being by reflecting on Thought 
alone, entailing that God has Thought as an attribute. It is important to note here that Spinoza 
does not qualify “Being” with an attribute when he reaches his conclusion: we conceive an 
infinite Being and not an infinite Thinking Being. On the Cognitive Route Interpretation, this 
is natural: the intrinsic nature of thinking things qua thinking is not carried over to the infinite 
Being at the end of this route.  
 Spinoza goes on in 2P2 to explain that this proof works for Extension, if one makes 
the necessary substitutions. This suggest that this method of proving attributes, namely 
following a cognitive route from some confused beginning to some clear and distinct 
terminus, is his general method for showing that God has an attribute. 
 There appears to be cognitive routing implicit of Part II’s discussion of the origins of 
knowledge, especially from 2P24-2P47. At 2P24-2P31 demonstrates that the idea of a body 
and the idea of a mind is initially inadequate. However, at 2P34, Spinoza indicates that there 
are ideas in us that are adequate are true, suggesting that our ideas of our minds and bodies, 
insofar as they are inadequate, are false. From 2P37 to 2P44, Spinoza gives his account of the 
three kinds of knowledge and suggests that knowledge is formed by forming “common 
notions.” At 2P45, Spinoza tell us that each idea “involves” the idea of God’s essence and 
2P46 tells us that that idea of God’s essence is adequate. Finally, Spinoza demonstrates from 
the proceeding that we have an adequate idea of God. The logical progression of these 
propositions suggests that there is a route from our inadequate ideas (of minds and bodies) to 
an adequate idea of God. 
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 There are also hints of cognitive routing in Part V. At 5P14, Spinoza claims that our 
ideas of bodily affections can be “related to” the idea of God via forming “clear and distinct 
concept[s].” And at 5P30, Spinoza tells us that “[i]nsofar as our Mind knows itself and the 
Body under a species of eternity, it necessarily has knowledge of God, and knows that it is in 
God and is conceived through God.” Spinoza defines “eternity” at 5D8, which implies that 
knowing the body and mind “under a species of eternity” is to understand them as following 
from an eternal thing, God. As 2P44c2 makes clear, understanding things under the species 
of eternity is in the “nature of Reason”. This suggests a connection between the routing 
implicit in Part II and the knowledge of God that plays the central role in Part V. 
 There is further evidence suggesting cognitive routing in the Short Treatise. In 
Chapter XXII’s discussion of our ability to know God and the “union” of our minds with 
God. Spinoza writes, 
And because the body is the very first thing our soul becomes aware of—for as we 
have said, there can be nothing in Nature whose Idea does not exist in the thinking 
thing, the idea which is the soul of that thing—that thing must, then, necessarily be 
the first cause of the idea. 
But this Idea cannot find any rest in the knowledge of the body, without 
passing over into knowledge of that without which neither the body nor the Idea itself 
can either exist or be understood. 
Here, again, Spinoza claims that we come to knowledge by seeking the cause of the idea with 
which we are first acquainted: the idea of a body. To understand God as the cause of the idea 
and of its object is to understand God via the attributes of Thought and Extension. 
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There is strong evidence of cognitive routing in the Treatise on the Emendation of the 
Intellect, where Spinoza appears to borrow Descartes’ method for clarifying and 
distinguishing ideas to reach the idea of God (Nelson 2015 52-4, 61-3). As was noted in 
4.2.1, the TIE aims to develop a method of distinguishing true from false ideas with the 
ultimate goal of forming a true idea of God. Spinoza tells us that this method involves 
“distinguishing” true ideas from “the rest of other perceptions,” suggesting a process of 
clarification and distinction (37). We are told the idea of God, along with other true ideas, is 
“inborn,” enabling it to be reached via this process (39). This process of “reflexive 
knowledge” involves understanding “ideas of ideas,” that are formed by reflexive on the 
nature of the mind itself (39).   
In the TIE, part of the process of “distinguishing” true ideas involves comprehending 
the causes of a given idea. Spinoza tells us that while God can be understood “through 
[God’s] essence alone,” dependent beings must be understood through their “proximate 
causes” (92). Like Descartes, Spinoza encourages not to seek these causes among other 
“singular things,” since this process can be continued indefinitely and will not lead to 
knowledge of eternal things (100). Once we each the idea of the being that is “the cause of all 
things” and understand it to be the “cause of all our ideas,” “our mind will […] reproduce 
Nature as much as possible” (99). These texts suggest that the idea of God can be reached by 
a process of clarification and distinguishing of ideas, where that process can start with any 
given idea (73). 
 Together, these texts suggest that there is cognitive routing in Spinoza.  
4.3. An Objection 
Objection: How can ideas of the attributes also be in the infinite intellect? 
 
 122 
It is clear that the Cognitive Routing Interpretation cannot be an “Objective Interpretation.” 
Remember that on the Objective Interpretation, the distinction among attributes is mirrored 
in some way in God. However, on the Cognitive Routing Interpretation, the distinction is 
extrinsic to God and involved in the conception of God by a finite intellect. So, on this 
reading, when Spinoza claims that the attributes are what “intellect perceives of [God], as 
constituting its essence,” he must be referring primarily to the human intellect (1D4). I 
defend this reading at length elsewhere.  
 An Objectivist might make the following objection. At 1P30 and again at 2P7s, 
Spinoza claims that the infinite intellect—God’s intellect—must cognize God’s attributes. 
On the Cognitive Route Interpretation, the distinction between the attributes is partially 
confused: the attributes can be conceived to be “really distinct” because the cognitive routes 
to the idea of God have confused and incommensurable starting points. This 
"incommensurability" is a fundamental feature of the nature of human minds. However, the 
infinite intellect is constituted by only adequate ideas, and so its ideas of the attributes must 
be adequate (2P11, 2P43). So, the ideas of the attributes in the infinite intellect must have 
really distinct objects. Therefore, there must be something in God corresponding to these 
distinct ideas in the infinite intellect that is “really distinct.” This objection is natural for 
Objectivists about the attributes, who assume that there must be something corresponding to 
each of our adequate ideas of God in the infinite intellect.   
This objection misunderstands the Cognitive Route Interpretation’s account of the 
attributes. On this interpretation, the attributes are not identical to cognitive routes. The 
attributes are strictly speaking identical to substance, or God. We ought not assume that 
Spinoza has a theory of reference on which each distinct term picks out some distinct entity 
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in his ontology. The idea is that we use the term “attribute” or the names for the particular 
attributes to communicate the fact that we arrived at the idea of God via some Cognitive 
Route. For example, “Thought” is just a name for the idea of God that is the terminus of a 
cognitive route beginning in a confused idea of our own thinking. For the sage who has 
traveled the routes starting at confused ideas of thinking and the affections of the body, 
“Thought” and “Extension” correspond to the same idea occurring in to temporally distinct 
instances. Therefore, there is no multiplicity of attributes to be grounded in God’s essence.  
On the Cognitive Route Interpretation, “the infinite intellect has an adequate idea of 
the attributes” is to be understood as the claim that “the intellect has an adequate idea of what 
we call ‘the attributes’.” In other words, the infinite intellect has the adequate idea of God 
that is at the terminus of our distinct cognitive routes. This does not entail that the infinite 
intellect itself had to travel distinct cognitive routes to apprehend God: that is clearly 
impossible given that the routes themselves essentially involve confused ideas. However, we 
cannot conceive of God except via some cognitive route. We do not have direct access to the 
idea of God in that sense. Therefore, we cannot conceive how the infinite intellect manages 
to conceive God without the use of some route. Spinoza never claims that we can. All 
Spinoza claims is that the infinite intellect has an adequate idea of God.  
 The demonstration of 1P30 is naturally read this way: 
Dem.: A true idea must agree with its object (by A6), i.e. (as is known through itself), 
what is contained objectively in the intellect must necessarily be in nature. But in 
nature (by P14C1) there is only one substance, viz. God… Therefore, an actual 




Notice how Spinoza slides from a proof about the single object of the relevant true idea—an 
idea of the one substance, God—to the claim that any intellect must comprehend God’s 
(multiple) attributes. This proof only makes sense if God is identical to the attributes and if 
the true idea of God just is the true idea of the attributes. There is no implication that there 
are multiple ideas of the attributes corresponding to an extra-intellectual distinction of some 
kind between them. 
4.4. Solutions to the Puzzles 
4.4.1. The Identity Puzzle 
On the current interpretation, God and God’s attributes are strictly identical. The same is true 
of the attributes themselves. The latter, however, can be conceived to be “really distinct.” 
This means that one can conceive God either with a route starting with a confused idea of 
one’s body or a confused idea of one’s mind. In either case, if these confused ideas are 
clarified and made distinct, one can reach an idea of an infinite being. Though confused 
origins of this idea distinguish the routes one takes to the idea of God, it is intrinsically the 
same idea of God at the terminus of each route. The distinct terms for distinct attributes 
signify the conceptual origins of the idea of God, and not something intrinsic to God. 
4.4.2. The Simplicity Puzzle 
Again, on the Cognitive Route Interpretation, there is a single idea of God at the end of each 
cognitive route. As Spinoza makes clear in the TIE, the idea itself is “simple” (72, II/27/29). 
The simplicity of the idea can be understood in a strict sense: there is nothing intrinsically 
complex about the idea itself. It does not have “aspects” that can be “selectively attended to.” 
But if the true idea of God is simple, then there is no pressure to say that God is “divided” in 
any sense. What is “divided” is our ways of conceiving God.
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CHAPTER 3: COULD SPINOZA UNDERSTAND HIS OWN THEORY OF GOD’S 
ATTRIBUTES? 
1. Introduction 
One of the central goals of Spinoza’s philosophy is to render God cognizable.71 Spinoza 
argues that God is cognizable through what he calls God’s “attributes,” which he defines as 
“what intellect perceives of [God] as constituting its essence” (1D4). Spinoza’s theory of 
God’s attributes includes views about (1) how the intellect comes to perceive God’s essence 
via these attributes and (2) what God’s attributes are, at least insofar as they are understood 
by the intellect.72 Because Spinoza believed that God is an infinite substance (1D6) of which 
everything else is merely a dependent “mode” (1D5), or way that God is, Spinoza’s theory of 
God’s attributes is really a theory about the fundamental nature of reality itself. And, 
crucially, it is a theory that is intended to make the fundamental nature of reality cognizable.73
                                               
71 As Della Rocca (2008, 1) writes “Spinoza’s philosophy is characterized by perhaps the boldest and most 
thoroughgoing commitment ever to appear in the history of philosophy to the intelligibility of everything. For 
Spinoza, no why-question is off limits, each why-question—in principle—admits of a satisfactory answer.” We 
can see Spinoza’s commitment to intelligibility through his text: see in the Ethics e.g., 1App, 2P47, 5P30. If one 
believes that Spinoza seeks intelligibility via explanation, as Della Rocca (ibid.) does, one might also cite 
apparent instances of the Principle of Sufficient Reason like 1A2. I do not have any commitments to how 
Spinoza renders things explicable. I will use the term “cognizable” to mean the ability of a mind to think 
something, which includes but is not limited to knowing, imagining, and believing something.  
72 See especially 2P1 and 2P2. See also 1P30, 2P40, 2P47 and 5P30. 
73 I will not be using “theory” in any technical sense here. By “theory,” I mean a collection of commitments 





 Spinoza argues that humans perceive God’s essence as constituted by the attributes of 
Thought and Extension. In other words, Spinoza believes that humans understand God to be 
essentially a thinking thing and a material thing. And because the rest of reality is just a way 
that God is, the rest of reality also consists fundamentally of beings that are mental and 
beings that are material.  For us, God is an infinite thinking and extended substance and 
everything else that depends on God is either a mode of Thought or a mode of Extension. 
Humans cannot conceive the fundamental nature of reality except via these two attributes, 
Spinoza argues. There is no way for us to transcend the division of the world into the mental 
and the material to see how it “really is” or how it could otherwise be.74 
 Nearly all of his interpreters commit Spinoza to the view that what humans cognize of 
God’s essence is distinct from what God’s essence is in itself or apart from the limited 
conception of humans. That is, they argue that Spinoza’s theory of God’s attributes entails 
that God is not wholly cognizable to human beings.  For example, most interpreters argue 
that God has attributes in addition to Thought and Extension that humans cannot cognize. 
 The popular view that Spinoza is committed to the existence of uncognizable aspects 
of reality has led to a number of disputes in the literature about the coherency of Spinoza’s 
metaphysics. However, as far as I can tell, none of these interpreters has asked themselves 
the following question about their interpretations of Spinoza’s theory of God’s attributes: 
could Spinoza himself have understood his own theory of the attributes on their 
interpretations, given how he characterizes the limits of human understanding in that theory? 
Is theory of the attributes itself cognizable to human beings by its own lights? It seems to me 
                                               
74 Or so I will argue is Spinoza’s view in Section 3.1. 
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that nearly every interpretation of Spinoza’s theory of the attributes must answer “no” to 
these questions. In other words, nearly every interpretation is committed to the view that 
human beings in principle cannot cognize Spinoza’s theory of the attributes. 
 This would be a disastrous result. After all, it is the consensus even among these 
interpreters that the central goal of Spinoza’s philosophy is to render reality cognizable to 
human beings, even if only partially so. The goal of the Ethics, after all, is to show that there 
is a path to human blessedness that starts with an adequate understanding of God via its 
attributes. However, on almost every contemporary interpretation, not only is God not wholly 
cognizable to us, Spinoza’s own theory is not wholly cognizable to us by its own lights. 
 This catastrophic consequence follows from a general approach to Spinoza’s 
metaphysics that is nearly mandatory in the secondary literature. Most interpreters are 
committed to the view that Spinoza constructed his metaphysics from what I call God’s 
Perspective.75 On this approach, Spinoza theorized about the fundamental nature of reality by 
somehow channeling the perfect, unlimited, transcendental perspective of an infinite being. 
Spinoza’s main project was to describe the world as it “really” is and not how it “appears” to 
a small subclass of finite beings, humans. As a result, they hold that Spinoza committed 
himself to the existence of aspects of reality that are essentially uncognizable to human 
beings. They are committed to the view that Spinoza’s metaphysics violates what I call the 
Cognizability Condition.76 
                                               
75 This terminology is loosely based on Putnam’s (1990). One might also call it the “View from Nowhere,” as 
Nagel (1986) does.  
76 A more precise, but verbose way of stating the Condition would be: “’Everything’, insofar as that word has 
meaning, is cognizable.” On the Human Perspective Interpretation, we will see, the Condition is ultimately 
revealed to be a truism. However, one with a God’s Perspective Interpretation might understand it to be an 
endorsement of (a possibly objectionable) form of Idealism. I do not support the latter reading because I do not 
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Cognizability Condition: Everything is cognizable by human beings. 
 
God’s Perspective Interpretations include all of the interpretations that fall under the familiar 
interpretative dichotomy of Subjective and Objective Interpretations of the attributes.77 The 
former class of interpretations understands our perception of the attributes to be illusive. On a 
Subjective Interpretation, God has a “real essence” that is uncognizable to finite beings. The 
“attributes” are just fictions or wholly subjective categories created by the human mind in its 
attempts to understand God.   
The latter class of interpretations understands the intellect’s perceptions of the 
attributes to be accurate: God “really is” a Thinking and Extended thing. In fact, what it is to 
be an “attribute” in the first place is to be what God’s intellect perceives of its own essence. 
Because Objectivists understand the attributes to be what God, an infinite being, perceives of 
its own essence, these interpreters also adopt the view that God has attributes other than 
those which human beings perceive. On these interpretations, there are infinitely many 
attributes that are not cognizable by human beings in addition to the two that are.  
 Most of the debates about how to interpret Spinoza’s theory of God’s attributes begin 
with the premise that some form of the Objective Interpretation is correct: no contemporary 
reader believes that the attributes are merely subjective.78 One of the central problems for 
                                               
take Spinoza to think that quantificational terms like “everything” or highly general metaphysical terms like 
“reality” to refer to ideas other than those that can be had by human minds. See Section 4.3. 
77 The distinction between “Objective” and “Subjective” interpretations was introduced by Wolfson 
(1934,v.1,146). Wolfson, as far as I know, is the only interpreter who endorses a Subjective Interpretation. 
78 The following is a partial list of supporters of the Objective Interpretation, each of whom is cited at the end of 
this dissertation: Allison, Ariew, Bennett, Curley, Delahunty, Deleuze, Della Rocca, Donagan, Garrett, 




Objectivists is to explain how the world of thinking things relates to the world of extended 
things: Spinoza argues that God and its modes are “one and the same” no matter which 
attribute they are conceived through.  One popular subclass of Objective Interpretation, 
Attribute-Neutral Interpretations, argue that the material and mental worlds are united in 
virtue of having “attribute-neutral” properties in common or in virtue of being different ways 
of conceiving the same “attribute-neutral” reality.79 
 The main thesis of this chapter is that, no matter what the details divide them, all 
God’s Perspective Interpretations understand Spinoza’s philosophy to violate the 
Cognizability Condition in two ways. First, they commit Spinoza to the existence of beings 
that humans cannot cognize. These beings include the Subjectivist’s “real essence” of God, 
the Objectivist’s “other attributes,” and “attribute-neutral” aspects of reality. This is already 
in conflict with Spinoza’s apparent desire to render God cognizable to humans. Second, they 
commit Spinoza to the uncognizablity of his own theory.  Regardless of whether one thinks 
that Spinoza’s main goal was to render God cognizable and whether one thinks that he was 
successful at that goal, they should surely agree that his own theory ought to be cognizable to 
its intended audience. 
 Nevertheless, Spinoza’s theory is not doomed to self-defeat. At the end of this 
chapter, I will show how what I call the Human Perspective Interpretation of Spinoza’s 
theory of the attributes, which takes attributes to be the ways what we conceive God, is 
                                               
 
 
79 For example, see Bennett (1984, 143-9), Della Rocca (1996, 118-71), Donagan (1989, 6-7), Gueroult (Spinoza 
I, 338–9) and Newlands (2010) and (2012), Morrison (2017). 
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immune to worries about self-defeat. If we understand that the attributes are what we 
accurately conceive of God’s essence, then Spinoza’s theory is cognizable by human beings.  
 I will begin by describing and briefly motivating each of the God’s Perspective 
Interpretations. 
2. The Rival Interpretations and their Commitments 
2.1. God’s Perspective Interpretations 
I will use the label “God’s Perspective Interpretation” to refer to any interpretation that takes 
Spinoza’s metaphysics to violate the Cognizability Condition.  
 
God’s Perspective Interpretation Spinoza denies that everything is cognizable by humans. 
 
To be clear, I mean “cognizable” according to Spinoza’s theory of cognition, contained 
largely in Part II of the Ethics. Whether Spinoza countenances certain aspects of reality that 
are cognizable on a contemporary theory of cognition is of no interest to us here.  
 I will not discuss every interpretation that I consider to be a God’s Perspective 
Interpretation here. However, I will discuss interpretations that give rival and, at least 
relatively speaking, plausible accounts of Spinoza’s theory of God’s attributes. However, my 
remarks here are intended to be general: the ultimate conclusion is that any interpretation that 
takes Spinoza’s metaphysics to violate the Cognizability Condition is subject to this 
objection. 
2.1.1. The Subjective and Objective Interpretations 
I discussed and characterized the Subjective and Objective Interpretations at length in 




Subjective Interpretation (SI): God has a “real essence” that humans cannot cognize. 
Wolfson’s Subjective Interpretation holds that the attributes humans perceive God as having 
are “illusory” or “merely subjective.” Though we perceive God to be a thinking and extended 
substance, God is not “in reality” either of those. Instead, God has a “real essence” that we 
fundamentally misrepresent.80 
 
Objective Interpretation (OI): God has attributes other than Thought and Extension. 
 
Strictly speaking, the core idea behind OI is that our perception of God’s essence is accurate. 
God “really is” a thinking and extended thing. However, attributes are not merely what 
humans perceive of God’s essence. Instead, the attributes are what God perceives of God’s 
essence. The accuracy of our perception is grounded in the fact we perceive God’s essence 
the way that God does. Because we are finite beings, we have merely a finite grasp of God’s 
essence. God, in other words, has infinitely many attributes distinct from Thought and 
Extension which humans cannot perceive. The infinity of these attributes is not the focus of 
the current discussion: the central commitment is God’s having at least one attribute other 
than the humanly cognizable attributes.81 
                                               
80 See Wolfson (v.1, 112-21, 142-57). 
81 The “objectivity” of the attributes will also not be under discussion. See my “The Identity of Substance and Its 




2.1.2. Attribute-Neutral Interpretations 
There is a third class of God’s Perspective Interpretation which does not necessarily fall into 
either the Subjective or Objective Category. Though those who adopt what I’ll call an 
“Attribute-Neutral Interpretation” typically do so in order to solve problems introduced by 
the Objective Interpretation, their commitment to “other attributes” will not be my focus 
here. Instead, I am interested in their commitment to “attribute-neutral” or “trans-attribute” 
entities. For example, some authors invoke the existence of “attribute-neutral” modes and 
relations, others talk about shared “attribute-neutral properties”.  
As far as I can tell, there are two kinds of Attribute-Neutral Interpretations on offer in 
the current secondary literature. The first kind is the Substratum View, on which attribute-
neutral entities are like substrata that can instantiate the attributes and properties specific to 
those attributes. The second is the Overlap View, on which attribute-neutral properties and 
are had by entities, regardless of which attribute those entities fall under. 
 The primary motivation for adopting an Attribute-Neutral Interpretation is making 
sense of Spinoza’s claim, discussed in Chapter 2, that both God and its modes are “one and 
the same” no matter which attribute they are conceived under. In what sense is the thinking 
God, the cause of all minds and their ideas “one and the same” as the extended God, the 
cause of bodies? Those who adopt Attribute-Neutral Interpretations argue that both God and 
its modes are “numerically” identical, even if they can be conceived to be “qualitatively” 
distinct. The primary difference between the Substratum and Overlap Views is how they 
secure numerical identity across attributes.  
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2.1.2.1. The Substratum View 
There are several of interpretations that count as invoking the Substratum View. I will focus 
on Bennett’s view as an example (1984, 143-9).82 In his discussion of the attributes, Bennett 
introduces the notion of “trans-attribute” differentia. We can get a tentative grip on what 
these “differentia” are by considering a mode with its attributes “peeled off” (142). That is, 
we ignore those properties belonging to a mode that are the result of its following from an 
attribute. For example, we might try to conceive of a mode of Extension without its size, 
shape, color, quantity of motion and rest, and so on. What’s left is the trans-attribute mode 
with only its trans-attribute properties. 
Bennett argues that trans-attribute modes are neither essentially nor intrinsically 
characterized by the attributes. They can however instantiate or “combine” with Thought, 
Extension, or some other attribute, to “produce” a mode of that attribute (ibid.). When the 
trans-attribute entities are conceived through attributes, they instantiate attribute-specific 
properties (62-3). For example, a trans-attribute mode x can combine with Thought to 
produce an idea. And this mode, conceived as an idea, will have various properties that only 
thinking things can have: indivisibility, for instance. However, that same mode can also 
combine with Extension and any other attributes and instantiate wholly different properties. 
The idea is that the conception of that trans-attribute mode imbues it with attribute-specific 
properties. A mode of Thought and a mode of Extension, for example, are “one and the 
                                               
82 Donagan, for example, posits the existence of attribute-neutral laws of nature that are metaphysically prior to 
the attribute-laden world (1989, 96-7). On his view, these attribute-neutral laws of nature (specifically of 
immanent and transient causation) produce and structure the parallel causal networks described by 2P7.  That is, 
the explanation for Spinoza’s parallelism is that the parallel modal realities are generated by a single collection 




same” because they are distinct ways of conceiving a single attribute-neutral mode which 
thereby take on attribute-specific properties depending on under which attribute it is 
conceived. 
The Substratum View can be extended to any number of entities in Spinoza’s system. 
Bennett’s preferred example is of “trans-attribute” modes, but one could easily apply the 
same idea to God itself or the relations that hold among the different parts of Spinoza’s 
ontology. The core idea is that there is a metaphysically basic substratum that is not 
intrinsically characterized by the attributes but which can instantiate the attributes when it is 
conceived in different ways. The attributes are like “lenses” through which this substratum is 
viewed.83   
2.1.2.2. The Overlap View 
Della Rocca (1996) is the most prominent defender of the Overlap View.84 His attribute-
neutral entities are properties and relations. However, unlike Bennett, Della Rocca does not 
claim that his attribute-neutral entities are substrata. Instead, Della Rocca argues that 
attribute-neutral properties the properties that both material and mental entities have. 
To understand the Overlap View, one needs to be clear about the difference between 
attribute-neutral and what I’ll call attribute-specific properties.85 For example, consider my 
                                               
83 Note that I am not claiming that Bennett believes the differentia to be substances. By “substratum,” I merely 
mean a being that is not intelligible in itself but is made intelligible via its properties. 
84 Another example is Newlands’ view that the “conceiving-through” relation is attribute-neutral (2012). 
85 This division corresponds to Della Rocca’s division between intensional (attribute-specific) and extensional 
(attribute-neutral) properties (132-40). Cashing out the difference in this way will take us too far afield from the 
current project. Della Rocca employs this division in part to explain why attribute contexts are “referentially 
opaque.” In other words, he wants to reconcile the numerical identity of substance and mode given that when 
conceived under distinct attributes, substance and mode cannot be conceived to be identical. For example, Della 
Rocca wants to make sense of apparently contradictory claims that minds and bodies are both “really distinct” 
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mind, a mode of Thought, and my body, a mode of Extension. My mind has a number of 
properties in virtue of being a thinking thing: it represents a body, it has no breadth or depth, 
it cannot move or be moved, and so on.  My body has a number of properties in virtue of 
being extended: it has a height and a width, it has a shape, it can move and be moved. In each 
case, these are properties that something can have only in virtue of falling under an attribute. 
These are attribute-specific properties. 
By contrast, attribute-neutral properties are those properties that an entity can have 
regardless of which attribute it falls under. Della Rocca gives the following examples of 
attribute-neutral properties: the number of causes and effects that each mode has, temporal 
properties like duration, the property of being simple or complex, and so on (134). One could 
add the properties of being a mode or substance, being self-identical, etc. Both modes of 
Thought and Extension, for example, have these properties. My mind has a particular 
duration that is identical to the duration of my body. Both my mind and body are self-
identical, modes, complex, etc. These attribute-neutral properties overlap the worlds of the 
different attributes. 
Attribute-neutral properties are thought to be useful for securing the numerical 
identity of modes across attributes because parallel modes have all the same attribute-neutral 
properties.86 In fact, Della Rocca argues that the notion of parallelism can be captured in 
terms of shared attribute-neutral properties because the attribute-neutral properties secure the 
                                               
and “one and the same”. His argument is that they are really distinct with respect to their intensional 
properties—in the way that Hesperus is distinct from Phosphorus—and identical with respect to their 
extensional properties—in that these are two ways of presenting the same referent.  Della Rocca did not need to 
attribute this 20th century apparatus to Spinoza to make his main claims, so I will avoid confusion by not doing 
so here.  




“place” that parallel modes occupy in the infinite causal network, the “order and connection” 
that is “the same” between ideas and things in 2P7 (ibid.). Let me explain. 
Spinoza argues at 1P28 that each mode, regardless of which attribute it falls under, 
exists in an infinite causal network. My body, for example, is an ultimate effect of an infinite 
number of other prior modes that serve as partial causes of my body. And my body is and 
will be the partial cause of an infinite number of effects. My body has a “place” in the 
infinite causal order of connected extended modes: it has a certain collection of causes and 
effects that are unique to it. My mind also has a “place” in the infinite causal order of 
connected thinking modes. In each case, this “place” is defined in attribute-neutral terms, my 
body’s place in its causal network can be described by numbers of causes and effects, a 
particular duration, and so on. The core idea behind the Overlap View is that my mind and 
body are numerically identical in virtue of having exactly the same “place” in their parallel 
causal orders. Their numerical identity consists in their having identical attribute-neutral 
properties.  
The proposal here is not that the attribute-specific properties instantiated by substrata 
characterized by attribute-neutral properties. Attribute-neutral properties are also not to be 
understood as metaphysically prior to the attribute-specific properties just because they are 
numerically the same across attributes. 
The following are the commitments of the two kinds of Attribute-Neutral 
Interpretations I’ll discuss here. 
ANS: There are “trans-attribute” substrata. 
ANO: There are “attribute-neutral” properties common to both Thinking and Extended things.   
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3. Why these are God’s Perspective Interpretations  
I have not yet justified the label “God’s Perspective Interpretation” in detail because I have 
not shown how each of the Objective, Subjective, and Attribute-Neutral Interpretations 
violate the Cognizability Condition. In this section, I will argue that defining commitments 
of these interpretations—abbreviated as OI, SI, ANS, and ANO –is a commitment to something 
that humans cannot cognize, on Spinoza’s theory of human cognition. Specifically, I will 
argue that humans cannot cognize particular things that meet the descriptions given by these 
abbreviations, on Spinoza’s theory of human cognition. For example, we cannot, according 
to Spinoza, cognize particular attributes other than Thought and Extension.  
3.1. Spinoza’s Master Argument 
I will now reconstruct what I’ll call Spinoza’s Master Argument against the cognizability of 
particular entities described by SI1, SI2, OA, ANS, and ANO. That argument can be 
reconstructed from an epistolary exchange between Spinoza and Walther von Tschirnhaus in 
Letters 63-66. The main topic of discussion in these letters is the cognizability of attributes 
other than Thought and Extension. Spinoza’s interlocutor, Tschirnhaus, believes Spinoza is 
committed to OA and is suspicious of the “other attributes.” His specific worry is our 
apparent ignorance of them: if we are “one and the same” as some mode of attribute78: why is 
it that we are aware only of modes of Thought (e.g., our ideas) and modes of Extension (i.e., 
the parts of our body), he asks. Across two letters, Spinoza gives a lengthy “proof” that we 
cannot cognize the other attributes. My claim is that this argument, when extended with a 
premise that Spinoza explicitly endorses (from 1P10s), suffices to rule out the cognizability 
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of God’s purported “real essence” and “attribute-neutral” entities as well as “other 
attributes.” 
 One brief note about terminology: the argument here is expressed in terms whether or 
not we can “conceive[concipio],” “perceive [perceptio],” or “know[cognitio]” certain 
attributes. Each of these terms describes a specific way that we can have ideas. Spinoza uses 
“perception” to indicate that the mind is passive with respect to some idea and “conceiving” 
to indicate that the mind’s activity is involved in some idea (2D3Exp). “Knowing” is just a 
way of conceiving ideas for Spinoza. The ultimate upshot of the Master Argument is that we 
can neither perceive, conceive, or know other attributes, and so on. I’m going to use the term 
“cognize” to mean “having an idea” in general, without regard for its origin or epistemic 
status. The Master Argument, then, is an argument showing the ideas that humans can have 
tout court. For that reason, it is a particularly strong argument, because it concludes that we 
can in no sense think the ideas corresponding to SI1, SI2, OA, ANS, and ANO. 
3.1.1. Reconstructing the Master Argument 
3.1.1.1. Letter 63 (July 25, 1675) from Schuller to Spinoza 
In a letter written on Tschirnhaus’ behalf, Schuller put the following “doubt” to Spinoza: 
 
First, would you please, Sir, convince us by some positive proof, not by a reduction to 
impossibility, that We cannot know more attributes of God than thought and 
extension? Furthermore, does it follow from this that, in contrast to us, creatures 
consisting of those other attributes cannot conceive extension? In this way, it would 




The two doubts here reveal that Tschirnhaus (and presumably Schuller) believed Spinoza to 
have committed to the existence of more attributes than Thought and Extension. Because, for 
Spinoza, infinitely many modes follow from each attribute (1P16), Tschirnhaus assumes that 
there must be an infinite number of “creatures” that belong to these additional attributes. 
These creatures must inhabit different “worlds” than ours on account of their following from 
different attributes. 
 Tschirnhaus expresses his doubt in the form of two questions asked from the human 
perspective and the perspective of an alien “creature” respectively. (1) Why can humans not 
know the other attributes?  (2) Are there other creatures—modes of one of the hidden 
attributes—that cannot conceive Extension, one of the attributes we know? While the second 
question displays one of the oddities of the existence of other attributes, namely that it 
requires Spinoza to believe in alien creatures that don’t suspect that we exist, it is not our 
main focus here. 
According to Tschirnhaus, Spinoza believes both that there are other attributes and 
that humans cannot know them. However, Tschirnhaus sees no explanation or “proof” of this 
fact in Spinoza’s system. Spinoza, the objection goes, cannot give a positive demonstration 
explaining why we do not know these other attributes. 
Here, I don’t think Tschirnhaus honestly believed that he could perceive other 
attributes and was requesting proof that he in fact could not. The doubt being raised is that 
Spinoza owes us an explanation of our ignorance of the fantastical-sounding “other worlds” 
filled with alien creatures of other attributes. This epistemic doubt is intended to be a kind of 
modus tollens of the proposition that there are such worlds, and thus such attributes, in the 
first place.  
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3.1.1.2. Letter 64 (July 29, 1675) from Spinoza to Schuller 
 Spinoza’s reply to this doubt consists in a complex positive proof concluding with the 
claim that we cannot conceive attributes other than Thought and Extension. Spinoza 
expresses the proof is a somewhat convoluted way, so I will reconstruct it in order and with a 
standardized vocabulary. 
(1) The power (ability) of each thing is defined solely by its essence. (3P7) 
(2) The essence of the human mind is that it is the idea of a particular body. (2P13) 
(3) Therefore, the mind’s ability to know extends to (a) what this idea involves or (b) 
what can be inferred from (a). 
(4) The object of the mind, i.e., the body has God as a cause only insofar as God is 
extended (2P6). 
(5) The idea of the body, therefore, involves knowledge of God only insofar as God is 
extended (1A6). 
(6) The mind itself has God as a cause only insofar as God is thinking (2P6). 
(7) The idea of the mind, therefore, involves knowledge of God only insofar as God is 
thinking (1A6).  
(8) Therefore, the mind involves knowledge of God as an extended and thinking thing 
only. 
(9) No attribute from God can be inferred from another attribute or its modes. (1P10) 
(10) Therefore, the human mind cannot know attributes other than Thought and Extension.  
The crucial propositions Spinoza cites in this proof are 2P13, 2P6, and 1P10. Here are those 
propositions: 
1P10: Each attribute of a substance must be conceived through itself. 
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2P6: The modes of each attribute have God for their cause only insofar as he is considered 
under the attribute of which they are modes, and not insofar as he is considered under 
any other attribute.  
2P13: The object of the idea constituting the human Mind is the Body, or a certain mode of 
Extension which actually exists, and nothing else. 
1P10 rules out the possibility that attributes can be conceived through or the cause of one 
another. 2P6 applies this claim to the modes of those attributes insofar as they are caused by 
God. For example, God can be conceived as a cause of bodies only insofar as God is an 
extended thing. There is no cross-attribute causation for Spinoza.87 God, conceived as an 
extended thing, cannot be understood to be the cause of any ideas, for example. The 
conceived separation between the mental and physical, and for Tschirnhaus, between the 
“worlds” of different attributes, is foundational for Spinoza. 
2P13 states Spinoza’s view on the metaphysical relationship between mind and body. 
For Spinoza, minds and bodies are not separate, causally interactive substances. 1P10 rules 
out the possibility of any interaction between minds and bodies. Spinoza famously argues in 
2P13 and its preceding propositions that a mind is an idea of a body: minds exist in a solely 
representational relationship to bodies. They neither cause the activities of bodies nor are 
they passively affected by bodies. Minds merely represent bodies via ideas. 
 Spinoza’s proof begins with an exhaustive characterization of the knowledge that a 
human mind can have. The mind can know only what it “involves” and “what can be 
inferred” from what it involves. This characterization requires clarification. 
                                               
87 1A5 and 1P2. Attributes have nothing in common with one another and so cannot enter into causal relations. 
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 Spinoza makes it clear that what the mind, the idea of the body, involves is what that 
idea “contains in itself.” According to Spinoza, the mind is not a simple idea of a body but is 
rather an aggregate of ideas of all of the different interacting parts that compose the human 
body. For Spinoza, these ideas are not the sum total of the sensory representations 
corresponding to the relevant changes the body undergoes in its interaction with external 
things. The mind is not identical to what Spinoza calls the imagination. (He is not an 
Empiricist.) Included in the mind are ideas that arise from the activity of the intellect, which 
we might characterize as the faculty of the mind responsible for “conceptual” behavior.  
Spinoza says that the mind “involves” the attributes of Extension and Thought 
because its ideas include ideas of God conceived under those attributes. For example, at least 
insofar as it has clear and distinct ideas, the mind conceives of the body as being (ultimately) 
caused by an infinite extended thing (e.g., 2P2). The idea of the body as having a causal 
history tracing to God is not the product of mere sensation. It is rather the product of the 
intellect’s apprehension of the body as a finite effect of an infinite extended substance. 
 Spinoza argues on these grounds that the idea of the body “involves” Extension 
because God is the cause of the body insofar as God is an extended thing and thus the idea of 
the body includes its causal origins in God. The same is true of the mind: the idea of the 
mind, an idea of an idea also in the mind itself, “involves” Thought because the mind is 
conceived as caused by God insofar as God is a thinking thing. If the human mind can know 
other attributes, therefore, it must be that the mind can “infer or conceive” other attributes 
from these two attributes and their modes. 
 1P10 rules out this possibility straightway. Just as Thought and Extension cannot be 
conceived through on another, no other attributes can be conceived through either Thought or 
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Extension. The same follows for the modes of these attributes (2P6): just as bodies cannot be 
conceived through minds, modes of attribute3 cannot be conceived through bodies or minds. 
Therefore, attributes other than Thought and Extension are neither contained in the mind, i.e., 
the idea of the body or can they be inferred from the idea of the body.  
 Before we turn to Tschirnhaus’ reply it is worth noting that while Spinoza’s argument 
is aimed at the knowledge of other attributes, the premises from the Ethics that Spinoza 
appeals to would have allowed him to demonstrate an even stronger claim. It’s not just that 
humans cannot know the other attributes. Spinoza could have argued that we cannot conceive 
the other attributes. That is, we cannot have ideas of the other attributes at all.  
 For Spinoza, this might have appeared to have been a distinction not worth making in 
his letter, especially given the context of Tschirnhaus’ question. Both Spinoza and 
Tschirnhaus move freely between “knowing” (cognoscere) and “conceiving” (concipere). 
This is to be expected: for Spinoza, knowing is just a way of conceiving (2P40s2). Or, better, 
“knowledge” is a term that Spinoza uses for ideas that are produced by “reason” or the 
intellect, rather than imagination. 
 However, for the contemporary reader, who, for example, might have a propositional 
model of knowledge, is worth stressing the strength of Spinoza’s argument here. Spinoza’s 
conclusion that we cannot know the other attributes amounts to the conclusion that we can in 
no sense think the other attributes in particular. We cannot form any kind of representation of 
each of them in particular whatsoever. Spinoza is not endorsing the weaker claim that we 
can, for example, understand what another attribute is and yet be ignorant of whether there 
are such things. Spinoza is not saying that we can understand the proposition “There are 
other attributes” and yet doubt whether it is true. Spinoza is claiming that we cannot entertain 
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the notion of another attribute in the first place. These attributes lie outside the boundaries of 
human thought entirely.  
 In other words, we could replace the instances of knowledge in the argument above 
with conception and reach the strong conclusion that the human mind cannot conceive 
attributes other than Thought and Extension. 
3.1.1.3. Letter 65 (August 12, 1675) from Tschirnhaus to Spinoza 
Tschirnhaus did not find this reply to be satisfactory. He wrote a brief reply to Spinoza’s 
“positive proof” described above. First, Tschirnhaus asks why we cannot perceive more 
attributes than Thought or Extension. This is a strictly separate question from whether we can 
conceive other attributes. Spinoza (and presumably Tschirnhaus) reserve the word “perceive” 
for the mind’s passive reception of some idea. “Conceive” is reserved for the activity of the 
intellect. 
 Strictly speaking, we both perceive and conceive Thought and Extension. We 
conceive the attributes, as 2P1 and 2P2 suggest, by conceiving of an infinite thinking and 
extended being that is the cause of our minds and bodies.  However, we don’t merely 
conceive the attributes. That is, they are not somehow the sole product of the activity of our 
minds. The attributes are not mind-dependent illusions, in other word, as some interpreters 
have suggested. We perceive the attributes because we perceive their modes (2A5). We 
perceive the attribute of Extension, for example, insofar as we perceive the affections of our 
bodies (2A4).  
 Tschirnhaus’ use of “perceives” suggests that his primary interest is in the first part of 
Spinoza’s proof, wherein he claims to show that the mind does not “involve” or “contain in 
itself” the idea of any other attributes. That is, his focus is not on what can be “inferred” or 
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“conceived” from the contents of the human mind. Therefore, his focus appears to be on 
2P13 rather than 1P10 or 2P6. 
 Tschirnhaus elaborates on his worry by arguing that 2P7, Spinoza’s proposition 
establishing the so-called “parallelism” of the attributes, is compatible with our having 
knowledge of the other attributes.  He gives the following argument: 
Although I gather from [2P7s] that the world is certainly unique, still it’s no less clear 
also from that [2P7s] that it is expressed in infinite ways, and therefore each singular 
thing is expressed in infinite ways. From this it seems to follow that the Modification 
which constitutes my Mind and the Modification which expresses my Body, although 
it’s one and the same Modification, is nevertheless expressed in infinite ways, in one 
way through Thought, in another through Extension, in a third through an attribute of 
God unknown to me, and so on to infinity (since there are infinitely many Attributes 
of God, and the Order and Connection of the Modifications seems to be the same in 
all). 
From this, now, the Question arises why the Mind, which represents a certain 
Modification, a Modification expressed not only in Extension, but also in infinite 
other ways, why, I ask, does the Mind perceive only the Modification expressed 
through Extension, i.e., the human Body, and no other expression through other 
attributes? (IV/279/14-29) 
 
For Tschirnhaus, the text of 2P7s suggests that (1) there are other attributes (2) that there are 
infinitely many of them (3) that each attribute has infinitely many modes that (4) exist in the 
same “order and connection” as each other and as the modes of the familiar attributes 
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because (5) they are “one and the same” although “expressed” in different attributes. To be 
fair to Tschirnhaus, the text of 2P7s does invite this reading. As we saw in Chapter 1, many 
of Spinoza’s contemporary interpreters regularly cite 2P7 as definitive evidence that he 
believed in the existence of other attributes. For example, Spinoza writes in 2P7s: 
Therefore, whether we conceive nature under the attribute of Extension, or under the 
attribute of Thought, or under any other attribute, we shall find one and the same 
order, or one and the same connection of causes, i.e., that the same things follow one 
another. 
And later, 
Hence, so long as things are considered as modes of thinking, we must explain the 
order of the whole of nature, or the connection of causes, through the attribute of 
Thought alone. And insofar as they are considered as modes of Extension, the order 
of the whole of nature must be explained through the attribute of Extension alone. I 
understand the same concerning other attributes. 
Given how Tschirnhaus reads 2P7s, it’s very natural to wonder why we don’t perceive the 
other attributes. The human mind is just an idea of a particular mode of Extension, a body. 
2P7s entails that that body is “one and the same” the idea of that body. It also entails that the 
body is “one and the same” as some mode of each of the “other attributes.”  Since the mind is 
the idea of the body (2P13) and therefore perceives everything that goes on in the body 
(2P12), and the body is “one and the same” as a mode of attribute3, why does the mind not 
perceive anything of that mode as well? And by extension, why doesn’t the mind perceive 
any of the infinitely many modes that are “one and the same” as the body?  
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 It seems most natural to read Tschirnhaus’ reply here as a restatement of the original 
question he asked via Schuller. After all, Spinoza’s reply to the original statement of the 
question does not seem to be relevant to Tschirnhaus’ question here. In Spinoza’s original 
reply, he cites 2P13 to establish that the mind “contains in itself” only the idea of the body. In 
other words, Spinoza offers as a premise that the mind is the idea of only of the body and is 
thus constituted wholly by ideas of the parts of the body. Tschirnhaus wonders why this is 
true, especially given that the body is “one and the same” as a mode of an attribute other than 
Extension.  What Tschirnhaus seems to be seeing, then, is an apparent conflict between (his 
reading) of 2P7s and 2P13. This is appropriate because Spinoza himself cites 2P7s in Letter 
64 as a means by which Tschirnhaus could remove his doubts about the “other worlds” that 
we do not know. 
3.1.1.4. Letter 66: Spinoza to Tschirnhaus 
Unfortunately, we do not have a direct reply to this further question from Spinoza himself. 
As Curley notes, what we have of Letter 66 appears to be merely a fragment of a longer 
letter. Here is Spinoza’s reply: 
For the rest, to reply to your Objection, I say that although each thing is expressed in 
infinite ways in the infinite intellect of God, nevertheless those infinite ideas by 
which it is expressed cannot constitute one and the same Mind of a singular thing, but 
infinitely many, since each of the infinite ideas has no connection with any other, as 
I’ve explained in the Scholium to 2P7, and as is evident from 1P10. If you attend just 




This reply is difficult to parse and requires some interpretation. It reads most naturally in the 
following way. 
(1) There are infinitely many modes that are different expressions of one and the 
same thing. 
(2) For example, if a, b are parallel modes of Extension and attribute3 then a=b. The 
same is true for infinitely many additional parallel modes. 
(3) There is an idea corresponding to each of these modes in the infinite intellect. 
(4) So, there are modes of Thought, call them idea(a), idea(b), in the infinite intellect. 
(5) These ideas “have no connection” with one another. 
(6) Therefore, they cannot constitute the mind of a singular thing. 
(7) Therefore, idea(a) and idea(b) are minds of distinct singular things.  
Spinoza suggests that (5) follows from 1P10 and is explained in 2P7s. He must be referring 
to the following passage: 
Hence, so long as things are considered as modes of thinking, we must explain the 
order of the whole of nature, or the connection of causes, through the attribute of 
Thought alone. And insofar as they are considered as modes of Extension, the order 
of the whole of nature must be explained through the attribute of Extension alone. 
In other words, there cannot be a “connection of causes” between a and b because they are 
modes of different attributes. This is what we would expect from 1P10, and in its application 
to modes, 2P6. Because idea(a) and idea(b) are ideas of modes of different attributes, those 
ideas must also not be causally connected. The reason is because a cannot be conceived 
through b as a cause and vice versa. There is no connection between a and b to represent in 
the infinite intellect. 
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 (1)-(5) in this argument, then, appear to be a restatement of Spinoza’s proof that my 
mind does not involve ideas of anything but my body. It cannot involve ideas of modes of 
other attributes because those modes cannot enter into a causal relationship with my body. 
Therefore, they cannot be represented by my mind. 
 However, (6) represents an addition to Spinoza’s argument in Letter 64 that rules out 
a scenario that is not ruled out by the positive proof in that Letter. The positive proof in 
Letter 64 excludes the possibility that I can conceive (modes of) other attributes via Thought 
and Extension. However, in Letter 65, Tschirnhaus seems to have also been worrying why it 
is that we don’t perceive the other attributes. Why is it that my mind cannot, in the first place, 
include ideas of modes of other attributes? Spinoza merely rules out this possibility by citing 
2P13, which states that the human mind just is the idea of a body. 
 The issue with this initial response lies in Spinoza’s proof of 2P13. Spinoza writes, 
Next, if the object of the Mind were something else also, in addition to the Body, then 
since (by IP36) nothing exists from which there does not follow some effect, there 
would necessarily (by P12) be an idea in our Mind of some effect of it. But (by A5) 
there is no idea of it. Therefore, the object of our Mind is the existing Body and 
nothing else, q.e.d.88 
2P13 rules out the possibility that I could have ideas of modes of some other attribute by 
appealing to 2A5, an axiom. 2A5 states: “We neither feel nor perceive any singular things 
except bodies and modes of thinking.” Spinoza’s initial response to Tschirnhaus, then, relies 
on an axiom that simply states that we do not perceive these other attributes. And in Letter 
                                               
88 All underlining is mine. 
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65, Tschirnhaus casts doubt on this axiom by appealing to the fact that my body is “one and 
the same” as a mode of other attributes. 
 Again, I don’t think that Tschirnhaus believes himself to perceive other attributes and 
that’s why he’s doubting 2A5. Spinoza also seems to believe that it is just obvious that we 
don’t perceive other attributes. However, (6) appears to be further reason for rejecting the 
possibility that we perceive modes of other attributes. In fact, (6) rules out the possibility that 
I perceive a mode that is “one and the same” as my body because, an idea that is of both my 
body, a singular thing, and a mode parallel to my body, also a singular thing, would not be a 
“mind” in the first place. 
 At 1P11, Spinoza argues that the human mind is the idea of an existing singular thing, 
without specifying that that thing is a body. The core idea behind the demonstration is that all 
of the modes of thinking that we are aware of (2A3) are posterior to an idea of a single thing. 
That is, my ideas of the particular modes of thinking (love, desire, hate, etc.) are all 
dependent on an idea of some singular thing. This idea can exist without any of particular 
modes of thinking I’m aware of—it exists whether I love or hate or desire—but these modes 
of thinking cannot exist without the idea—in 2A3, Spinoza argues that this idea can exist 
“even though there is no other mode of thinking.” So, for Spinoza is it is the nature of the 
human mind to be the idea of a singular thing. 
 Given that we are perceive the effects on a body (2A4)—something that Tschirnhaus 
does not deny—it must be that this singular thing, of which our mind is an idea, is a body 
(2P13). A body is a singular thing, according to Spinoza’s definition (2D7), because it is the 
effect of a number of smaller bodies that exist in a complex causal relationship with one 
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another. Some of the details of this complexity are described in the physical discursus 
following 2P13.  
 So, Spinoza’s response in Letter 66 is two-fold: it explains again that we cannot 
perceive modes of other attributes because they cannot enter into causal relations with our 
body and it explains that our mind can be the idea of only our body because the human mind 
is the idea of a singular thing and not of multiple things, and in particular, not of modes of 
different attributes.    
3.1.2. The Master Argument, Stated 
We can now restate Spinoza’s proof that other attributes are uncognizable to humans as it is 
stated across Letters 64 and 66. I will replace instances of “know” with “cognize” to 
emphasize that the argument shows our inability to have any idea of the other attributes.  
(1) The power (ability) of each thing is defined solely by its essence. (3P7) 
(2) Humans have ideas. (2A2) 
(3) Humans have ideas of a particular body. (2A4) 
(4) Humans do not perceive any other singular thing. (2A5) 
(5) The human mind is the idea of a singular thing. (1P11) 
(6) The body is a singular thing. (2D7) 
(7) The essence of the human mind is that it is the idea of a particular body. (2P13) 
(8) Therefore, the mind’s ability to cognize extends to (a) what this idea involves or (b) what 
can be inferred from (a). 
(9) The object of the mind, i.e., the body has God as a cause only insofar as God is extended 
(2P6). 
(10) The idea of the body, therefore, cognizes God only insofar as God is extended (1A6). 
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(11) The mind itself has God as a cause only insofar as God is thinking (2P6). 
(12) The idea of the mind, therefore, cognizes God only insofar as God is thinking (1A6).  
(13) Therefore, the mind cognizes God as an extended and thinking thing only. 
(14) No attribute from God can be inferred from another attribute or its modes. (1P10) 
(15) Therefore, the human mind cannot cognize attributes other than Thought and Extension.  
 
This Master Argument allows us to flesh out the Cognizability Condition because it 
provides a rubric by which we can tell whether or not some x is cognizable by humans.  
 
Cognizability Condition: Everything is conceived through Thought or Extension, but not 
both.   
 
We cannot therefore cognize particular attributes “other than” Thought and Extension. 
3.1.3. Extending this Argument to SI1, SI2, ANS, and ANO 
 We can extend this argument to show that the Subjectivist’s “real essence” and 
Objectivist’s “attribute-neutral” entities are uncognizable in particular. To do that, we need 
only to add the following additional premise: 
 
(14b.) We must cognize everything under an attribute. (1P10s)  
 
As the argument above suggests, Spinoza denies that we can conceive “other attributes” via 
the attributes we do conceive. However, Spinoza reveals in the scholium to 1P10, we are also 
unable to conceive anything except under an attribute. He writes, “Indeed, nothing in nature 
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is clearer than that each being must be conceived under some attribute…” (II/52/10). With 
(14b.) included in our argument, we can reach a further conclusion: 
 
(16b.) Therefore, the human mind cannot cognize anything except under the attributes of 
Thought and Extension. 
 
This conclusion is inconsistent with the cognizability of the entities described by SI1 and the 
version of ANS. 
 Take SI1’s “real essence”. This essence is not identical to any attribute, since the 
attributes are mere illusions of the mind. And, of course, it is not a mode of either of those 
attributes. Therefore, it cannot be cognized under any attribute. Because we must cognize 
everything under an attribute, we cannot cognize God’s “real essence.” 
 Now take an example of an attribute-neutral substratum, e.g., a mode. This mode’s 
intrinsic properties do not include any attribute-specific properties. In itself, it is not 
cognizable under any attribute. Therefore, we cannot cognize it as it is in itself. Therefore, 
we cannot cognize its instantiating attribute-specific properties. What we do cognize are 
modes of Thought and of Extension. We cannot cognize modes simpliciter, according to 
Spinoza. 
It is more difficult to extend this argument to ANO, because it is neither clear what the 
nature of an attribute-neutral property or relations is on this view, nor is it clear what it means 
to consider something “neutrally.”  
 The central idea of the Overlap Strategy is that parallel modes of different attributes 
have identical neutral properties. The Overlap strategy seems to face a dilemma about what a 
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“neutral property” is. There are two ways of understanding the identity or commonness of 
neutral properties. Consider a neutral property that two modes, one of Thought (t) and one of 
Extension (e) have in common, call it F. F either falls under an attribute or it doesn’t. If it 
does not fall under an attribute, then, according to 14b., we cannot conceive it. On this 
option, F is uncognizable for the same reason that the “real essence” and substrata are.  
Let’s assume then that F falls under an attribute. In this case, F is no longer an 
attribute-neutral property because we are now in an attribute context. F must, for example, 
follow either from Thought or Extension. But if it follows from, e.g., Thought, then it cannot 
be conceived through Extension and vice versa. This possibility is ruled out by 1P10. That is, 
the entire point of the Overlap View is to maintain the difference between properties that fall 
under attributes while maintaining their identity in some attribute-neutral context. If F falls 
under an attribute, then that identity cannot be maintained.  
One final move is to insist that F falls under both, thus jettisoning the Overlap View’s 
distinction of attribute-neutral and attribute-specific properties.89 Identically the “same” F 
falls under both Thought and Extension and its sameness imbues the modes of the different 
attributes with numerical identity. However, we cannot conceive the identity of some mode 
or property under Thought and simultaneously under Extension. There is no “connection” 
between these entities (1P10, 2P7). Those modes and properties must be conceived through 
their respective attributes. 
                                               
89 Della Rocca’s (1996, 134-5) discussion of attribute-neutral properties invites this confusion, partially because 
Spinoza does not typically describe things in terms of “properties.” A “property” must be a mode, since it is 
conceived through its bearer. But if it is a mode, then it must be a mode of an attribute. However, nothing can 
be a mode of two attributes because attributes have nothing in common.  
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Here, it will likely be objected that we do conceive “neutral” properties, just always 
under particular attributes. That is, though we cannot cognize, for example, “being a cause” 
except under Thought (“being a causeT”) or Extension (“being a causeE”), we are still 
conceiving attribute neural properties. We can abstract, one might say, the neutral properties 
from their particular instances under the different attributes. 
It is correct that these arguments purport to show that the neutral properties cannot be 
cognized “concretely,” that is, in particular and not via an attribute. But this leads us to the 
next question: can the “neutral properties” be conceived in abstraction? Or can we only 
conceive particular attribute-specific properties? This question is addressed in Section 4.3. 
3.2. Commitments to Uncognizables vs. Uncognizable Commitments 
We now have our justification for labeling the Objective, Subjective, and Attribute-Neutral 
Interpretations “God’s Perspective Interpretations”: each is committed to something that 
humans cannot cognize. I now want to argue that these commitments themselves are 
uncognizable to humans: God’s Perspective Interpretations must hold that humans cannot 
cognize Spinoza’s theory given what it says about human cognition. 
Let me clarify this claim. There are two ways of understanding the “commitments” of 
Spinoza’s theory of God’s attributes. On the one hand, the commitments are each instances 
of human language. That is, the “commitments” are strings of letters written on a page, 
vocalized sounds, ink on paper, black pixels on screens, and so on. Regarded in this way, the 
“commitments” are modes of extension: they take up space, have some quantity of motion 
and rest, have a definite duration, and so on. On this way of looking at it, these commitments 
are cognizable in the sense that a human can perceive them insofar as they have full use of 
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their various senses. When I say that the commitments themselves are uncognizable, I do not 
mean insofar as they are modes of extension perceived by the various human senses. 
 Instead, when I say that these commitments are uncognizable, I refer to the intended 
meaning of these various blots of ink and soundwaves. On a contemporary view, we might 
think of these modes of extension as having meaning insofar as they, for example, express 
propositions or refer to particular entities via definite description or a chain of causal links 
from an initial baptism to later instance of reference.90 Perhaps tools like these are needed for 
Spinoza to express general commitments to collections of entities that are uncognizable in 
particular. However, whether or not these commitments are meaningful on some theory of 
meaning is not our interest here. We are interested in what Spinoza thinks about the meaning 
of the various modes of extension used to express his theory. 
 In this section, I will argue that Spinoza believes that human language has meaning 
insofar as it causes ideas. Spinoza thinks of the function of language as consisting solely in 
the association of words and other bits of language with ideas in memory. Therefore, a bit of 
language has meaning, or at least its intended meaning, only insofar as it causes an intended 
idea. There are no abstract “propositions” that are expressed by language on Spinoza’s view.  
 Because this is Spinoza’s account of how language manages to “mean” something, 
the various commitments constituting Spinoza’s theory of the attributes only have meaning 
insofar as they cause us to have ideas of the entities involved in that theory. And, as I’ve 
argued in the previous section, the commitments that God’s Perspective Interpretations want 
                                               
90 This helps partly explain why Curley (1969, 121-6) wants the attribute of thought to be "propositional." As we 
will see, Spinoza cannot make sense of commitments to other attributes, etc. except under this propositional 
model of thought, which allows for the assertion and affirmation of propositions about entities that cannot 
themselves be conceived, 
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to include in Spinoza’s theory are uncognizable: we cannot in principle have ideas of those 
particular things. Therefore, the intended “commitments” of Spinoza’s theory on these 
interpretations are themselves uncognizable. 
 The following discussion will also show why there is pressure for Spinoza to allow 
for the possibility of “general ideas”—that is, ideas of “attributes” and such that are ideas of 
collections of things where one cannot have the idea of each particular thing in those 
collections. In other words, Spinoza cannot commit to there being “other attributes” simply 
in virtue of asserting a general proposition like “There are other attributes.” This general 
claim can have meaning for us only if it can cause ideas in us.  
 In other words, God’s Perspective interpreters are guilty of not heeding his 
admonition to his readers in the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect: 
It is, of course, true that we can (when there are reasons which move us to do so) 
indicate to others, by words or other [means, something other than what we are aware 
of. But we shall never bring it about, either by words or by any other means, that we 
think differently about the things than we do think about them. That is impossible, as 
is clear to all, once they attend only to their intellect, apart from the use of words or 
other symbols. (I/83/19) 
3.2.1. Spinoza on the Nature of Language 
Spinoza never explicitly develops a theory of human language in the Ethics or elsewhere. 
However, his comments on the nature of words and their relationship to ideas makes it clear 
that he takes language to consist in the association of linguistic devices with ideas in memory 
and the causal exchange of those ideas via activations of those associations.  In this section, I 
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will briefly explain and give textual evidence for the core theses of Spinoza’s account of 
language. 
3.2.1.1. Words are a product of the imagination, not the intellect. 
 One recurring theme throughout Spinoza’s work is that language, and especially 
words, are products of the imagination rather than the intellect.  In the Treatise on the 
Emendation of the Intellect, Spinoza writes, 
…since words are part of the imagination, i.e., since we feign many concepts, in 
accordance with the random composition of words in the memory from some 
disposition of the body, it is not to be doubted that words, as much as the imagination, 
can be the cause of many and great errors, unless we are very wary of them.” (TIE, 
88). 
In the Theological-Political Treatise, Spinoza asserts that “except for Christ no one has 
received God’s revelations without the aid of the imagination, i.e., without the aid of words 
or images.” (1, 25). It will be helpful, then, for Spinoza to distinguish language itself from 
what that language is used to express, as I did earlier with the notion of “commitment.” 
Spinoza does so himself later in the TTP, where he writes, “Scripture is sacred only insofar 
as by Scripture we mean the things signified in Scripture, not insofar as we mean by 
Scripture the words, or the language and utterances, by which things are signified.” (X, 20) 
For Spinoza, words themselves are nothing but a collection of “images,” presumably 
meaning that they are nothing but symbols on pages, vocalized sounds, and so forth. They are 
not necessarily identical with the things that they mean. 
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3.2.1.2. Words are modes of extension, not ideas. 
A corollary to the claim that words are the product of the imagination is Spinoza’s claim that 
words are extended things. He writes that  
…an idea (since it is a mode of thinking) consists neither in the image of anything, 
nor in words. For the essence of words and of images is constituted only by corporeal 
motions, which do not at all involve the concept of thought. (2P49s1) 
Spinoza draws a distinction in 2P49 between ideas, images, and words. Only ideas are modes 
of Thought which do not involve Extension in any sense. Ideas are “concepts” of the mind, 
suggesting that they are the product of the intellect rather than the imagination. Words and 
images, however, involve Extension essentially. They consist in “corporeal motions” in the 
body and in other bodies: they are either themselves modes of Extension, like words on a 
page, or images caused by interactions with modes of Extension. For example, a seeing the 
word “apple” might cause me to have the image of an apple.  
3.2.1.3. Words have meaning insofar as they are associated with ideas and 
images.  
In the Second Part of the Ethics, Spinoza’s gives us a brief insight into how he understands 
the signification of words. Here, Spinoza illustrates how memory works via association of 
ideas and images with the example of one’s hearing the word pomum (apple). He writes, 
And from this we clearly understand why the Mind, from the thought of one thing, 
immediately passes to the thought of another, which has no likeness to the first: as, 
for example, from the thought of the word pomum a Roman will immediately pass to 
the thought of the fruit, which has no similarity to that articulate sound and nothing in 
 
 160 
common with it except that the Body of the same man has often been affected by 
these two, i.e., that the man often heard the word pomum while he saw the fruit 
(2P18s, II/107/14). 
The primary function of words is to be associated with certain ideas and images in the mind. 
Here, Spinoza argues that certain strings of letters and/or sounds get associated with certain 
ideas and images. In the background here is a view about the nature of language education: 
children hear parents using the word “apple” whenever they hold a piece of a particular kind 
of fruit. The child thus associates the image of the word “apple”—likely just a sound until the 
child learns written language—with the image of the fruit itself. This simple model is 
intended to extend to all of human language, no matter how complex. The example here is of 
an image and some words associated with that image. However, Spinoza also thought that 
words can be associated with ideas as well. That is, “God” can come to be associated with 
the intellect’s idea of the infinite substance.  
3.2.1.4. Meaning is “mind-relative”. 
Laerke argues convincingly that this associationist account of language entails that meaning 
is “mind-relative” for Spinoza (533). Because Spinoza believes that words get their meaning 
by being associated with certain images and ideas in memory and in the intellect, the 
associations people have with certain words will be different. This suggests that there is no 
one single idea always associated with the word “apple” in a group of persons or within the 
experience of one person. It is inevitable that each person will form a different image or idea 
of an apple upon hearing that word and that any given person has several ideas associated 
with “apple”. It all depends on the contexts in which they’ve heard the word in the past and 
in which they continue to hear the word “apple” that associate the idea of that word with 
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other ideas in their memory. For this reason, Spinoza would encourage us to avoid talking 
about the idea or the image associated with a particular word. 
This also suggests that pragmatics will play a crucial role in Spinoza’s understanding 
of linguistic expression. Spinoza tells us explicitly that “Words have a definite meaning only 
from their use” (TTP, XII, II).91 Because there is not necessarily one idea associated with each 
particular word, one correct usage, one cannot rely on “the” semantics of certain words to get 
their meaning across. Context, including one’s knowledge about the associations their 
interlocutor might have with certain words, what features of those ideas are relevant for 
discussion (the color of the apple vs its flavor), and so on will play a central role in causing 
the appropriate ideas in others’ minds.  
3.2.1.5. Language is a primary cause of philosophical error. 
Because words are the product of the imagination, they are liable to leave us in confusion.  
The fundamental trouble with words is that we can produce innumerable combinations of 
them, just like we can produce innumerable combinations of colors and shape on a canvas. 
And, even though those words might each be associated with images and ideas, there’s no 
guarantee that the images and ideas one intends to cause in oneself or another will match up 
with the ideas and images that are actually associated with certain words. This leads to a 
major source of philosophical error: cases wherein we mistakenly believe that certain words 
                                               
91 Spinoza illustrates this point by discussing the sanctity of certain words: ““If they should be so organized that, 
according to their usage, they move the people reading them to devotion, then those words will be sacred. So 
will a book written with the words organized that way. But if, afterward, the usage should be lost, so that the 
words have no meaning, or if the book should be completely neglected, whether from malice or because men no 
longer need it, then neither the words nor the book will be of any use. They will lose their holiness. Finally, if 
the same words should be organized in another way, or a usage should prevail according to which they are to be 
taken in an opposite meaning, then the words and the book which were previously sacred will be unclean and 
profane.” (TTP, XII, II.) 
 
 162 
are associated with an intended class of ideas, but in fact that class of ideas is absent in the 
human intellect.  There are possible instances of “empty words.” 
 One of Spinoza’s favorite examples of this phenomenon is the example of the words 
“the will,” which, he thinks, previous philosophers have intended to use to refer to a distinct 
faculty of the mind responsible for, for example, affirming an idea. Spinoza writes, 
…men are deceived in that they think themselves free, an opinion which consists only 
in this, that they are conscious of their actions and ignorant of the causes by which 
they are determined. This, then, is their idea of freedom—that they do not know any 
cause of their actions. They say, of course, that human actions depend on the will, but 
these are only words for which they have no idea. For all are ignorant of what the will 
is, and how it [20] moves the Body; those who boast of something else, who feign 
seats and dwelling places of the soul, usually provoke either ridicule or disgust. 
(2P35s) 
Here we have an example of where previous philosophers intend to talk about the “will” as a 
free faculty of the mind. However, Spinoza argues that we can have no idea of such a faculty, 
because there is no “will” distinct from the intellect (1P31, 1P33). In this case, the words “the 
will” are associated with ideas of one’s actions coupled with a lack of ideas about their 
causes. They cannot be, however, associated with the idea of a faculty distinct from the 
intellect. 
 We see a similar discussion of the disconnect between words and ideas in Spinoza’s 
discussion of Prophets in the Theological-Political Treatise. He writes, 
Since the Prophets perceived God’s revelations with the aid of the imagination, there 
is no doubt that they were able to perceive many things beyond the limits of the 
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intellect. For we can compose many more ideas from words and images than we can 
by using only the principles and notions on which our whole natural knowledge is 
constructed. (1, 45) 
What distinguishes us non-Prophets from the Prophets is that we have to use the principles 
and notions in the intellect to come to knowledge of God. Prophets, however, could 
somehow perceive God with the aid of the imagination. And the Prophets thereby “perceived 
and taught almost everything in metaphors and enigmatic sayings, and expressed all spiritual 
things corporeally. For all these things agree more with the nature of the imagination” (1, 
46).  However, Spinoza is clear that we cannot rely on the imagination for knowledge of God 
(2P44). This suggests that the words that the Prophets use, though intended to describe God, 
are associated in us with images of God and not of ideas. To confuse the two would be 
disastrous for our knowledge of God.  
 Considerations like these lead to Spinoza’s diagnosis of the cause of most errors in 
philosophy and in general. He writes, 
And indeed, most errors consist only in our not rightly applying names to things. For 
when someone says that the lines which are drawn from the center of a circle to its 
circumference are unequal, he surely understands (then at least) by a circle something 
different from what Mathematicians understand. Similarly, when men err in 
calculating, they have certain numbers in their mind and different ones on the paper. 
So if you consider what they have in Mind, they really do not err, though they seem 
to err because we think they have in their mind the numbers which are on the paper. If 
this were not so, we would not believe that they were erring, just as I did not believe 
that he was erring whom I recently heard cry out that his courtyard had flown into his 
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neighbor's hen because what he had in mind seemed sufficiently clear to me [viz. that 
his hen had flown into his neighbor's courtyard. 
And most controversies have arisen from this, that men do not rightly explain 
their own mind, or interpret the mind of the other man badly. For really, when they 
contradict one another most vehemently, they either have the same thoughts, or they 
are thinking of different things, so that what they think are errors and absurdities in 
the other are not (2P47s, II/128/24). 
Again, this is why pragmatics must play a central role in Spinoza’s theory of meaning. 
Words are associated with any number of ideas and images in the minds of different people. 
Errors arise when people are unclear about (1) the ideas and images that words are actually 
associated with in their minds, that is, the ideas that they actually have in mind upon 
encountering certain words and (2) the ideas and images that words are associated with in 
other people’s minds. The only way to sort this out, presumably, is careful attention to one’s 
own mind, and the behavior of other persons.  
3.2.2. Commitments to Particular Uncognizables are Meaningless 
I will assume that Spinoza took this views on language to apply to his own theory of the 
attributes. That is, he took each of the words constituting the various propositions, 
demonstrations, and scholia that describe that theory to be associated or able to be associated 
with an intended class of ideas. If SI1, SI2, OA, ANS, ANO are cognizable commitments, then 
they ought to be able to be associated with ideas of particular things that words like “real 
essence,” “the attributes are identical,” “other attributes,” “attribute-neutral” are intended to 
be associated with. However, Spinoza’s Master Argument shows that no human can have 
these ideas. Therefore, these words cannot be associated with any of their intended ideas.  
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 That is not to say that they are not associated with any ideas or images tout court. As 
Spinoza’s account of language suggests, words can be associated with any number of 
different images and ideas depending on the context and the person encountering those 
words. For example, the words “other attributes” might be associated with pixels, chalk 
marks, vocal utterances, and so on. They might be associated with diagrams in a classroom 
intended to illustrate Spinoza’s ontology or with formulas like “∀𝑥 ≠ 𝑇 ∨ 𝐸”. Each reader 
will have to determine that for themselves. However, they cannot be associated with the ideas 
of attributes other than Thought and Extension, because we cannot conceive attributes other 
than Thought and Extension. For that reason, SI1, SI2, OA, ANS, and ANO are uncognizable 
commitments: we cannot have the ideas they are intended to be associated with.  To return to 
Spinoza’s admonition at the beginning of this section: these commitments require us to think 
about things in a way that is impossible for us, and reflection on what these words are 
associated with in our intellects will reveal that they are not cognizable as intended. 
4. The Demand for the Generality of Thought 
In the previous two sections, I’ve argued that (1) God’s Perspective Interpretations commit 
Spinoza to particular uncognizable things and (2) that these commitments are themselves 
therefore uncognizable. However, I’ve ignore another way of understanding OI, SI, ANO and 
ANS.  It could be that God’s Perspective Interpreters think of these commitments as general 
commitments to a collection of uncognizable entities rather than as commitments to 
particular uncognizable entities. “Though we cannot conceive particular attributes other than 
Thought and Extension,” and Objectivist might say, “we can conceive that there exist things 
meeting that description.” 
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 In this section, I will argue that Spinoza’s theory of cognition and abstraction rule out 
this possibility. For Spinoza, all thought consists in ideas of particular things: we cannot have 
ideas of, e.g., “other attributes” in general or as a collective. Thus, God’s Perspective 
Interpretations cannot avoid the central objection under discussion. 
4.1. Indirect Routes to Ideas of Uncognizable Entities  
A defender of a God’s Perspective Interpretation might object that we can cognize 
purportedly uncognizable things as a collective even though we cannot cognize them in 
particular. The most natural “indirect route” that Spinoza might turn to is the route of 
forming general, abstract ideas. The basic strategy is simple: one can abstract from particular 
ideas to form a general idea (what we would now call a “concept”) that one can leverage to 
represent entities that one cannot have particular ideas of. For example, in order to represent 
attributes other than Thought and Extension, one might form a general, abstract idea of “an 
attribute” and then form the idea corresponding to the description “some attribute not 
identical to Thought and Extension.” The ideas here would be general in the sense that they 
are not ideas of any particular instance, e.g., the idea of “an attribute” is not identical to the 
idea of Thought or Extension, but is abstracted by representing what the objects of those two 
ideas have “in common.” This basic strategy, it seems to me, is common to a number of 
superficially different responses one might have to the challenges to direct representation of 
the uncognizable entities that I’ve just offered.  Here are some examples. 
4.1.1. Divine Deferral 
Confronted with our own cognitive limitations, one might make defense of the cognizability 
of rival interpretations’ commitments.  
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We cannot interpret the metaphysical commitments of the Ethics as restricted to what 
we human beings can cognize.  After all, we are limited creatures with finite 
intellects. There is a limit to what we can understand about God’s essence, the 
constitution of the natural world, and so on. The Ethics is constructed, as it were, 
from God’s point of view. God can cognize [insert humanly uncognizable item here] 
because God’s intellect is not confined to a finite number of ideas of things which 
follow from Thought and Extension. Spinoza can commit himself to the existence of 
these humanly uncognizable things because we can understand that they are 
cognizable by the infinite intellect. 
If this route is to be successful, it must avoid the reliance on our having particular ideas of 
entities that are uncognizable to us, but are cognized by the infinite intellect. That is, when 
one describes the “other attributes”, for example, as “those attributes conceived by God that 
are neither Thought or Extension,” one cannot claim to have formed an idea of the particular 
attribute matching that description. This is the essence of divine deferral: one has to leverage 
their particular ideas of the infinite intellect insofar as it is understood by us and the humanly 
cognizable attributes to form a kind of general idea of “what’s in the infinite intellect.” For 
example, the idea here might match the description “an attribute that God conceives and is 
not identical with Thought or Extension” with the proviso that we cannot form an idea of the 
x.  
4.1.2. Implicit Definition and Analogy 
Another attempt to cognize other attributes indirectly is the use of implicit definition to try to 
get a grip on the relevant directly uncognizable entity. One might argue, 
 
 168 
The “other attributes” are like Thought and Extension in the following ways: they 
have modes parallel to the modes of the known attributes; they are infinite in their 
own kind; they cannot be conceived through one another; they are what God 
conceives of as constituting his essence; there are ideas of their modes in the infinite 
intellect; if we could conceive them, our ideas of them would be adequate. If you 
want an idea of the other attributes, just make a list of everything that is true of the 
known attributes and then your idea of the “other attributes” is just an idea of 
something of which all those things are true and which is not identical to Thought or 
Extension. 
The idea here is to spell out everything that the uncognizable item has in common with 
similar cognizable times in order to establish the tightest possible analogy between the two. 
If one has a full grasp on the ways that, for example, the known attributes function in 
Spinoza’s theoretical framework and a grasp on the non-identity of the putative attributes 
with the known ones, one might argue that has generated a kind of implicit definition of the 
“other attributes”. On this strategy, the transcendental items are like unobservable entities on 
some philosophical interpretations of scientific theorizing: they are understood not by being 
directly “observed” but by understanding that the role they play in Spinoza’s metaphysics. 
One might even argue on this strategy that we are in a better position with the other attributes 
than we are with other unobservables, because it is at least the case that we “observe” two of 
their class, namely, the known attributes.     
 But this fails. Like in the case of divine deferral, this strategy basically asks us to 
form an idea of some x not identical to but playing the same theoretical role as some 
cognizable items. That’s why I consider it an instance of the same general strategy as the 
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divine deferral strategy. In order for this strategy to be successful, it would need to show that 
the idea of e.g., “what the two attributes have in common” is not an idea of an attribute-
neutral entity. 
4.1.3. Critical Self-Reflection and the Via Negativa 
A supporter of Wolfson’s Subjective Interpretation who is friendly to Maimonides might 
make the following speech about God’s “real essence”: 
If we reflect on our own cognition, we recognize that it has certain limitations. We 
cognize God has having two attributes because the objects of our experience are most 
generally categorized as following from either Thought or Extension. However, since 
God’s essence is infinite, our conception of it is irredeemably flawed. At best, the 
most we can say is that God’s real essence is not identical to Thought or Extension, 
taken individually, and is in some sense identical to them, taken collectively. All we 
can be sure of is our own illusions, thus our idea of God’s essence must be wholly 
negative. 
This speech is perhaps unfair to Wolfson, because it has one glaring problem. The suggestion 
is that the real essence can only be known negatively, that is, in terms of what it is not. 
Nevertheless, it would seem reasonable to say that at least we can know that the “real 
essence” is itself an essence, that it is infinite, and so on suggesting that it has at least 
something in common with the illusory subjective attributes. However, I present the speech 
in this way merely to throw a general strategy into sharp relief. 
 Again, we can see the same basic strategy in play here, except that it has a negative, 
self-critical cast. Our idea of the “real essence” on this view is wholly negative: one can 
imagine taking the implicit definition from the previous subsection and strategically placing 
 
 170 
negations throughout. Whatever the specifics, the basic move here is the same as in the other 
two examples. Our idea of the “real essence” must amount to the idea of “some x that is not 
Thought or Extension and is not conceived by the finite intellect and is not…” where we 
have ideas of Thought, the finite intellect, and logical relations like negation, conceived in 
attribute-specific ways. The question is whether we can have the relevant general idea of 
“some x” that meets this wholly negative description. 
 Of course, this strategy may rely on decidedly un-Spinozistic interpretation of what 
“negative” claims amount to. Spinoza does not seem to think of negation as a truth-functional 
device, as we might. For example, in the TIE, Spinoza writes, 
[…] the names given to things that are only in the intellect, and not in the 
imagination, are often negative (for example, infinite, incorporeal, etc.), and also 
from the fact that they express negatively many things that are really affirmative, and 
conversely (for example, uncreated, independent, infinite, immortal). Because the 
contraries of these are much more easily imagined, they occurred first to the earliest 
men, and they used positive names. We affirm and deny many things because the 
nature of words— not the nature of things—allows us to affirm them. And in our 
ignorance of this, we easily take something false to be true. (TIE, 89) 
In other words, those employing the “via negativa” strategy will need to assure themselves 
that they are not merely affirming a positive commitment to “other attributes.” 
4.1.4. The “Infinity” of God’s Attributes  
Finally, one might argue that we can get a grip on the existence of other attributes because 
we understand God to have “infinite” attributes. For example, one might number the 
attributes that we can cognize (2) and then claim that “God has more than 2 attributes, and in 
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fact more than we could ever count.” This strategy is similar to the one discussed in 4.1.2: the 
idea is that we can form a general idea of “attribute” and then say how many entities satisfy 
that general idea. Or, one may argue that we can cognize that God has other attributes 
because we can cognize God as an infinite being. An infinite being, one might argue, cannot 
have finitely many attributes, so the God’s Perspective Interpretation is correct. 
 Of course, this indirect route rests on an interpretation of Spinoza’s usage of 
“infinite” that I dispute elsewhere.92 Spinoza is clear that the infinite should be treated as 
something that it is inappropriate to count and that God ought not to be conceived as 
“divided” into an innumerable collection of attributes. So, it’s not clear how an idea of God’s 
infinity will help us cognize the existence of other attributes. To cognize God as infinite is to 
cognize God as being unlimited or as lacking no attributes.  
 In any case, this strategy’s success seems to rest on our ability to form a general idea 
of God’s attributes or essence so that we can form a general idea of the count of those 
attributes or the “infinity” of that essence. 
4.2. The Requirement for Generality of Thought 
The four examples of indirect routes of cognition all employ the same basic philosophical 
move. They all claim that one can form some general idea of “some [uncognizable] x” that is 
related to an abstract from what we can cognize. 
Some interpreters (Curley 1969, 153) have pointed out that there is at least one text 
pertaining to the “other attributes” wherein Spinoza, at least prima facie, explains his 
                                               
92 See Section 4 of my “Spinoza’s Theory of God’s Attributes: a Textual Analysis” 
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epistemic relationship to the “other attributes” in terms congenial to this strategy. In text we 
discussed in Chapter 1 from the Short Treatise, Spinoza writes, 
After the preceding consideration of Nature, we have so far been able to find in it 
only two attributes which belong to this all-perfect being. And these attributes give us 
nothing to satisfy us that they are the only ones which constitute this perfect being—
on the contrary, we find in ourselves something which openly proclaims to us the 
existence, not merely of a great many, but of infinitely many perfect attributes, which 
must belong to this perfect being before it can be said to be perfect. […] This 
something…can only come from the infinite attributes themselves, which tell us that 
they are, but not what they are.93 
Here, a God’s Perspective Interpreter will read Spinoza as saying that we know that there 
exists some x that has all of the features of an attribute but is not identical to Thought or 
Extension. (We might formalize this claim as: ∃𝑥(𝐴𝑥 ∧ 𝑥 ≠ 𝑡 ∧ 𝑥 ≠ 𝑒), where A corresponds 
to a general idea of “being an attribute”, and t and e name Thought and Extension.) Other 
interpretations might claim that we know that God has a distinct real essence or that there are 
attribute-neutral properties. Though we know enough about these entities to know that they 
exist and that they count as “attributes” or “essences” or “extensional properties”, we don’t 
know what these entities are: we cannot know the uncognizable features that distinguish 
them from one another and from those entities we cognize.   
 The central question the God’s Perspective Interpretation is whether Spinoza allows 
for the formation of general ideas: ideas that are formed from some kind of reflection on the 
                                               
93 From Spinoza’s note 3 on Part I Chapter 1. One might also cite Letter 56, where Spinoza discusses his 
ignorance of “other attributes.” In Section 4.2 of Chapter 1,  I argue that neither text suffices to show that 
Spinoza was committed to other attributes. 
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commonalities between their cognizable instances that can be conjoined with other ideas (say 
of existence and logical relations like negation) to represent their uncognizable instances as a 
collection of entities falling under some description. These general ideas must in addition be 
characterized only in attribute-specific terms: any “general idea” cannot be an idea of 
something that underlies or overlaps the attributes and their modes. I will now argue that all 
available textual evidence suggests that Spinoza rejected the existence of these general ideas. 
According to Spinoza, all thought consists of ideas of particular things. Descriptions 
purporting to cause us to have general ideas in fact only cause us to have particular ideas. In 
addition, these particular ideas are of no help in indirectly cognizing the uncognizable. 
4.3. Spinoza on Abstraction  
In this section, I will briefly describe two accounts of “abstraction” that are present in 
Spinoza. The first is an account of “abstraction” on which the word denotes an essentially 
confused imaginative process. I will call this the process of forming “common images.” 
Spinoza discusses this account of “abstraction” only to dismiss it as inherently flawed: 
forming an imaginative model of what a class of things has in common does not suffice to 
give one knowledge about what those things have in common. The second is an account of 
“abstraction” on which the word denotes the process of reasoning itself, that is, the 
intellectual process of forming clear and distinct ideas of that in which a collection of things 
“agrees.” It is clear that the God’s Perspective Interpretation requires “general ideas” to refer 
to the “common notions” formed by this second kind of abstraction and not the confused 
ideas produced by the first kind. I will ultimately argue that we cannot form the common 
notions we would need to cognize OA, SI, ANO and ANS. 
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4.3.1. Common Images: Abstraction through Confusion 
In most cases, Spinoza uses the word “abstraction” to denote a confused, imaginative 
process. I will briefly describe that process (insofar as it can be gleaned from Spinoza’s text) 
and then I will explain why it is confused. 
 Imagine attempting to form the general idea of “human being” by imagining what 
different human beings have in common. This process involves both ignoring what 
distinguishes human beings and focusing on what they have in common. To abstract this 
way, one might try to mentally focus on the shared features of a number of different human 
beings. One person might notice that the humans they imagine all walk upright, have a 
relatively large brain, two kidneys, and so forth. Another might notice that all the humans 
they survey have hair on top of their heads but no fur, have roughly the same skin tone, have 
four limbs, and so forth. Depending on which humans one surveys, they will form a different 
idea of what a “human” is in general. In each case, however, the idea formed will be different 
because we will inevitably survey different classes of humans when trying to imagine “what 
they have in common” (2P40s).  
 What will these ideas be like? One can only answer for oneself. However, Spinoza 
suggests that these ideas will inevitably be more confused than the ideas of the instances 
from which they are formed. What would it be to imagine a being that has just the features 
common to all human beings? How tall would it be? What shape would it be? What skin 
color or gender would it have? Spinoza seems to think that a general idea of “human” 
imagined in this way will either have to arbitrary features that answer these questions or will 
somehow lack these features, if such a thing is imaginable in the first place. 
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 In any case, these “general ideas” will ultimately be images, or what I’ll call 
“common images.” Common images are the product of the imaginations attempts to abstract 
an image of something that resembles every input of that abstraction. The images are 
common in that they resemble each of their “instances”—and I mean “resemble” in a strictly 
sensory way. 
 Spinoza worries in various places across his work that this kind of “abstraction” is 
both confused simultaneously taken to have philosophical value.  Platonists, Spinoza seems 
to think are most guilty of taking this route of abstraction. For example, Spinoza warns us in 
the Preface to Part IV of the Ethics that some philosophers create “models” of beings in this 
way and then go on to suggest that these “models” are prior in Nature to actual natural things. 
Spinoza seems to have in mind (his understanding) of Plato’s forms. The worry is that 
philosophers claim to have “universal notions” of the forms of things because they can form 
confused images of what a class of things has in common.  
According to Spinoza, this confused process is usually obscured by the way that his 
rivals use technical language. According to Spinoza notions that are sometimes called 
“universal,” “transcendental,” or “Second” and are intended to be “general” in the sense that 
they are meant to be ideas of multiple objects of a common class. Spinoza gives the example 
of putative ideas corresponding to “transcendental” words like “Being, Thing, and 
something” and words signifying “universal notions” like “Man, Horse, Dog” and so on.  In 
the TIE, Spinoza calls these warns us of thinking in terms of these confused “abstractions.” 
(19, 21, 75, 76, 93) 
If these words signify common images, and Spinoza thinks that they must, they must 
signify highly confused images. We’ve seen earlier that the idea of “Man” must be highly 
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confused. But imagine what the idea of “Being” would have to be. What does literally 
everything that exists have in common? How can we be sure that, in attempting to imagine 
this commonality, that we have considered everything?  Spinoza regards this as obviously 
impossible: the imagination can only form a small and finite number of images at once 
(2P40s). 
 If OA, SI, ANO,,  and ANS signify common images, then they are of no use in helping 
us cognize the uncognizable. First, they are the result of an imaginative process. However, 
Spinoza denies that the imagination can form an idea of, for example, an attribute. Second, 
they will inevitably be particular images that vary from person to person. This suggest that 
they cannot be appropriately called “general.” And finally, because common images are 
supposed achieve “generality” in virtue of resembling a collection of other images, they are 
of no use to the God’s Perspective Interpretation. For example, since Spinoza is clear that 
attributes cannot be conceived through one another, it’s not clear how a single image could 
“resemble” two attributes. 
 I do not see a reason to believe that Spinoza took this to be the only model of what 
someone might call “abstraction.” Spinoza does not claim to be able to read the minds of 
those that he disagrees with. Instead, it appears that the “common image story” is intended to 
be a diagnosis of what is going on in the cases where we claim to form “universal notions” or 
“abstract ideas.” Here, I think Spinoza’s challenge to the reader is to show how they manage 
to achieve the generality of thought with the imagination: that is with the use of images and 
words. Because the imagination is finite and inherently flawed, according to Spinoza, it does 




 This is not to say that Spinoza denies the impossibility of “general thought.” In fact, 
he takes a certain kind of “general” thought to be the basis of all reasoning and key to 
forming the kinds of knowledge that he is after in the Ethics. Spinoza claims that we can 
form “common notions” with the intellect that are actually more clear and distinct that the 
ideas from which they are formed. The God’s Perspective Interpretation, then, must show 
that the “general ideas” they take Spinoza to be able to produce are common notions and not 
some confused kind of abstraction. I will now argue that they cannot do that.  
4.3.2. Common Notions: Abstraction via the Intellect 
In this section, I want to clarify the idea of a “common notion” both by briefly characterizing 
it and by contrasting it with the idea of a “common image.” I should note right at the start 
that what precisely a “common notion” is the subject of a great deal of discussion among 
Spinoza’s interpreters.94 However, what I say here does not rest on any controversial specifics 
about what “common notions” are and how they work. I am only interested in two properties 
of common notions: (1) they are formed from conceiving what some class of entities has “in 
common” and (2) they are more adequate than the ideas from which they are formed. 
 It will be helpful to begin with an example of a common notion before jumping into a 
characterization of common notions. At 2P37, Spinoza introduces talk of “common notions” 
                                               
94 See e.g., Wilson (1996, 114), Curley (1973, 357), Pollock (1880,150-1), Savan (1958, 217), Melamed (2000, 
9-11), Melamed (2009, 75), Matson (1990, 87), Bennett (1984, Section 11.3), Schliesser (2014), Schliesser 
(2017), Schliesser and James (2011), Schoen (1977), Peterman (2014) 
What I say here is friendly to Huebner’s (2015, 8-11) discussion of the “generality” of common notions. On my 
view, the generality of common notions is equivalent to their being identically present in the complex idea of 
their “instances.” This is consistent with Spinoza’s belief that “all thought is particular” because the common 
notions are particular ideas. In Spinoza, thought cannot be “general” in the sense that one can have an “idea of” 
some collection of things without (1) ideas of some of the instances of that collection and (2) by using some of 
those instances as prototypes resembling other ideas in that class.  
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and refers the reader to L2 in the physical discursus of Part II as an example of a “common 
notion.” At L2, Spinoza writes, 
L2: All bodies agree in certain things. 
Dem.: For all bodies agree in that they involve the concept of one and the same 
attribute (by D1), and in that they can move now more slowly, now more quickly, and 
absolutely, that now they move, now they are at rest. 
Here, Spinoza suggests that what bodies have “in common” is (1) that they belong to the 
same attribute, namely Extension, and (2) that they all are in a state of motion or rest. At 
2P38, Spinoza goes on to clarify that this is true not only of composite bodies (e.g., human 
bodies) but also of their parts. Common notions, in other words, are of features that are 
“equally in the part and in the whole.” This latter fact is of course entailed by the generality 
of common notions like L2. 
 This is why Spinoza tells us that common notions are not ideas of the essences of 
“singular things” (2P44c2d), but are instead of a collection of things. For example, there is no 
“common notion” of a particular body. Common notions are that with respect to which a 
collection of things agrees. In the example above, the common notion of motion-and-rest is 
equally in a body and all of its parts and is that in virtue of which that body and other bodies 
(including its own parts) “agree” (2P38). For another example, 2P40s2 cites the common 
property of proportionals that Spinoza cites from Euclid. Spinoza seems to think that the 
axioms and theorems of geometry would also be examples of notions common to all 
extended things. Our ideas of attributes, of course, will also be common notions and indeed 
the most common because all bodies are extended things and all minds are thinking things. 
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 It is key to note that the common notions are apparently not formed by merely 
imagining what a class of things has in common. Instead, they seem to correspond to 
commonalities between different things that can be used in the process of reasoning about 
those things. Spinoza’s law-like, axiomatic expression of common notions (e.g., in the 
Physical Discursus of Part II) suggests that common notions allow us to make inferences 
about a class of things.  
This is likely why Spinoza insists that common notions, unlike common imagines, are 
more adequate than the ideas from which they are derived (e.g., 2P38). For example, my idea 
of “something common to all bodies,” like the attribute of Extension, will be more adequate 
than my idea of any given singular body. This is why forming common notions amounts to 
“reason” and the “second kind of knowledge” for Spinoza. If we were not able to form 
adequate ideas of what singular things have in common, we would not be able to “distinguish 
the true from the false” (2P42s). 
The key features of common notions are that (1) they are ideas of what the intellect 
conceives as the common features or “agreements” among of a class of things, (2) they are 
ideas that allow us to reason and form knowledge about those things, and (3) they are more 
adequate than the ideas from which they are formed. Because Spinoza believes that the 
intellect “is the same in all men” (2P18s), he also believes that two people can have the same 
common notion, or at least a common notion that is distinct only in virtue of being present in 
a distinct mind and because of some distinction among the ideas themselves. That is why (4) 
common notions are general not only in virtue of representing agreements, but also in virtue 
of being identically present in different intellects. 
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4.3.3. Common Notions or Common Images? 
The key question, then, is whether the general ideas corresponding to OA, SI, ANO and ANS 
correspond to common notions or common images. If they correspond to common images, 
then our purported indirect representations of uncognizable entities are not representations of 
those entities at all. They are merely confused images of bodily states associated with certain 
words in memory. So, if the general ideas are to be any help in our cognition of the 
“indirectly cognizable” entities, they ought to be common notions. 
Strictly speaking, one can only answer this question for oneself. Spinoza does not 
claim to be able to read minds. However, I will argue that though we cannot be certain 
exactly what is someone’s mind when they consider OA, SI, ANO or ANS, we can prove in 
each case that it cannot be a common notion. 
 As was noted before, Spinoza is explicitly clear that transcendental notions, expressed 
with words like “some,” “being,” and “thing” correspond to confused common images. So, it 
is already clear that the expressions I’ve been using to characterize the general ideas in OA, 
SI, ANO and ANS —all of which rely on the use of quantification—must correspond in part to 
common images and not notions. However, I will allow that there are perhaps other ways of 
expressing the general ideas that need not rely on transcendental terms or the device of 
quantification. Perhaps, for example, one can express her commitment to the “other 
attributes” by using terms for numbers, e.g. “There are more than two attributes.” 
 Having said that, certain notions must be employed to express the relevant ideas 
involved in commitments to the uncognizable. Those notions, for example of “attribute” and 
“essence” are formed from ideas that we can have like of Thought and Extension. So, I will 
focus on examples of words of these types. 
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 There are presumably as many purported common notions as there are purported 
routes to the indirect cognition of uncognizable essences, attributes, and neutral properties. 
I’m going to focus on three for the sake of brevity: the putative notions of attribute, essence, 
and duration, with the last one serving as an obvious example of an attribute-neutral 
property. In each case, I will argue that there cannot be common notions corresponding to 
these terms. They must either correspond to common images or ideas of cognizable entities. 
These examples can be used as a model for how Spinoza would handle other “general ideas.” 
4.3.4. Common Notions of “Attribute” or “Essence” 
If SI1, SI2, and OA are cognizable via general ideas, then it must be that we can form 
common notions of their otherwise uncognizable entities. That is, we would need a common 
notion of “essence” in the case of SI and a common notion of “attribute” in the case of OA.  
It is clear that, insofar as we have an adequate idea of God, we have ideas of Thought 
and Extension, the two known attributes. The question is whether there is a common notion 
of “attribute” or “essence” that is not just the idea of Thought or the idea of Extension. If 
there is a common notion, there ought to be some “agreement” between Thought and 
Extension of which we can from a simple idea. However, it appears that there can be no such 
agreement since, as Spinoza is clear throughout Part I of the Ethics, the attributes “have 
nothing in common with one another” (1D3, 1P2, 1P10). In other words, there is not some 
property—being an attribute—that Thought and Extension of which we can have a common 
notion.  
Furthermore, the purported common notion of an “attribute” or “essence” would, 
because it is common to both attributes, have to be more adequate than the ideas of the 
individual attributes. Given that these attributes are the essence of God and are that through 
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which we have an adequate idea of God, it’s not clear that we can achieve ideas that are more 
adequate than our ideas of the attributes (2P46, 2P47).  
By extension, words like “other attributes” or “the real essence of God” or “all of the 
non-Thought, non-Extension attributes conceived by the infinite intellect” and so on must 
inevitably correspond to some idea or image that is not a common notion. In some cases, it 
could be a confused common image, or it could be just the image of the words themselves, or 
it could be of something cognizable like Thought or Extension. What these words are 
associated with depends on the person and the context.  
 These considerations suggest that we cannot cognize OA or SI, even if they are 
understood to refer indirectly to some class of uncognizable things. 
4.3.5. Common Notions of “Attribute-Neutral” Entities 
Similar considerations apply to the purported general ideas of attribute-neutral entities. 
Consider first the entities described by ANO. Because there are perhaps infinitely many such 
entities, I will focus on one example: duration. In order to form a general idea of duration, 
one would have to have an idea of some “agreement” between the duration of bodies and the 
duration of minds. On the surface, this may seem plausible since the duration of these items 
might be represented with the same imaginative aids: number, time, and so on (Letter 12). 
However, Spinoza is clear that because the attributes have nothing in common with one 
another, nothing that follows from one of them has anything in common with anything that 
follows from the other attribute (1P10, 2P6). There is therefore no “agreement” between 
them that can serve as the object of a common notion.  
 This suggests that attribute-neutral language, including words like “mode,” 
“substance,” “cause,” “duration,” and so on, either corresponds to ideas of entities under the 
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known attributes or to a confused common image produced by trying to ignore the 
distinctions between those ideas. However, there can be no common notions that cross 
attributes. Therefore, no such “general idea” can be used to indirectly cognize attribute-
neutral entities.  
 Terms that appear to signify attribute-neutral entities must therefore refer to attribute-
specific entities. For example, “duration” must refer to the duration of a thought or the 
duration of a body specifically and not some property that both thoughts and bodies have in 
common. Perhaps a more accurate, though inelegant, expression would be “durationT” or 
“durationE.” 
 In the case of the “substrata” of ANS, the situation is even worse. The problem is that 
because we cannot consider anything except as falling under an attribute (1P10s), it’s not 
clear that we can form the idea of particular substrata, stripped of their attributes, and then 
form a notion of what they have in common. What is “common” to these substrata is their 
attribute-specific properties. Of course, we might claim to deny attribute-specific properties 
of these substrata, but given that we must conceive everything under an attribute, it’s not 
clear that such an idea could exist in the first place. Merely saying “a mode with its attribute-
specific features removed” does not suffice to cause one to have an idea of an attribute-
neutral substratum. 
4.3.6. Is Spinoza’s Theory Meaningless? 
In Sections 3 and 4, I have argued that we cannot cognize the commitments of the God’s Eye 
Interpretations, according to Spinoza’s theory of cognition. In other words, we cannot form 
ideas of what the words “other attributes,” a “real essence,” or “attribute-neutral entities” are 
intended to refer to either in particular or in general. If this is correct, then Spinoza’s theory 
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of cognition requires that his theory of God’s attributes be at least partially meaningless. This 
suggests that God’s Perspective Interpreters must believe that either Spinoza didn’t really 
believe one or both of these theories, that he took his theory of cognition to be inapplicable to 
his own philosophical system, which in turns suggests that he was not a systematic 
philosopher, or that Spinoza held foundational ideas about God and human thought that are 
simply inconsistent with one another. These conclusions ought to make us suspect whether 
the God’s Perspective Interpretation is charitable to Spinoza.  
5. Conclusion: The Cognizability and Meaningfulness of Spinoza’s Theory 
How did we get in this position? It seems to me to be the direct product of how God’s 
Perspective Interpreters approach Spinoza’s text. Because they end up ascribing humanly 
uncognizable commitments to Spinoza, it must be that they want to isolate Spinoza’s theory 
of cognition from his metaphysics. Because his metaphysical theory describes the most 
fundamental parts of reality, they might argue, we ought to begin with an interpretation of it 
before worrying about how dependent beings like humans think about those parts of reality.  
 But if we ignore how Spinoza’s system accounts for the nature of human thought and, 
by extension, how that system accounts for thought about philosophical issues, we open up 
the possibility that our interpretation of Spinoza’s metaphysics will ascribe to him views that 
his theory of cognition takes to be uncognizable. In other words, if we deny the general form 
of the Cognizability Condition, we open up the possibility that Spinoza’s own system will 
violate that condition. It seems to me that the only way to avoid this pitfall is to start with 
Spinoza’s theory of cognition, see what it says about how we understand his other theories, 
and then go about the work of interpreting those other theories with that characterization of 
human thought in mind. 
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 If we take this route and assume that Spinoza was a systematic thinker who didn’t 
hold inconsistent beliefs about his central doctrines, we adopt the Human Perspective 
Interpretation. In this chapter, I’ve tried to show that we can arrive at the Human Perspective 
Interpretation from a highly intuitive starting point: if we assume that Spinoza took himself 
and his readers to be able to make sense of his system, then we must assume that the 
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